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Abstract 
This thesis reports the results of both normative and empirical investigations into human 
conditional reasoning, i. e. reasoning using if... then and related constructions. 
Previous empirical investigations have concentrated on experimental paradigms like 
Wason's Selection Task, where subjects must assess evidence relevant to the truth or falsity 
of a conditional rule. Popperian falsification provided the normative theory by which to 
assess errorful behaviour on these tasks. However, it is doubtful whether this is an 
appropriate normative theory from which to derive a competence model of human reason- 
ing abilities. 
The relationship between normative theory and competence model need not be direct, no 
more than the relationship between competence model and performance needs to be. How- 
ever, research in this area has imported a theory directly into individual psychology from 
the philosophy of science. On the apparently orthodox assumption of directness, continued 
adherence to this import may stand in need of re-assessment in the light of the quite radical 
descriptive inadequacy of falsification as a model of rational scientific inquiry. However, 
this model also possesses the virtue of relating the interpretation of the rule directly to the 
normative task strategy. 
Hence, this thesis has two aims: first, to retain the virtue of a direct relation between nor- 
mative task strategy and interpretation while simultaneously offering a competence model 
which is consistent with more recent and descriptively adequate accounts of the process of 
scientific inquiry. In Part I, this will involve introducing a semantic theory (situation 
semantics) and showing that the process of inquiry implicit in this semantic theory is con- 
sistent with recent normative conceptions in the philosophy of science. 
The second aim is to show that the competence model derived in Part I can provide a 
sound rational basis for subjects' observed patterns of reasoning in conditional reasoning 
tasks. In Part II, chapter 5, the data obtained from the Wason Selection Task using only 
affirmative rules is discussed and the behaviour observed rationally reconstructed in terms 
of the competence model of Part I. A central concept of that model is partial interpreta- 
tion (motivated by concerns of context sensitivity). 'Prima facie evidence for partial 
interpretation is provided by the observation of defective truth tables. However, in condi- 
tional reasoning experiments using negated constituents, this evidence has been interpreted 
differently. A subsidiary aim of Part II (which will constitute the largest section of this 
thesis) therefore concerns the empirical demonstration of the consistency of this data with 
the competence model. 
-iv- 
Contents 
Chapter 1: Introduction 1 
1.1 Current positions 1 
1.2 Points of departure 3 
1.3 Destinations 6 
1.4 The structure of the thesis 7 
Part I: Competence 9 
Chapter 2: Situation Semantics 10 
2.1 Introduction 10 
2.2 Situation Semantics 10 
2.2.1 Partial interpretation 11 
2.2.2 Information conditions 12 
2.3 Situation theory 12 
2.3.1 Situations 13 
2.3.2 Relations and states of affairs 13 
2.3.3 Facts and Partiality 14 
2.3.4 Saturated, unsaturated and parametric soas 15 
2.3.5 Appropriate assignments, anchors and proper anchors 16 
2.3.6 Situation types 16 
2.3.7 Restrictions 17 
2.3.8 Constraints 17 
2.3.9 "=I": The precludes relation 21 
2.4 Inference and Information Gain 23 
Summary 25 
Chapter 3: The Theory Justified 27 
3.1 Introduction 27 
3.2 The problem of objective causal dependencies 28 
3.2.1 Hume 28 
3.2.1.1 A Kantian digression 30 
3.2.2 The "Humean" view 31 
3.2.3 Goodman 32 
3.2.4 Two "solutions" 37 
3.2.5 The demand for analysis 38 
3.2.6 Cartwright 40 
3.2.7 Stalnaker 43 
3.2.8 Localism vs Globalism 47 
3.3 Below "causal" constraints and attunement 49 
3.3.1 Error and projectibility 50 
3.3.2 Dispositions and conditional promises 51 
3.3.3 Moral obligations and social conventions 55 
3.4 Induction and information gain 58 
3.4.1 The predictive cycle 58 
3.4.2 Are constraints falsifiable? 63 
Summary 65 
Chapter 4: The Selection Task: Re-interpretation 67 
4.1 Introduction 67 
4.2 Inference: Deductive, Eductive and Inductive 68 4.2.1 Content and information gain 70 4.2.2 Disjoint vs unified rules and belief bias 74 
. o. 
4.3 Confirmation, surveyable domains and the COST 78 
4.4. Partial interpretation and defective truth tables 84 
4.4.3 Philosophical postscript on falsification 89 
4.4.4 Syntactic vs semantic proof procedures 93 
Summary 96 
Part II: Performance 97 
Chapter 5: The Affirmative Selection Tasks 98 
5.1 Introduction 98 
5.2 Examples 99 
5.2.1 Non-taxonomic case: My hall light 99 
5.2.2 Taxonomic case: Johnny and the pipes 104 
5.3 The abstract results 108 
5.3.1 The therapy experiments 112 
5.4 The thematic facilitation results 116 
5.4.1 Thematic facilitation and pragmatic context 121 
Summary 126 
Chapter 6: The Evans Negations Paradigm 127 
6.1 Introduction 127 
6.2 Critical review of work using Evans negations paradigm 128 
6.2.1 Truth table construction and evaluation tasks 128 
6.2.2 Selection Tasks 140 
6.3 A situation theoretic analysis of conditionals containing negations 146 
6.3.1 Taxonomic constraints 146 
6.3.2 Non-taxonomic constraints 147 
6.4 Introduction to the experiments 152 
6.4.1 Construction tasks 152 
6.4.2 Selection task 154 
Summary 155 
Chapter 7: The Experiments 156 
7.1 Introduction and overall design 156 
7.2 Experiment 1: Abstract Construction Task 156 
7.3 Experiment 2: Thematic Construction Task 168 
7.4 Experiment 3: Abstract Selection Task 188 
7.5 Experiment 4: Thematic Selection Task 198 
Summary 206 
Chapter 8: Conclusions and Consequences 208 
8.1 Introduction 208 
8.2 Conclusions 208 
8.3 Theories of conditional reasoning 210 
8.4 The computation of context 214 
8.5 Implications for the human cognitive architecture 217 
References 221 
-vi- 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This thesis is about human conditional reasoning. The conditional if... then construction is 
central to formal attempts to characterise inferential processes in logic. However, relative to 
normative logical theories the human data presents a problem. Human conditional reasoning 
appears beset by various non-logical biases apparently reflecting the influence of content 
(cf. Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972; Evans, 1982), -memory (Griggs & Cox, 1982), prior 
beliefs (Pollard & Evans, 1981), resource limitations (Johnson-Laird, 1983) and attentional 
processes (Evans, 1983a). Thus, normative conceptions of rationality appear radically at 
odds with people's observed facility for logical thought. This state of affairs has been 
taken to license the paradoxical conclusion that the only organism apparently capable of 
formulating systems of pure deductive reasoning, may, after all, be an irrational animal (eg. 
Stich, 1985). 
1.1 Current positions 
Within Cognitive Psychology/Cognitive Science this situation has lead to a range of possi- 
ble responses. First there is a division between Pragmatic and Rationalist approaches. On 
the pragmatic view (eg. Evans, 1982), people may have no generalisable unlearned facility 
for abstract formal reasoning (cf. Evans, 1982). Reasoning is bound to content and limited 
by selective attention processes (Evans, 1982,1983a). People are rational, but only in the 
sense that they are well adapted to their environment. On this view competence models 
which could provide a rational basis for real human reasoning are unlikely to be found. 
Subjects can only be classified as falling into error if an appropriate adaptive function for a 
putative limitation on the cognitive system cannot be identified. 
Henceforth, by "competence model" I will mean the following to be understood. A com- 
petence model is usually derived from some normative theory, be it semantic theory, proba- 
bility theory, decision theory or whatever. However, a competence model will also have 
additional bounds placed " on its scope in virtue of common sense assumptions concerning 
the nature of human cognition. For example, standard logic licenses an infinite list of infer- 
ences from any set of premises, none of which would be drawn by any human reasoner (cf. 
Johnson-Laird, 1986b). Hence, common sense and the known empirical data also enter into 
the constructive process. In the end, in reasoning research (as opposed to language 
production and comprehension) the result should be a model of rationality. It should 
specify the range of inferences one could (reasonably) expect someone to draw, without 
necessarily specifying anything about how people actually draw them, which is of course 
the domain of performance. 
Rationalists adopt a point of view diametrically opposed to the pragmatist (Henle, 1962; 
Braine, 1978; Johnson-Laird, 1983,1986a, 1986b; Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Cheng et al, 
1986). People do possess an ability for abstract reasoning, however there are at least three 
competing rationalist positions which differ in attitude towards the relationship between 
competence and performance. For mental logicians (Heule, 1962; Braine, 1978) formal log- 
ics constitute not only the normative theories from which competence models are derived 
but also, once implemented in the cognitive system, the actual mechanisms of inferential 
performance. Characteristic errors and biases are put down to errors of interpretation or a 
lack of a particular inference rule. Thus, error is still possible in a system operating solely 
on logical principles. 
Mental modellers, on the other hand, allow that although normative formal systems are 
partly constitutive of competence, additional bounds need to be placed on rational perfor- 
mance by various resource limitations (Johnson-Laird, 1983,1986a, 1986b). This concep- 
tion (described above) also allows that although competence should be respected by perfor- 
mance, the mechanisms which underlie performance need not be provided by logic per se 
(Johnson-Laird, 1986a: 21). Rather, semantic procedures for inference based on mental 
models are proposed which mirror the observed complexity of human inference patterns. 
Although logic is not being employed, logically pristine performance is possible. However, 
limitations on, eg. working memory, will lead to characteristic errors and biases. 
A third position holds that although performance is capable of abstract reasoning, this need 
not be bound by the dictates of any competence model. This is the view implicit in the pro- 
posal for the existence of domain specific pragmatic reasoning schemas (Cheng & 
Holyoak, 1985, Cheng et al, 1986). On this view abstract reasoning is specific to particular 
pragmatic knowledge domains. In contrast both mental logicians and mental modellers pro- 
pose domain independent mechanisms for inference. On the pragmatic reasoning schemas 
view, the characteristic errors and biases observed in human reasoning are the result of the 
inability to access the appropriate schema, or perhaps the elicitation of the wrong schema. 
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1.2 Points of Departure 
The aim of this thesis will be to develop a competence model of the inferential processes 
involved in conditional reasoning tasks which is adequate both to the data and to certain 
normative conceptions of rationality. The motivations for this goal came primarily from a 
dissatisfaction with the assessment hat subjects may being doing something irrational on 
conditional reasoning experiments based on Wason's (1966) selection task. Falsification 
(Popper, 1959) was taken as normative in this task. However, in the philosophy of science, 
falsificationism has been recognised as descriptively inadequate for sometime. The com- 
petence model to be proposed here will share many of the features of Evans (1982) prag- 
matic approach. But obviously it is more aligned with the concern of both the mental logi- 
cians and modellers, to provide adequate characterisations of what the cognitive system 
needs to compute as precursor to modelling performance (Johnson-Laird, 1986b). Before 
indicating how these aims are to be achieved, I will render explicit the grounds for my dis- 
satisfaction with falsification. 
The principle experimental paradigm which has fueled speculation concerning the abstract 
reasoning abilities of human agents has been Wason's selection task (Wason, 1966). In this 
task subjects must assess evidence relevant to the truth or falsity of a conditional rule. They 
are presented with four cards and a conditional rule: if p one side, then q on the other side. 
The upwardly turned faces of the four cards correspond to the logical possibilities: p, -, p, 
q, -, q. In ignorance of the downwardly turned face the subjects' task is to turn only those 
cards they must in order to determine the rule's truth or falsity. In accordance with the dic- 
tates of the normative theory provided by Popperian falsification, which derives directly 
from the semantics of the material conditional (and the implicit universal quantifier), sub- 
jects should turn just the p card and the -q card. This is because, logically, these are the 
only cards with the potential to falsify the eile and, logically, conclusive verification of the 
rule is impossible (at least in an infinite domain, cf. chapter 4). The empirical finding using 
abstract material is that subjects tend to turn the p and the q card or the p card only. This 
response profile accords with a verification strategy whereby subjects are looking only for 
potentially verifying p, q combinations. Relative to the competence model represented by 
Popperian falsificationism, this behaviour is irrational. 
Falsificationism is a strategy, grounded in formal logic, for the testing of scientific 
hypotheses, specifically scientific laws. The program which falsification was partly a reac- 
tion against was Logical Positivism (Camap, 1923,1950; Hempel, 1952,1965). The logical 
positivists held a view of meaning derived from Hume and Mach which maintained that the 
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meaning of an expression was given by its empirical mode of verification. Popper's obser- 
vations were anti-positivistic in the sense that although one may falsify with certainty, logi- 
cally one could never verify, with. similar certainty (but cf. above). However, 
falsificationism was at least residually positivist in the sense that Popper was still commit- 
ted to the view that scientific theories and their mode of testing could be formalised. Condi- 
tionals and their logic are central to this enterprise since they could provide the means of 
formally specifying the structure of scientific or causal laws. Understanding the semantic 
structure of scientific laws is a prerequisite for an understanding of how they can be 
confirmed. For the logical positivists, a law was simply a universally quantified -material 
conditional which could receive inductive support via the formal definition of a relation of 
confirmation which held between instances and a law (cf. chapter 3). Popper retains the 
analysis of laws but replaces confirmation with falsificationism and "corroboration", ie. a 
law which has withstood our earnest attempts to falsify it, is well "corroborated" (cf. 
Popper, 1959). A central observation which conditions the position to be adopted in this 
thesis concerns the fact that within the philosophy of science such attempts to formalise the 
testing of scientific laws has been rejected as descriptively inadequate for almost 30 years 
(Toulmin, 1961; Kuhn, 1970, originally 1962; Lakatos, 1970; Putnam, 1974; Feyerabend, 
1975). 1 
The philosophy of science is the contemporary locus of discussions of epistemology. Cog- 
nitive Science has its origins in "Epistemics" (Goldman, 1986): the study of epistemology 
which takes the cognitive resources of the knowing agent into account. Contemporary 
views of the scientific endeavour are particularly sensitive to the historical evidence on the 
progress of science. And in the historical record it is clear that falsificationist strategies play 
a very minor and intermittent role in scientific inquiry (Kuhn, 1970; Lakatos, 1970). These 
issues in the philosophy of science bear on two perennial concerns: scientific realism and 
rationality. Psychological interest in reasoning research also centres on human rationality 
and psychology has traditionally drawn on models in the philosophy of science to function 
as sources of prediction in psychological tasks. This suggests a rather direct relation 
between a normative theory governing the group activity of science, and a competence 
model of what individual subjects should do on particular reasoning tasks. I think this 
orthodoxy is open to question, but not radically. Competence models of rationality are at 
liberty to modify by common sense, the technical aspects of a normative theory, but 
nonetheless the central principles governing rational behaviour in both domains remain 
unchanged. My own view is that mutual influence between these two domains would be the 
ideal, after all have they have similar goals: to understand how we come to know and rea- 
son about our world. However, the traffic has usually been from philosophy of science to 
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the psychology of reasoning. And in the light of this apparent orthodoxy, if the evidence 
suggests that certain models in the philosophy of science are descriptively inadequate rela- 
tive to their own original domain of application, then this might suggest that they should 
not be taken as normative in conditional reasoning tasks. However, the search for more 
enlightening competence models in psychology need not abandon the philosophy of sci- 
ence. 
Contemporary philosophy of science is a fertile area for the identification of appropriate 
alternative competence models of conditional reasoning. Moreover, its contemporary con- 
cern for descriptive adequacy concerning the processes of inquiry scientists actually employ 
should provide for psychologically valid competence models. Scientific laws are generali- 
sations involving content. They relate regularly occurring events in the world to other regu- 
larly occurring events. It will be shown in chapter 3 that empiricist attempts to reduce the 
notion of causal law to less problematic concepts fail, causal relations form part of the 
structure of our world and are not reducible to logical or probabilistic concepts. Knowledge 
of these relations is fundamental to the ability of organisms to act and react effectively and 
efficiently to their environment. ie. to act adaptively and therefore rationally. It is these 
causal and kindred relations which we describe in language using the conditional construc- 
tion. 
This is a familiar view of the semantics of conditionals which finds its origins in Goodman 
(1983, originally, 1947 & 1955) and Quine (1950). In discussing counterfactual condition- 
als Quine observes that: 
(1.1) "Any adequate analysis... must consider causal connections, or kindred relation- 
ships, between matters spoken of [ie. content] in the antecedent of the conditional 
and matters spoken of in the consequent" (Quine, 1950: 14-15). 
In the logic of conditionals it is now a common-place that even the semantics of the indica- 
tive conditional is inadequately rendered by the material conditional of standard logic 
(Nute, 1984; Stalnaker, 1984). Hence, Quine's suggestion can be seen to hold equally for 
the indicative as well as the subjunctive and contrary-to-fact conditional. In order to ade- 
quately characterise the respects in which various conditionals employed in psychological 
tasks differ, it would be convenient if a semantic theory existed which took Quine's obser- 
vations and those made concerning scientific laws as the basis for a semantic theory of con- 
ditionals. Situation semantics (Barwise & Perry, 1983, Barwise, 1986) adopts just such a 
position. In situation semantics the locus of meaning is provided by constraints, ie. lawlike, 
causal or explanatory relations which hold between contents. Situation semantics can pro- 
vide a system of classification which will permit the identification of some important 
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contrasts between the various conditional rules employed in psychological tasks. The direct 
connection between situation theory and a contemporary conception of scientific laws in the 
philosophy of science will also permit the identification of the strategies of confirmation 
appropriate to conditional rules describing irreducible lawlike relationships or constraints. 
1.3 Destinations 
The principle novelty of the present research inheres in the juxtaposition and application of 
ideas rather than in any new innovation of my own. The principle semantic theory which 
supports this research is put to novel use in empirical research. By locating this view in 
the contemporary literature in the philosophy of science and conditional logics, a model of 
the inductive process is developed which may have the virtue of psychological plausibility 
while cohering both with the normative literature and a semantic theory. Five specific 
applications will prove central to applying this competence model to the empirical results 
on human conditional reasoning. 
First, scientific or causal laws play a central role in predicting and explaining the world. 
The process of predicting the unknown from the known and thereby gaining information is 
traditionally classified as eductive inference (cf. chapter 4). This serves to contrast the 
inferential role of the conditional exploited below with its more familiar logical role. 
Second, a view of the inductive process will be outlined which is licensed by the need to 
ground human inferential procedures in actual constraints in the world and which is con- 
sistent with recent conceptions in the philosophy of science. This will identify an alterna- 
tive model to falsification as the rational procedure subjects should adopt in tasks like 
Wason's selection task. 
Third, an important distinction will be drawn between those laws or constraints which 
apply to instances or single occurrences of events and those which relate discrete events. It 
will be shown how situation theory provides different interpretations for these cases and 
how this distinction may lead to subjects' misinterpreting the conditional rules in standard 
versions of the selection task. 
Fourth, it will be shown how negations function differently between these two types of 
constraint. This will prove central to providing a rational basis for the results obtained in 
conditional reasoning paradigms where negations are systematically ý varied between 
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antecedent and consequent. 
Fifth and last, the conception of scientific laws recently emergent in the philosophy of sci- 
ence holds that they are fundamentally context sensitive (Hacking, 1983; Cartwright, 1983). 
This position is also taken with regard to constraints in situation semantics. One conse- 
quence of this view is that interpretation is partial, ie. there can be truth value gaps. This 
means that false antecedent instances are generally irrelevant to a conditionals truth or fal- 
sity. It is a common observation in truth table tasks (eg. Johnson-Lain! & Tagart; Evans, 
1972) that subjects typically adopt just this interpretation which is described as a "defective 
truth table". Since this empirical observation is central to the competence theory, most of 
the empirical work to be reported in this thesis involves re-assessing the import of research 
on defective truth tables in the light of a competence model which provides a rational basis 
for the observed behaviour. 
1.4 The structure of the thesis 
The structure of the Thesis will mirror the distinction between competence and perfor- 
mance. Part I, on competence, will begin in chapter 2 by introducing situation semantics. 
This will serve to provide a classificatory scheme which can then be employed in later 
chapters to characterise the important differences between rules used in various psychologi- 
cal tasks. It will also serve to introduce the distinctions which will prove central to provid- 
ing a rational basis for at least some of the empirical findings on human conditional reason- 
ing. 
In chapter 3, the problems raised by empiricism for the conception of objective dependen- 
cies in the world will be discussed. This will serve two functions. First to justify the con- 
cept of irreducible causal laws which provides the motivation for the situation theoretic 
concept of a constraint. Second, to identify and resolve further problems which emerge for 
this semantic theory. This chapter will also include a model of the inductive process 
licensed by this conception of causal laws. The competence model developed here was 
equally motivated by consideration of the psychological data. 
In the preceding chapters the restrictions of presentation order precluded detailed discussion 
of the psychological motivation. In chapter 4 this imbalance is redressed. But first the con- 
ception of inference licensed by-the developing competence model is located in the tradi- 
tional classification of modes of inference. It is shown how the model provides a rational 
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basis for some of the data which provided the principle psychological motivation for its 
development. Two further domains of competence are then looked at. The first relates to 
some versions of the selection task which employ non-standard procedures and where facil- 
itation of the falsificatory response has often been observed using abstract material. The 
grounds for this facilitation are located in the specific procedures used which may imply 
that they are exceptional cases where strategies appropriate to small closed domains are 
applicable. The implications of partial interpretation and the defective truth table (Wason, 
1965) are then discussed. It is argued that the consequences of this empirical observation 
have been seriously underestimated in the literature. 
Part II, on performance, begins in chapter 5 with a discussion of the data on selection tasks 
which employ only affirmative rules. The results are then provided with a rational basis in 
the competence model. In this chapter certain process factors need to be introduced to clar- 
ify the model's intended import. The model is also given a name: Pragmatic Context 
Theory. The results obtained when employing thematic content are also introduced and the 
facilitation of the falsificatory response observed shown to be within the scope of pragmatic 
context theory. 
In chapter 6, the results obtained by Jonathan Evans and his colleagues when systematically 
varying negations between antecedent and consequent are introduced and critically dis- 
cussed. The interpretation put on this data (especially Evans, 1983b) is at odds with that 
provided by pragmatic context theory. Precise hypotheses are therefore formulated which 
may empirically distinguish between pragmatic context theory and the position taken by 
Evans (1972,1979,1982,1983b). In chapter 7, the results of these experiments are 
reported. 
In chapter 8, the conclusions licensed by this research are outlined and the consequences 
for existing theories of conditional reasoning discussed. Some speculations on the nature of 
the general cognitive architecture which would be consistent with the conclusions of this 




Chapter 2: Situation Semantics 
2.1 Introduction 
There are two principle reasons for introducing situations semantics. First, there is a need 
for a system of classification in order to characterise the semantic/pragmatic content of con- 
ditionals. This is required to identify the respects in which the semantics of conditional 
rules used in psychological experiments differ. Second, the reasons for introducing situa- 
tion semantics in particular are tied to the preliminary outline presented in chapter 1, of the 
kind of competence theory psychology requires. Following Quine (1950), it was suggested 
that the kind of theory psychology needs must take subject matter or content into account. 
This also accords with the preliminary observations made in chapter 1 concerning the evi- 
dence on the psychological importance of content in human reasoning experiments. Another 
aspect of those results which was highlighted in chapter 1, concerned the apparent partiality 
of subjects' interpretations of conditionals. This functions as a further motivating factor in 
introducing situation semantics. Content and partiality are central to the situation theoretic 
perspective. 
2.2 Situation Semantics 
Semantics is about assigning bits of the world to sentences. In model theoretic semantics 
this is done by defining an abstract model of the world (this may include bits of the mind, 
cf. intensional logics) which can be systematically assigned to parts of a language via a 
recursive definition which defines a truth predicate for that language. The world is modeled 
using the'resources of set theory. However, the objects and relations which can be defined 
in set theoretic terms may provide to coarse grained an account to get at subject matter 
(Barwise, 1986). Hence, a prior requirement is to develop an account of the contents of the 
world which can subsequently be used to provide a semantics for natural language. This is 
the enterprise of situation theory. The current stage of development is informal in the sense 
that there is no mathematical model of situation theory. As it stands, situation theory is a 
formalism for talking about the world from the situation theoretic perspective. It is this for- 
malism which will be introduced in this chapter. 
First, by way of further motivation, some observations will made on how situation seman- 
tics views partiality and content. 
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2.2.1 Partial interpretation 
Partial interpretation was introduced in the last chapter via the observation that in many 
experiments there is evidence that people take some conditions to be irrelevant to the truth 
or falsity of a conditional. This phenomenon can be captured logically by allowing a third 
truth value and redefining the truth tables for the connectives accordingly (cf. Haack, 1975). 
Alternatively, bivalence can be retained but truth relativised to knowledge or information 
states (Kripke, 1965). This is the option taken by Kripke (1965) in providing a semantics 
for intuitionistic logic. The idea has been taken up again recently by Veltman (1985,1986). 
An information model (Veltman, 1985,1986) contains a partially ordered set of information 
states each consisting of a set of atomic propositions. A partial valuation function assigns 
truth values to these propositions. "Partial" here means that for some propositions the 
valuation function, which takes propositions as arguments, is undefined. Hence, partiality is 
captured while retaining bivalence. The recursive truth definition for the connectives is 
defined relative to information states and specifies conditions on the valuation function 
which must obtain for the connective to, be true ̀  or false (both must be defined since 
although there are only two truth values the valuation function is undefined for some pro- 
positions). 
In Veltman's system truth is relativised to an epistemic concept, ie. truth on the basis of the 
evidence. We can contrast the situation theoretic concept of a situation with the concept of 
an information state. An information state is a psychological concept. Whereas, a situation 
is a local part of the world. A situation can be viewed as an individuated fragment of the 
world to which an agent may attend at any given time. The limits on a situation are given 
by an agents perceptual/attentional resources. So, a situation is' somewhere in between a 
purely psychological something and reality. What someone attends to in a situation may 
well depend on prior knowledge but the situation is not defined in terms of what that per- 
son knows. More will be said on the status of situation theoretic objects in the next chapter. 
For the moment, situations can be contrasted with information states insofar as the former 
but not the latter are taken to be real parts of the world. 
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2.2.2 Information conditions 
A major point of contrast is that rather than unstructured atomic propositions, the situation 
theoretic equivalent to the valuation function is defined over structured objects which 
describe the contents of a statement. This marks a shift in emphasis away from truth condi- 
tions and towards information conditions. Situation theory is attempting to provide an 
account of informational content, it, therefore, wants to provide an account of the condi- 
tions under which a statement is informational. This contrasts with having propositional 
content as the primary goal. Here the concern is to provide an account of the conditions 
under which a statement is true. The difference is that although if a statement is informa- 
tional then it is true, it is not the case that if it is true, then it is informational. 
This can be seen via the additional observation that truth conditions are relative to language 
or some other representational scheme, eg. a representational mental state. However, infor- 
mation is representation independent. Smoke carries the information that fire whether any- 
one represents the fact or describes it in language. Because of this real world relationship 
an utterance "smoke" can carry the information that there is fire. If it does carry this infor- 
mation on a particular occasion of use, then "smoke" is true. Whether it does or not is 
determined by the structure of the world. And whether it is informational for any individual 
is determined by whether they are attuned to that structure. This is the principle motivation 
for proposing a semantic theory which talks about content. The relations which license 
information flow hold between particular parts of the world. 
Of themselves, these twin motivations make situation semantics of psychological interest. 
Both factors, partiality and content dependence, are common observations in the psycholog- 
ical data (for a complete justification of this claim cf. chapter 4). The formalism which 
attempts to capture these properties will now be introduced. 
2.3 Situation theory 
The following account of situation theory is based on unpublished manuscripts by Barwise 
(1987) and Israel & Perry (1987). The reason for not using a standard text, for example 
Barwise & Perry (1983) or Barwise (1986), is due to the state of flux in which situation 
semantics currently finds itself. The need to fully articulate situation theory as a precursor 
to a full blown situation semantics is a relatively recent realisation. Moreover, the richness 
of the more recent, but admittedly preliminary, formulations will be required later on. It 
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would be a marked step forward in providing an empirically adequate semantic theory if 
the psychological applications to be discussed were in turn to motivate aspects of the theory 
itself. With this in mind, possible, but minor, extensions to the theory will be proposed. 
These extensions will all be based on the need to characterise some aspect of the 
semantics/pragmatics of conditional sentences as they appear to influence the psychological 
data. 
2.3.1 Situations 
Situation Theory is committed to the existence of a concrete, structured reality. Reality has 
parts, called situations but does not include possible ways the world may have been. How- 
ever, reality can include mental states corresponding to ways people believe the world to 
be. But that people possess these mental states is as much a fact about the world as the 
existence of mind independent physical states. Situation Theory is not committed to there 
being a largest total situation of which all others are parts, it is a localist theory (cf. 
chapter. 3). 
23.2 Relations and states of affairs 
In order to analyse reality some system of classification is required which for the purposes 
of semantic theory reflects how that reality is individuated. This will include domains of 
situations {s, s'... ), relations {R. R... }, spatio-temporal locations {l, 1'... } and individuals 
{a, a'... }. 
A relation R comes with a set of argument roles. The relation of traveling, for example, 
comes with the roles of, traveler, mode of transport ("mode"), destination and location of 
traveling. Locations may be spatially and/or temporally extended. -
Individuals or objects must be of the appropriate sort to play these roles. The traveler must 
be an animate object, the mode is obvious, ie. bike, car, plane etc., destination a physical 
location. 
Given an appropriate assignment of objects to its roles, a relation gives rise to an issue con- 
cerning whether or not the objects stand in that relation. There are two possibilities, each 
called a state of affairs (soa). 
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For example, take the relation of traveling, let Johnny be the traveler, train be the mode, 
Manchester be the destination and the 20th April 1988 be the location (henceforth: 1), then 
the following two soas arise: 
(2.2) <<Traveling, 1: 20-4-88, traveler: Johnny, mode: train, destination: Manchester; 
1», and 
(2.3) <<Traveling, 1: 20-4-88, traveler: Johnny, mode: train, destination: Manchester; 
0» 
(2.2) resolves the issue positively, whereas (2.3) resolves it negatively; (2.2) has positive 
polarity, and (2.3) negative polarity. Normally argument roles are suppressed and, hen- 
ceforth, they will not be included in descriptions of soas. The objects assigned to the vari- 
ous roles are called the minor constituents and the traveling relation in this soa is the major 
constituent. soar are the structured objects which enables situation theory to characterise 
content. 
2.3.3 Facts and Partiality 
A fundamental relation in situation theory is "I=", the holds-in relation. If an soa a holds in 
a situations, ie. 
(2.4) sIa 
then a is a fact. If a's dual (same assignment of constituents but different polarity) holds in 
s, then this can be expressed as: 
(2.5) s 1-, a 
Situations are only partial bits of the world. Therefore, for any given issue a situation s 
may resolve ß positively, or negatively, or s may fail to resolve the issue one way or 
another. The converse relation "1/=" for "does not hold in" expresses this. If neither a nor 
its dual - holds in s, this can be expressed: 
(2.6) s I/= a, s I= -, a 
This aspect of "1=" mirrors the partial valuation function for Veltman's information models 
previously discussed. The general form of a proposition is a pair. s 1= a, which can be true, 
false or undecided. 
Since, situations are only partial bits of the world, one situation s can be part of another 
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situation s'. Hence, another fundamental relation is "<", the part-of relation. 
(2.7) s< s' 
This is the case iff-. 
(2.8) If sIa, then s' I= a. 
However, there may be no situation s such that all other situations are part of it, ie. there is 
no "maximal" situation. This is equivalent to the partial ordering over information states in 
Veltman's information models. The important difference is that, whereas a chain of infor- 
mation states always ends in a complete, "maximal", information state, this is not the case 
for situations. 
23.4 Saturated, unsaturated and parametric soas 
In a saturated soa there is an appropriate assignment of some object to every argument 
role, as in (2.2) and (2.3) above. Thus, (2.2) would be the interpretation of the assertion 
that: 
(2.9) Johnny traveled to Manchester by train. 
In an unsaturated soa one (or more) argument role(s) is not assigned an object, for exam- 
ple: 
a: <<Traveling, 1, Johnny, ??, train; 1» 
Here it still makes sense to say that there is a situation s, such that au holds in s, ie. s I= 
q U. 
That assignments can be partial expresses the fact that sometimes it is not possible, or 
it may not be important to fully describe a soa, it nonetheless raises an issue which can be 
resolved. So, a would be the interpretation of the assertion that 
(2.10) Johnny traveled by train. 
This situation relates to the two relations above in an intuitive way. For any situation s, s 
I= au iff there is some s' such that s< s' and s' I= ßu. So an unsaturated soa holds in 
situation s iff s can be incrementally extended to a situation s' such s is a part of s', and in 
s' the destination role is filled in some appropriate way. 
However, sometimes although precisely where Johnny traveled may not be important that 
he traveled somewhere is. In this case a parameter must be assigned to the argument role: 
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(2.11) <<Traveling, 1. Johnny, x, train; 1» 
So, a domain of parameters: x, y, z... is required (these function rather like free variables); 
these are enboldened to distinguish them from individual constants: a, b, c..., and possibly 
bound variables x, y, z... (2.11) would be the interpretation of the assertion that: 
(2.12) Johnny traveled somewhere by train. 
Parametric soas ("psoas") are denoted "E". 
2.3.5 Appropriate assignments, anchors and proper anchors 
Argument roles place restrictions on assignments such that they are appropriate. For exam- 
ple, the mode argument role restricts assignments to modes of transport, so train, car... etc. 
are appropriate assignments whereas, Manchester, table, the number 77... etc. are not. 
It does not make sense to ask whether a psoa holds in a given situation. Nonetheless 
parametric claims can be made about a situation, eg. (2.12). However, to determine 
whether. 
(2.13) sk <<Traveling, 1, Johnny, x, train; 1». 
requires x to be filled. Parametric argument roles are filled using anchors; possibly partial 
functions from parameters to objects. Anchors are to parameters what assignments are to 
argument roles. Let E(destination: x) denote the psoa in (2.11). That an anchor f anchors 
this psoa can be written E(destination: x)[ J. If f: x I-> Manchester, then f is said to be 
proper as Manchester is an appropriate sort of thing to fill this role. 
2.3.6 Situation types 
Psoas can be used to generate situation types. For example, (2.11) is a psoa E: 
(2.14) E: <<Traveling, 1, Johnny, x, train; 1» 
A type T, where the generating type is given by E. is expressed as T. and when a situation 
s is of type T. this is written s: TT. A situation is of a given type T, if there is an anchor 
for the parameters of the generating psoa E (2.14), such that s 1= E[f]. 
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It is not necessary to generate types only from psoas. To preserve generality, it can be 
allowed that non-parametric soas can also generate types, eg. 
(2.15) a: <<Traveling, Johnny, Manchester, train; 1» 
These can be seen as a special case. Henceforth, only parametric types will be discussed, 
so the unmarked term "type" will be restricted to parametric types. Later on, if a non- 
parametric type is introduced, it will be explicitly marked. 
This provides a dimension of generality versus specificity on types. Types generated from 
non-parametric soas are clearly the most specific. All argument roles have specific consti- 
tuents assigned. A type generated from a psoa whose argument roles are all assigned 
parameters is clearly the most general type. There is a dimension of variation between these 
two extremes dependent on the number of argument roles assigned parameters. 
2.3.7 Restrictions 
Restrictions can be placed on anchors such that only anchors which also satisfy the restric- 
tion will be admitted as proper anchors for restricted parameters. So for example, in (2.11), 
it could be further specified that x be restricted to British travel destinations, ie. any anchor 
for x must also provide an anchor for. 
(2.16) «British travel destination, x; 1» 
This concept of a restriction will prove important later on in defining taxonomic constraints. 
2.3.8 Constraints 
The class of relations which produce constraints are central to the situation semantic 
account of meaning and information. Constraints control the flow of information within a 
situation. Being attuned (cf. below) to a constraint allows people to draw inferences to gain 
information about their world. Constraints are based on involves relations. There are many 
involves relations, some of the important ones are as follows: 
Dl=>: INVOLVES-LOGICALLY 
[a]=>: INVOLVES-ANALYTICALLY 
[n]=>: INVOLVES NOMICALY 
[C]=>: INVOLVES-CONVENTIONALLY 
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These relations take types as arguments. A constraint is a soa based on an involves relation 
and having positive polarity. For example, (2.17) is a ubiquitous constraint. 
(2.17) «[i]=>, TE, T'r; 1» 
If a situations supports (2.17), then s: TT involves s being of the consequent type s: T'Z,. 
That is, any anchor f for the parameters of TZ can be extended to an anchor g which also 
anchors the parameters of T'Z,. 
The following example of an analytic constraint instantiates the schema in (2.17), let: 
E: ' <<Traveling, 1, x, y, z; 1», and 
E': «1Kode_of_transport, I, x; 1» 
Then the following is an analytic constraint 
(2.18) «[a]=>, T., T'Z.; 1» 
This constraint is unconditional. Any traveling event will involve the traveler employing a 
mode of transport, be it his legs, a train, bus etc. There are no other conditions which need 
to be fixed before inferring that a mode of transport is being employed if a traveling event 
is taking place. However, most constraints are conditional, a situations supports such a 
constraint only ifs supports some other types. 
For example, if an object is unsupported it falls, expresses the constraint that being unsup- 
ported involves falling. This can be expressed as the following nomic constraint: 
X. <<Unsupported, 1, x; 1», and 
E': «Palling, I, x; 1» 
Then the following is a nomic constraint: 
(2.19) «[n]=>, T., T'z.; 1» 
However, this constraint can only be supported in a situation where there is zero gravity. 
So, all situations which support (2.19) must be of type T"Z,,, where: 
E": «Zero-gravity, l; 0» 
This can be expressed by allowing the general form of a constraint to be a ternary relation: 
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(2.19 «[i']=>, TE, T',, T'-r,; 1» 
T,: is called the indicating type, T' v the indicated type and T",:  the background or con- 
necting type. 
The background type can be complex. When a situation supports a constraint many other 
background types will also be fixed, ultimately their precise nature may be inefable. This 
captures the conditional nature of most constraints. Some constraints are ubiquitous in so 
far as they hold in all situations. Perhaps some high level physical laws are ubiquitous in 
this sense. Of the conditional constraints where one or more background type needs to be 
fixed, some are more conditional than others. The more background types which would 
need to be fixed the more conditional it is. The ubiquity or conditionality of a constraint 
should not be confused with the generality or specificity of the related types. 
The arguments of a constraint are usually quite general types. In a particular situation the 
parameters of these types will be anchored to specific objects. Capturing this is why the 
background type was also described as the connecting type. Additional more specific types 
may be included in the background or connecting type which explicitly place restrictions on 
the anchors for the indicating and indicated types. These types connect the constraint to a 
specific instantiation. So, for (2.19), T",  may include: 
T",,: «Johnny's ball x; 1» 
This restricts any anchor f for the indicating and indicated type such that f. x I-> Johnny's 
ball. 
It is not always the case that constraints are defined over the most general types. For exam- 
ple, suppose you are disposed to buy a newspaper on your way to work. This can be 
expressed as the following dispositional constraint: 
E: . «Going to_work, ], you; 1», and 
E': <<Buying, 1, you, x; 1» & «newspaper, 1, x; 1» 
Then the following is a dispositional constraint: 
(2.20) «[d]=>, TT, T'Z,; 1» 
This constraint is specific in so far as it cannot be expressed as the instantiation of any 
more general constraint. When this is the case it is inappropriate to describe it more gen- 
erally, and then add further connecting types. The higher level generality is misleading: 
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going to work does not involve buying a newspaper, unless you are disposed to do so. 
A special case is where the parameters of the indicated type are included in the parameters 
of the indicating type. For example, someone, say Johnny, may be disposed to travel to 
Manchester only by train. This can be described by the following constraint: 
TI: : <<Traveling, 1, Johnny, Manchester, z; 1», and 
T'r : <<train, z; 1» 
C: <4d]=>, TT, T',; 1» 
Here the parameter z in T' is included in the parameters of T. When a situation s I= C, 
then if s: TV], then s: T'(f1. It is the same anchor f which must anchor both indicating and 
indicated types, this contrasts with (2.20) where there are additional parameters in the indi- 
cated type not included in the indicating type. In C the indicated type adds restrictions on 
appropriate anchors for unassigned minor constituents in the indicating type. 
Constraints of this form will be called taxonomic. This is because they induce a restriction 
on an anchor f to a token a such that if a is of the indicating type then a is also of the indi- 
cated type. Such restrictions give rise to a class inclusion hierarchy in the obvious way. 
Taxonomic constraints do not form a separate class: the constraint C is dispositional, but it 
is of taxonomic type. To mark this the nomenclature "[dd=>" will be used. 
Taxonomic constraints serve to encode the distinction between involves relations which 
ascribe properties to instances of objects or single occurrences of events rather than relating 
discrete occurrences. C describes single occurrences of traveling events, which are res- 
tricted such that the mode parameter can only be anchored to tokens of the type train. In 
non-taxonomic constraints discrete events are related, by some higher order involves rela- 
tion. This distinction will prove central in providing a rational basis for peoples' behaviour 
on various conditional reasoning tasks in subsequent chapters. 
Constraints are higher level relations. Along with the involves relations already introduced 
there may be other slightly lower level kinds. For example, within the conventional con- 
straints a permission involves relation will be found. Qua relation, constraints also impose 
restrictions on proper assignments to the argument roles which can be filled by types. For 
example, the permission relation will demand that the indicating type be an action and its 
indicated type a precondition. So, for example, that to enter the Phillipines involves having 
been inoculated against cholera may be expressed as follows, making the argument roles 
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explicit: 
Ti «Enter, Phillipines, x; 1», and 
T'r: <dnoculated, Phillipines, x, cholera; 1» 
(2.22) «[pm]=>, action: T, precondition: T' E.; 
1» 
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Constraints are the situation theoretic objects which function as the interpretations of condi- 
tionals in situation semantics. In general conditional sentences are interpreted as proposing 
the existence of a constraint. However, there may be no 1-1 mapping between constraints 
and conditionals sentences. This can be understood by analogy with the inference rules 
which logic attaches to the conditional construction. Different inference rules will apply 
dependent on the subjunctive or indicative mood of the conditional, or perhaps in tense 
logic on the temporal relationship which holds between antecedent and consequent. By 
anology, dependent on what contextual. information is available either directly in the 
environment or indirectly in an agents prior beliefs, a conditional may propose different or 
multiple constraints to be operative within a given situation. Exampling this phenomenon 
will be postponed to later chapters, where it will prove central to explicating the rational 
basis of peoples' inferential behaviour in conditional reasoning tasks. 
23.9 "=I": The precludes relation 
The precludes relation is a primitive relation in situation theory, although it is fundamen- 
tally related to the involves relations. Preclusion also takes types as arguments in exactly 
the same way as the involves relations. 
(2.25) «[&I, TE, Tr; 1» 
If a situation s supports (2.25), then s: TE precludes s being of the consequent type s: T',,. 
That is, any anchor f for the parameters of TT can not be extended to an anchor g which 
also anchors the parameters of T'r" 
The preclusion relation captures the fact that many events may be related to each other but 
in a negative way. In the causal case, events may be positively or negatively causally 
related. For example, smoking causes heart disease, and exercise prevents heart disease. As 
the involves relations concern the positive relations between events, so the precludes 
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relations concern the negative relations. 
(The 
rest of this chapter is not concerned with situa- 
tion theory per se, but rather using it to characterise some distinctions which will prove 
important in subsequent chapters. We will begin by looking at how negative soas function 
to identify contrast classes. 
Take a previous example: 
(2.26) <<Traveling, I, Johnny, Manchester, car; 0» 
What is the cognitive significance of assigning negative polarity to this soa? The force it 
possesses depends on which constituent is focused upon. In natural language negative focus 
is usually marked by intonation. So let us look at the way this works in natural language. 
The stressed word is enboldened 
(2.27) Johnny didn't travel to Manchester by car. Jo 
ýWwj yJ£- ýý ky 
J, m 
(2271 Johnny didn't travel to Manchester by car. 
(227") Johnny didn't travel to Manchester by car. 
(2.27") Johnny didn't travel to Manchester by car. 
In each of (2.27) - (2.27"') intonation serves to identify which minor constituent is being 
denied. Each constituent is an appropriate assignment to some argument role. And the argu- 
ment roles serve to identify the relevant contrast class. In (2.27), it is denied that Johnny 
traveled to Manchester by car, so the relevant contrast class is modes of transport, ie. 
Johnny traveled to Manchester by some mode of transport other than the car. In (2.27'), it 
is denied that Johnny traveled to Manchester by car, so the relevant contrast class is travel 
destinations, ie. Johnny traveled by car to some destination other than Manchester. In 
(2.27"), it is denied that Johnny traveled to Manchester by car, the relevant contrast class 
is traveler, ie. someone else other than Johnny traveled to Manchester by car. (2.27"') indi- 
cates that the whole traveling event did not occur. For (2.27) - (2.27"), focus can be 
encoded by placing a negative restriction on anchors for a particular constituent. For exam- 
ple, take (2.27): 
fß(2.26) 
<<Traveling, I, Johnny, Manchester, x; 1» & «Car, 1, x; 0» 
For n-ary relations, if the soa has negative polarity, then it can be assumed that the issue 
raised concerns whether a whole event defined by the major constituent held in a particular 
situation. 
The relations which act as major constituents of soas may function differently with respect 
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to their domains of complementation. For example, (2.29) 
(2.29) «Mode, 1, x; 1» & «Car, 1, x; 0» 
identifies a full contrast class consisting of modes of transport other than cars. This will 
include sub types: train, aeroplane etc. of which individual trains, aeroplanes etc. are 
tokens. However, many relations may not identify such extensive contrast classes but rather 
may define other gradations of a continuum. For example: 
(230) «Zero-gravity, I; 0» 
serves to identify a soa where gravity has some positive value. Similarly, the dimension of 
variation may be dichotomous: 
(231) «Stationary, 1, x; 0» 
identifies a positive soa where x is in motion. These antonymic cases maybe contextually 
defined. For example: 
(2.32) «Serves-drinks, 1, Mary, x; 1» & <<Tea, 1, x; 0» 
The dimension of variation is drinks, but in a context where Mary serves tea she is unlikely 
to serve cocktails, so perhaps coffee is the most likely contextually defined antonym. 
Preclusion serves to identify why various background types need to be specified for a con- 
straint to hold in a situation. If the duals of any background type held in a situation, then 
they would preclude the indicating type of the constraint from holding. Thus, for a situation 
to support the constraint in (21) concerning unsupported objects falling, it must also sup- ? 
port the condition in the background type that gravity is non-zero. This is because if gravity 
were zero, this would preclude an object from falling. 
2.4 Inference and Information Gain. 
"Inference" in situation theory concerns the constraints between mental states which permit 
those states to track reality. Diagram 1, taken from Barwise (1984), serves to illustrate this: 
There are constraints which hold between various mental states and states of the world. 
Types of mental state are denoted "`YT". So a constraint which holds between mental types 
and types in the world is given by C: `YT => T. If an agent a is in mental state `Yß which 
is of type `PT, then this is normally because there is an actual state of affairs a which is of 
type T. In Barwise (1984), for a to be attuned to a constraint C': T => T' amounts to the 
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Diagram 2.1 Inference and Information Gain in Situation 
Semantics. 
corresponding constraint ̀ PC': `YT => `YT' being actual. This constitutes a's disposition to 
infer T' on learning T and is what keeps "his mental state 'in synch' with reality" (Bar- 
wise, 1984: 23). 
a will gain information if the diagram commutes ie. on transiting to mental state To' of 
type TV from To of type TT, T' is actual. This will depend on whether the background 
types are appropriately anchored in the situation. If T' is not actual then, this carries the 
information that one of the background types did not hold. This information could initiate 
inquiry into which background type it was. The order of search may be determined by fam- 
iliarity with possible reasons for a constraint not holding. This represents moving into the 
domain of psychology and process. Diagram 1 can be used to characterise the central prob- 
lem for a psychology which views transitions between mental states to be a computational 
process. Distinct from Barwise's (1984) treatment, a clear separation is best retained 
between the transitions which occur between mental states and constraints. The cognitive 
system must be able to make various transitions from one mental state to another. 
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However, for these transitions to constitute effective strategies for acting in the world, they 
must commute with the operative constraints. It is misleading to characterise the transitions 
as constraints themselves. The nature of the mechanisms which support inference, ie. the 
transitions between mental states which systematically track the operative constraints in the 
world, is a matter for psychology. 
Real world constraints purportedly specify a dynamics which would, in the right cir- 
cumstances, involve transitions from soas of type T to soas of type T'. This is because 
they specify something about the actual dynamic structure of the world. However, the fun- 
damental problem for a computational psychology is to specify a similar dynamics for tran- 
sitions between mental states. Two questions are raised. First, what are the mental mechan- 
isms which allow mental states to track real states and the transitions between them in the 
world? Second, what is it to become "attuned" to the operative constraints in the world 
such that mental states can be seen to respect the semantics being developed in situation 
theory. The traditional answer to the first question is mechanised proof theory (Fodor, 
1975; Fodor, 1987, Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988). In the conclusions the viability of this 
approach will be questioned. The Fodorian position also adopts an answer to the second 
question (Fodor, 1975,1980) which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
The traditional solution is also closely allied to a position which radically questions the 
coherence of the view outlined in diagram 1. Empiricism holds that it is fundamentally 
misguided. The only real transitions which occur are the psychological inferential ones. 
"Real world" transitions are merely projections onto an unstructured world of our tenden- 
cies to make inferences. As a first move in the direction of answering some of the psycho- 
logical questions posed above, the tension between these positions needs to be resolved. 
Their resolution will fundamentally affect the way in which the psychological questions 
about learning and inference are addressed. 
Summary 
In subsequent chapters the formalism of the theory will prove less important than the con- 
ceptual foundations which will be discussed in the next chapter. The technical detail will be 
required however. In, for example, chapter 5 some detailed worked examples will be 
employed to render absolutely explicit how the situation theoretic view of inference as 
information gain permits a rational foundation for psychological findings on human condi- 
tional reasoning. These accounts will also rely upon the distinction between taxonomic and 
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non-taxonomic constraints. Their principle role will be to encode the psychologically 
important distinction between thinking about instances or single occurrences of events pos- 
sessing two properties and discrete events being related by higher order relations. The 
manner by which argument roles permit the encoding of the relevant contrast classes 
defined by a negative soa will also prove central to providing a rational basis for psycho- 
logical behaviour on conditional reasoning tasks when negations are systematically per- 
muted between antecedent and consequent. A similar role will be played by the preclusion 
relation. 
In the next chapter the concept of a constraint is located in the philosophical literature. This 
has two purposes. First, to justify the concept. Second, to show its relevance to the issues 
surrounding scientific hypotheses, but more particularly scientific laws and their 
confirmation, which are of central concern to the principle psychological task which will be 
investigated in subsequent chapters. 
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Chapter 3: The Theory Justified 
3.1 Introduction 
Problems for situation semantics derive from the fact that the model outlined at the end of 
the last chapter flies in the face of the last 300 years of philosophy. Due to the empiricist 
theory of meaning adopted by Hume (taken from Locke) a deep seated skepticism was 
induced concerning the existence of objective causal dependencies in the world. Unlike 
individuals, relations were not ontologically respectable. They could not be treated as primi- 
tive but were to be analysed or otherwise reduced to set theoretic constructs, to probabili- 
ties, or to psychological somethings. A second problem, relates to the move made by situa- 
tion semantics to treating the interpretation of all conditionals as proposing the existence of 
"constraints", ie. law-like, explanatory or causal relations. While it may be reasonable to 
treat some conditionals as asserting the existence of relations, eg. those imputing a causal 
connection between antecedent and consequent, it seems a considerable leap to treat all 
conditionals as referring to real world relations. 
Two questions need to be initially separated. First, can the skeptic be answered over the 
need for objective causal dependencies? Second, can Barwise and Perry legitimately 
bootstrap up to the position whereby all conditionals can be treated as referring to depen- 
dencies of a common species with causality? These questions will be dealt with separately 
and in the order indicated. It will be found that being able to answer the second question in 
the affirmative relates rather directly to having something to say about the role of experi- 
ence. The relations of which people have experience legitimise their inferences. This 
involves the old Humean problem of Induction. The question posed is what role does 
induction play in learning and can this process be used to justify our use of knowledge of 
these relations to make predictions? It will be discovered that providing an alternative 
answer to Nelson Goodman's New Riddle of Induction provides the answer to whether 
those boots can be appropriately strapped. 
Since Hume, many attempts have been made to reduce statements about causal relations to 
some other less problematic concept. The arguments that will finally establish the need for 
objective causal dependencies rely on showing that two philosophically "received" views of 
how to achieve this reduction entail a circular appeal to the concepts of causal laws, 
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dependencies or powers. However, Hume is the starting place. What he had to say not only 
established the problem space, but will also figure in part of the resolution of the problem. 
Care will have to be taken in assessing arguments as philosophical standards change over 
the centuries and have indeed changed recently. The issue concerns the demand for analysis 
as opposed to possibly psychologistic responses to philosophical problems. This issue will 
be discussed as and when it arises. 
The problem is to make sense of what is meant by the use of particular causal statements, 
let el, e2 be token events: 
(3.1) el caused e2 
Attempted solutions involve analysing many other related statement forms and concepts. (i) 
Universally quantified conditionals, (ii) counterfactual conditionals, (iii) scientific laws, (iv) 
law-like relations, (v) dispositions all form a conceptually related group. All have been 
appealed to in attempting a reduction of (3.1). (3.1) is either subsumed under the generali- 
ties in (i), (iii) or (iv), or is synonymous with (ii) or (v). However, I will begin with 
Hume's psychological reduction. I will then look at Goodman's (1983, originally, 1955) 
reformulation of the problem and his attempted reductions via (ii) and (iii), and the emer- 
gence of his new riddle of induction. I will then pause to consider. Goodman's and Fodor's 
responses to the riddle, where some discussion of the "demand for analysis" will be 
required. I will then outline two recent positions, one due to Cartwright (1983) and one due 
to Stalnaker (1984), which argue for objective dependencies in the manner described above. 
I will then go on to discuss the problems created for situation semantics due to the boot 
strapping maneuver. This will be followed by an attempt at a resolution of these problems. 
3.2 The problem of objective causal dependencies 
3.2.1 Hume 
The problem Hume identified was that of justifying the grounds upon which people take 
the causal relation to warrant inferences concerning future events. ie. predictions (cf. Ayer, 
1980). If the grounds are purely inductive, ie. I have observed that every B-occurrence has 
been preceded by an A-occurrence, then I have no grounds to infer that on the next A- 
occurrence a B-occurrence will follow. Any appeal to the future conforming to the past 
etc. is doomed to circularity by the need to appeal to the very inductive grounds such a 
premise is supposed to justify. However, it seems that people are led to predict B- 
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occurrences on observing A-occurrences by some necessary connection between A- 
occurrences and B-occurrences. This can not be logical necessity as it does not imply a log- 
ical contradiction to deny that a B-occurrence will follow an A-occurrence on the assump- 
tion that they are causally related (cf. Bennett, 1971: 272). Moreover, logical necessity holds 
only between propositions not to the facts therein described. Because of his empiricism, 
Hume was lead to argue that the concept of necessary connection in the world (ie. causal " 
necessity) was unintelligible. 
The theory of meaning Hume adopted was essentially Locke's. The meaning of a term was 
simply the "idea" it was associated with for an agent. For Hume, ideas were simply 
weaker, less vivid, versions of "impressions" which were the immediate data given by the 
senses. He also adopted the simple/complex distinction introduced by Locke. A term could 
either have a complex meaning or a simple meaning. If a terms meaning was complex, then 
it was decomposable into simples. If a terms meaning was simple it was associated directly 
with an idea, which was a less vivid version of an immediate sense impression. All terms 
are meaningful only to the extent that they are either simple or complex ideas. For Hume, 
the concept of "necessary connection" was unintelligible because (i) it could not be 
assigned a complex meaning, ie. it could not be decomposed into simpler parts; and (ii) it 
could not be assigned a simple meaning, ie. there is nothing in the impression of, for exam- 
ple, one billiard ball making another billiard ball move which corresponds to the necessary 
connection. To make sense of particular causal statements Hume, therefore, had to proffer a 
reduction of eI caused e2 which accorded with his semantic theory. 
All that was contained in the sense impression was the relata, and the impressions of con- 
tiguity, and priority, ie. the relata are "constantly conjoined". The question Hume addressed 
was what needed to be added in order to account for the feeling of necessitation we subjec- 
tively experience in making predictions? Two factors conditioned Hume's reduction: (i) his 
aforementioned Lockean, ideational, or empiricist theory of meaning, and (ii) his "geneti- 
cism". A genetic approach can be contrasted with an analytic approach. On the former, an 
account of, say, "cause" will involve outlining what it is that leads or causes us to make 
predictions. On an analytic account one is required to outline in what a concept, such as 
cause, consists, without implying anything about what leads people to predict (the latter is 
relegated to the level of psychological explanation). Hume finds the third ingredient in the 
self evidence of the following claim which establishes that people can have no more than 
inductive grounds for making predictions: 
(32) ".., even after the observation of the frequent or constant conjunction of objects, 
we have no reason to draw any inference concerning any object beyond those of 
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which we have had experience" (Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 139). 
Hume's solution "is that the observation of the frequent or constant conjunction of facts of 
recurring types gives rise to a habit or custom of expecting this regularity to be repeated" 
(Ayer, 1980: 66). The repeated observation of conjoined events habituates people to expect 
that a regularity will be repeated. The habit or custom, becomes so entrenched that people 
project the subjective association of ideas onto the world. Hence the belief arises that 
"necessary connections" hold between the relata themselves. This is the first statement of 
the empiricist Projection strategy regarding relational structure in the world. Causality and 
like relations are reduced to projections of the structure of the mind onto an unstructured 
reality. 
There are many points of detail which can be questioned in Hume's response. For example, 
his ideational semantic theory which drive him inwards to look for the third ingredient 
rather than outwards to natural laws perhaps. His assumption of the passivity with which 
people arrive at habits of inference which may equally be arrived at by active and cons- 
cious cogitation and conscious acceptance of a custom. The very notions of contiguity and 
priority no longer seem essential to the concept of "cause". No modem philosopher would 
wish to beg the question against backwards causation, nor contemporary scientist give up 
the notion of action at a distance (cf. Bennett, 1971). However, the reductive projection 
strategy has survived the years since Hume and this is in no small measure due to the syn- 
thesis of empiricism and rationalism bought about by Kant. 
3.2.1.1 A Kantian digression 
Hume's position is often characterised as a skeptical solution to a skeptical problem, ie. he 
proffers a psychological reduction of a philosophical problem (Kripke, 1982). In effect he 
gives reasons why people confidently predict on the basis of inductive evidence but no 
justification of this procedure without which it could not guarantee certain knowledge. The 
solution proposed by Kant runs as follows. 
Kant was one of the first philosophers to realise that there is an active component to per- 
ception. Conscious experience of sensations involves the application of a priori intuitions 
concerning, eg. space and time, which actively structure experience. These intuitions are 
required to allow conscious appreciation of even subjective sensations which Kant called 
"representations". In virtue of these intuitions, however, only representations would be pos- 
sible. Objective experience of an external world was only possible given that a persons 
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representations were further structured in accordance with certain a priori concepts, eg. the 
concept of necessary causal connection: 
(3.3) "So. Kant held that we could only know the empirical world as something inter- 
preted in accordance with "rules" which were innate in our minds". (Trusted, 
1979: 56) 
Shorn of the distinction between noumena and phenomena and the goal of certain 
knowledge, the picture of the mind structuring its representations of reality in accordance 
with innate rules is one with which a modem cognitive scientist would be wholly familiar. 
Indeed Fodor (1985), has advanced the opinion that the only significant advance made by 
cognitive science over the views of Kant and the British Empiricists has been the computer 
metaphor. Fodor, like Kant, subsequently proffers a rationalist solution to an empiricist's 
skeptical problem in the Language of Thought (1975). 
3.2.2 The "Humean" view 
Jonathan Bennett (1971) observes that the modem "Humean View" of the causal relation 
arises from making Hume's psychological reduction analytically "respectable". This is 
achieved by removing the genetic, psychological component from the theory by appealing 
to the genetically neutral concept of a "disposition". Where "disposition", "is to be under- 
stood in Ryle's [1949] way: to credit someone with a disposition is to speak not of what he 
feels like doing but only of what in general [my italics] he does do or would do if... " (Ben- 
nett, 1971: 305). This is in part a contemporary empiricist retraction of the Kantian picture 
based on the logical behaviourism of Ryle. However, the problems that emerged at around 
the same time for the Humean view led to Fodor's (1975) re-instantiation of this picture. 
Now made analytically respectable, the modem Humean view has the following form: 
(3.4) "The difference between 'el caused e2' and 'el preceded e2' is that the former en- 
tails that there is a law which... " (Bennett, 1971: 307) 
In this context a "law" is a true, contingent, universally quantified conditional statement. 
This recognises the important element of generality observed in the move to dispositional 
terminology, ie. particular causal statements are subsumed under, or are particular instan- 
tiations of general laws. 
This analytic response is intentionally divorced from psychological and epistemological 
concerns. It has nothing to say about how humans represent and utilise lawlike relations, 
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nor about how people come to know that any particular contingent, universally quantified 
conditional is true. "Laws" are simply identified with universally quantified conditionals; ie. 
statements of the form Vx(Fx -> Gx). This is a reduction of particular causal statements to 
instantiations of general laws of association, ie. things of type F are generally associated 
with things of type G. No relation between things of type F and things of type G, apart 
from inclusion between classes, forms part of the analysis, thereby effecting the desired 
reduction. 
3.2.3 Goodman 
The observation that the el caused e2 locution possesses a subjunctive character lead to 
Goodman's reassessment of the analytic reduction, ie. because of this additional twist the 
reduction could not be direct. Making the Humean View of causation "analytically respect. 
able" involved introducing the concept of a disposition. This concept was introduced in 
Bennett's adversion to Ryle: 
(3S) "... this is to be understood in Ryle's way: to credit someone with a disposition is 
to speak not of what he feels like doing but only of what in general he does do or 
would do if [my italics]... " (Bennett, 1971: 305). 
Science, in general, also makes appeal to dispositional terms like "solubility", "fragility" 
etc. These terms possess a subjunctive character, in that they seem to describe "not only 
what has happened or what will, but also describe what would happen under various cir- 
cumstances" (Suppe, 1977: 36). This subjunctive character is also a factor in Ryle's psycho- 
logical application of the term, ie. dispositions refer to "what in general he does do or 
would do if... ". Particular causal statements also have this subjunctive character.. Hume's 
famous "second" definition of causality was framed in terms of a counterfactual conditional 
(I adopt the usual philosophical convention of using "counterfactual conditional" to refer to 
all conditionals in the subjunctive mood, regardless of whether the antecedent is contrary to 
fact): 
(3.6) "... we may define a cause to be an object followed by another, and where all the 
objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second [first con- 
stant conjunction definition]. 
Or, in other words, where, if the first 
had not been, the second never had existed 
[second counterfactual definition]" (Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Under- 
standing, p. 87) 
Treating el caused e2 and 
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(3.7) If el had not occurred, then neither would e2. 
as synonyms, the question becomes can a semantics, ie. truth conditions, be provided for 
(3.7) without appeal to causal locutions. Chisolm (1946) had already observed that disposi- 
tions could not be provided with truth conditions using just the material conditional (ie. 
using reduction sentences). However, at the time it was a desiderata to provide a purely 
extentional analysis. If nothing else this was because the logical positivists received view 
(the earliest statement of which is, Carnap, 1923; for later formulations, cf. Hempel (1952) 
and cf. Suppe (1977) for an overview) held that scientific theories were axiomatisable 
using just the first order calculus. The problem that arises for dispositions is as follows. 
"Fragility", for example, could be defined as in (3.8): 
(3.8) X is fragile if, if X were dropped, then X would break 
The problem for an extentional account of this conditional, ie. using the semantics for the 
material conditional, is that the right hand side of (3.8) would be true of any X which was 
not dropped. However, 
(3.9) If X were dropped, then X would not break 
would also then be tnie of any such X. So, it would appear that counterfactual conditionals 
cannot be analysed using only the material conditional. Goodman felt that he might circum- 
vent this problem by invoking the concept of law like relation still analysed as above and 
thereby provide an extentional analysis of counterfactuals. 
Goodman notes that the truth of counterfactuals seems to require that a certain connection 
obtains between antecedent and consequent. However, the consequent does not follow from 
the antecedent by logic alone. Take the following example: 
(3.10) If the match had been scratched, it would have lighted 
Asserting (3.10) amounts to the claim that the consequent can be infemd from the 
antecedent if the relevant conditions, eg. the match is well made, there is sufficient oxygen, 
the match is dry etc., hold. However, the conjunction of all the relevant conditions with 
the explicitly stated antecedent does not yield the conclusion that the "match lights" as a 
logical consequence. It only follows in virtue of some natural law holding between these 
conditions and matches lighting. 
As the truth of a counterfactual seems to depend on the elliptically present relevant condi- 
tions in the antecedent, Goodman first attempts to specify truth conditions for 
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counterfactuals by placing restrictions on the conjunction of the relevant conditions with the 
antecedent. So the general form of the counterfactual is take to resemble the implicit form 
of a default rule: 
(3.11) p&RC ->q 
Goodman's classic argument is that one of the conditions which must be satisfied is that p 
must be cotenable with RC; where p is cotenable with RC if it is not the case that RC 
would not be true if p were. However, this leads to an infinite regress: to determine 
whether p and RC are cotenable involves determining whether the counterfactual "if p were 
true then RC would not be true" is itself true. Cotenability is itself defined in terms of 
counterfactuals, so the truth of a counterfactual always involves determining the truth of 
another counterfactual ad infinitum. So, an analysis of counterfactuals will have to be in 
terms of the natural laws which license the inference from p& RC to q. (The introduction 
of relevant conditions serves to indicate the quite radical context sensitivity of the counter- 
factual and/or the laws which support them. ) 
This leads to the second half of Goodman's project: the analysis of law-like relations. 
Goodman adopts the view stated above that such a relation is analysed as a universally 
quantified material conditional. However, not all generalisations are law-like. For exam- 
ple: 
(3.12) All ravens are black. 
(3.13) All the coins in my pocket today are silver. 
Two factors distinguish (3.12) from (3.13): 
(i) To confirm (3.12) one would not need to examine all ravens, in Goodman's termi- 
nology (3.12), but not (3.13), is a projecdble hypothesis. 
(n) Due to (i), (3.12) (but not (3.13)) could be used to predict the colour of as yet 
unobserved ravens (coins). 
Both (3.12) and (3.13) are based on observed empirical regularities and so on the Humean 
View both should give rise to habits of inference. But only (3.12) can be reasonably 
expected to do so. So, not all empirical regularities give rise to habits of inference. hence 
the New Riddle of Induction is how to distinguish between those that do from those that do 
not. 
Goodman considers the old Humean problem of the justification of induction to be solved. 
People are as justified in using inductive procedures as they are deductive procedures. The 
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only justification each has is that they conform to peoples' respective inductive and deduc- 
tive practices. The only issue which separates them is that deduction is formalised in a cal- 
culus which guarantees confidence in deductive practices. The new problem of induction is 
to specify a similar calculus which allows a principled distinction between law-like (3.12) 
and accidental generalisations (3.13), projectible hypotheses from non-projectible 
hypotheses. Such a calculus is the purview of Confirmation Theory. So, the reduction of 
particular causal statements now relies on whether sense can be made of confirming univer- 
sal laws of association while retaining a principled distinction between law-like and 
accidental generalisations. The pure analytic reduction is now making appeal to epistemol- 
ogy. But this is analytically respectable if a formal account of what it is for a universal 
law to be confirmed can be provided. 
Devising a logic involves formally defining a consequence relation. This can be done syn- 
tactically or semantically. Perhaps by analogy it would be possible to formally define a 
confirmation relation. A straightforward proposal would be to treat confirmation as the con- 
verse of deduction, ie. as deduction in reverse The desired relation of confirmation can be 
defined as follows: 
(Conf. ) If A I- B and B, then C[B, A) (read, "B confirms A") 
ie. a hypothesis A, is confirmed by the truth of its deductive consequences B (Hempel, 
1965; Carnap, 1950). This suggestion, however, leads to the many paradoxes of 
confirmation theory. If the plausible condition is added that any evidence e, which confirms 
a hypothesis H, also confirms the logical consequences of H, ie. the special consequence 
condition: 
(Cons. ) (C[e, H] &H I- H) -> C[e Jfl 
then the conclusion can be derived that every hypothesis confirms every other hypothesis. 
The proof is trivial: take any hypothesis Hl; this is a consequence of the conjunction of HI 
with any other hypothesis, say HZ, and thereby confirms this conjunction by the present 
criterion. This confirmed conjunction, Hl & H2, has H2 as a consequence, therefore any 
hypothesis, Hl, confirms any other hypothesis, HZ. 
This conclusion can be avoided. It may be the case that although all statements which 
confirm a hypothesis are deductive consequences of it, it is not the case that all the conse- 
quences of a hypothesis confirm it. For example, although finding out that John is Greek 
supports the hypothesis that John is a tall, overweight, Greek shipping magnate, "by reduc- 
ing the net undetermined claim" (Goodman, 1983: 69), it is counter-intuitive to argue that 
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this observation confines this particular hypothesis. There is no transfer of credibility either 
to the other components of the claim or to other instances. This indicates that'the claim 
should be relativised to instances mentioned in the general claim. This is equivalent to res- 
tricting the domain of the universal quantifier in a hypothesis to the kinds of thing men- 
tioned in the antecedent Restricting the domain of the quantifier in this way'is called the 
"Sufficiency Condition" or "Nicod's Criterion". Thus, Vx(Fx -> Gx), is interpreted as: for 
all things x of kind F, Gx. (This form of restriction on the quantifier is a property restric- 
tion, ie. a restriction to still potentially infinite set of a certain kind of object. Later on the 
possibility of objectual restrictions will emerge, ie. restrictions to finite domains, cf. chapter 
4) 
Take the hypothesis that yr. All ravens are black and render it logically in the familiar way: 
Vx(Ax -> Ax). Then take an instance a, by restricting the domain of the quantifier. Fa & 
Fa confirms, Fa & -1Fa disconfirms, and, -, Fa & Fa and -, Fa & -, Fa are irrelevant. 
Nicod's criterion seems admirably sensible. But a problem is created if another reasonable 
adequacy condition on the relation of confirmation is assumed, ie. if e confirms Hl, and Hl 
is equivalent to H2, then e confirms H2, ie. 
(Equiv. ) C[e, H1] & (H! <-> Hý) -> C[eN2])" 
This is called the equivalence condition and it leads directly to the notorious Ravens Para- 
dox: 
(Ravens) Vx(Ax -> Ax) <-> Vx(-Bx -> -Rx), and 
C(-Ra & -, Ba, Vx(-Bx -> -, Rx)], therefore, given (Equiv. ) 
C[-, Ra & -, Ba, Vx(Rx -> Bx)] 
That is, instances of non-black non-ravens, eg. white plimsoles, confirm the hypothesis that 
all ravens are black, or more generally any evidence which does not disconfirm a 
hypothesis confirms it. So, even if Nicod's criterion is accepted subject's should turn all the 
cards if they were confirming (confirmation will now be contrasted with verification) as -p, 
-, q instances also confirm. 
(Most attempts to get round this problem involve rejecting the equivalence condition on the 
relation of confirmation. However, another way out is to reject the material conditional. 
Perhaps it is the particular equivalences licensed by this connective which cause the prob- 
lem. This route has been explored by Belnap (1970) who defines a connective he calls con- 
ditional assertion This is based on the Quine-Rhinelander idea that a conditional is 
not an assertion of a conditional but a conditional assertion, ie. the consequent is affirmed 
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only on the assumption that the antecedent is true. On the semantics Belnap provides "f' 
does not contrapose. Therefore, the equivalence which the ravens paradox relies upon does 
not hold, and hence the paradox does not arise; cf. chapter 4, on "Defective truth tables"). 
The paradoxes which beset confirmation theory lead Goodman to reject any formal attempt 
to derive a confirmation relation. He further drives home his skeptical point by demonstrat- 
ing that any hypothesis which was first felt to be projectible on the basis of the evidence to 
date, can be turned into one which is obviously not so projectible. -By locating the problem 
in the nature of the predicates used to categorise the world Goodman simultaneously rejects 
any simple formal solution to his skeptical puzzle. Take the following hypothesis: 
(3.14) All emeralds are green. A 
This looks like a perfectly respectable projectible hypothesis. However, take the predicate 
"grue", such that: 
(3.15) Vx(x is grue iff x is green before 2000 a. d. or x is blue on or after 2000 a. d. ) 
then the hypothesis that: 
(3.16) All emeralds are grue. 
is as equally confirmed by the evidence to date as (3.14), but (3.16) is obviously not pro- 
jectible. After 2000 a. d. a green emerald would no longer be a grue emerald. This poses the 
problem of how one can know whether "green" does not function like "geie"? Observing, 
for example, that "green" is not disjunctive fails to resolve the problem because whether a 
predicate is disjunctive or not is relative to the predicative base one starts with. On a predi- 
cative base containing grue-type predicates, "green" would be a disjunctive predicate. There 
have been many attempts to circumvent these problems. However, Hilary Putnam notes in 
his forward to the fourth edition of Goodman's Fact, Fiction and Forecast (1983) that none 
appear to succeed in their goal of permitting a formal definition of inductive validity. 
Induction relies on content. ie. the concepts/predicates by which people categorise their 
world. 
3.2.4 Two "solutions" 
Two "solutions" to the problem are prominent in the literature: one due to Goodman him- 
self, the other due to Fodor (1975,1980). Both could be described as skeptical solutions to 
skeptical problems in that they invoke non-analytic psychological considerations about what 
-37- 
causes or leads to a hypothesis being projectible. Fodor's response mirrors Kant's to Hume. 
Direct appeal is made to innate concepts or predicates and an innate ordering of hypotheses 
which structure our experience of the world. Insofar as Kant's original answer to Hume 
was convincing as a rationalist justification of induction one may be persuaded that Fodor's 
response offers a similar justification in the face of Goodman's riddle. Fodor's position, 
however, is less of a justification of induction than a denial that induction plays any 
significant role in learning. Hypotheses can not be induced from experience because the a 
priori possession of the appropriate concepts (predicates) is a pre-requisite for experience. 
Learning is the process of confirming or disconfirming hypotheses which are given a priori, 
ie. innately. This imbues Fodor's response with an analytic flavour. It apparently makes no 
appeal to particular matters of fact, but relies on arguments concerning what people require 
to have any experience of particular matters of fact at all. This relies on the identification of 
the a priori with the innate. However, what is innate and what is not is an empirical ques- 
tion, not to be determined a priori. And so Fodor's response is on the same psychological 
footing as Goodman's. 
Goodman proffers a typically pragmatic response. Conceding the circularity, he allows that 
the predicates which are now considered projectible are those which have been previously 
projected within a linguistic community. These predicates have become "entrenched" in that 
community and although guaranteeing nothing about future projections they none-the-less 
conform with current practices. And that is all that can be legitimately asked for. 
One consequence of pursuing an analytic reduction, which captures the subjunctive charac- 
ter of causal statements, is that in the limit genetic, psychological or intentional factors 
have been invoked. The empiricist projection strategy (not to be confused with the "pmjec- 
tibility" of predicates) is retained in both responses. For Fodor, objective dependencies are 
simply the projections onto the world of peoples' well confirmed innate hypotheses. For 
Goodman, they are the projections onto the world of peoples' projectible habits of infer- 
ence, where, these are given by the well entrenched predicates of a persons linguistic com- 
munity. 
3.2.5 The demand for analysis 
Both responses appear to violate the demand for analysis. That is, the demand to resolve an 
epistemological problem using the tools of metaphysical analysis. One is allowed the tools 
to specify in what a concept must consist without making appeal to how the concept may 
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actually arise for an agent with thus and so cognitive resources. Denying the legitimacy of 
this demand forms part of Fodor's (1975) criticism of Ryle (1949). Separating conceptual 
or analytic responses from causal or genetic ones, Fodor views as a mistake. Dennett's 
(1978) criticism of Fodor amounts to an accusation of committing the fallacy of ignoratio 
elenchi, ie. the proposition Fodor refutes (the postulation of inner cognitive processes plays 
no explanatory role in psychology) is not the'proposition defended (the postulation of inner 
cognitive processes plays no role in philosophical analysis). Ryle is making a philosophical 
point, not a psychological one. As Dennett observes, Ryle's analyses of cognitive concepts 
are replete with intentional idioms. Viewed from a historical perspective the apparent prob- 
lem can be resolved. The view that philosophical analysis was independent of science, and 
of psychology in particular, dominated when Ryle was writing. Fodor is observing that this 
is not the case. And this is the contemporary view, especially in epistemology (Goldman, 
1986) but also in metaphysical analysis. For example, Stalnaker (1984) objects to Lewis' 
(1973) conception of the methodology of metaphysics as succeeding: 
(3.17) "... to the extent that (1) it is systematic. and (2) it respects those of our pre- 
philosophical opinions to which we are firmly attached. " 
insofar as it should: 
(3.18) "... also help to explain the source of those opinions and their role in our practical 
activities" (Stalnaker, 1984: 50). 
Within the context of peoples' pre-philosophical opinions concerning modality (insofar as 
they relate to an understanding of objective dependencies in the world), Stalnaker interprets 
(3.18) as the demand to show how a possible worlds semantics for counterfactuals relates 
to some conception of an intentional state. He attempts to show how an abstract semantic 
analysis of the counterfactual can inform conceptions of what constitutes a law-like relation 
(Stalnaker, 1984). In doing so, he makes explicit appeal to the empiricist projection stra- 
tegy. 
By more contemporary lights, either of the proposed responses are respectable. However, 
Goodman's "solution" mirrors much of the later Wittgenstein. The properties, eg. meanings, 
which attach to words are derived from their place within a communities "language games" 
or customs and practices which are described in language. One language game involves 
predicting future events, and the predicates chosen in this "game" are those which will be 
projected. This view of language is not the view adopted by Cognitive Science which has 
its roots firmly in the early Wittgenstein and the heirs of the Tractatus, eg. Camap, Tarski, 
Davidson etc. To the extent that this is so, the Fodorian response is the "only straw afloat", 
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to quote an oft used phrase. However, Fodor's innatist response is just one other empirical 
hypothesis about the nature of the device. The best response to an a priori claim to innate- 
ness is to come up with an alternative straw to grasp concerning the mechanisms make up. 
As a corollary to exploring the empirical adequacy of an alternative semantic position 
(situation semantics), some speculations on mechanism will be proffered in the conclusions. 
Despite the contemporary respectability of these responses, there may be no need to go as 
far as either Goodman or Fodor. Both result in a psychological reduction due to the attempt 
to resolve new problems arising with induction. However, perhaps it would be conceptually 
more satisfactory if the semantic question of the meaning of particular causal statements 
and the epistemological problem of induction could be kept separate. To do so would 
involve stopping the reduction at some earlier point. This has been attempted in two ways. 
First, the observation that most laws of association are probabilistic may allow a reduction 
by placing sufficient restrictions on the probabilistic relation (conditional probability) which 
putatively holds between el and e2. Second, the contemporary gloss on law-like generali- 
sations as those which support counterfactuals, could be captured by providing an inten- 
sional semantics for the counterfactual. It emerges that either way the reduction is 
attempted involves circular appeal to causal laws, powers, or properties. Although this may 
indicate that Goodman's and Fodor's responses still stand an alternative will be proposed in 
section 3.4. 
3.2.6 Cartwright 
Successful prediction relies on the basis of an organisms predictions constituting effective 
strategies for dealing with its environment, ie. achieving its goals. The concept of what 
constitutes an effective strategy is an interesting turn in Cartwright's (1983) argument that 
causal laws can not be reduced to probabilistic laws of association. In effecting the reduc- 
tion of particular causal statements the proposal is that they are instantiations of general 
causal laws and the latter can be reduced to probabilistic laws of association. (That is we 
no longer accept the Vx(Fx -> Gx) general form for laws of association). Cartwright's 
argument for the objectivity of causal laws is somewhat technical but can be summarised 
quite succinctly. 
The argument depends on a quantity known to statisticians as partial conditional probabil- 
ity: Prob(E/C. K9, ie. the probability of E given C holding K. fixed. The main line of the 
argument is that in using this quantity in attempting to reduce causal laws to probabilistic 
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laws of association or in defining an effective strategy the K. that need to be held fixed are 
all and only the causally relevant factors. If the factors that are to be held fixed are deter- 
mined in any other way there can be no guarantee that the appropriate probability measure 
(ie. increase in conditional probability) taken to define whether E is a cause of C, or C is 
an effective strategy to achieve goal G, will be observed. 
Some examples will clarify the force of the argument. The following example makes expli- 
cit the distinction between an effective and an ineffective strategy: Cartwright received the 
following letter from an insurance company: 
(3.19) "It simply wouldn't be true to say, 
"Nancy L. D. Cartwright. -if you own a TTAA 
life insurance policy you'll live 
longer" 
But it is a fact, nonetheless, that persons insured by TIAA do enjoy longer life- 
times, on average, than persons insured by commercial insurance companies that 
serve the general public. " (Cartwright, 1983: 22) 
Agreeing with the sales pitch, buying a TIAA policy would not be an effective strategy for 
lengthening ones life, but perhaps stopping smoking would be. If this is so, then the 
difference must depend on "on the causal laws of our universe, and on nothing weaker" 
(Cartwright, 1983: 22). This can be seen in two ways (i) in the attempt to provide a statisti- 
cal analysis of causation, (ii) in attempting to provide a statistical analysis of an effective 
strategy. 
(i) The intuition behind a statistical analysis of causation is that if, say, generally smoking 
(S) causes heart disease (H) (note 'S' and 'H' = event types), then the conditional probabil- 
ity, Prob(H/S), is greater than the probability of H alone, Prob(es), ie. Prob(H/S) > Prob(es). 
However, if smoking is also correlated with a sufficiently strong preventative factor, say 
exercise (X), then the expected increase in probability will not appear. As long as in the 
population smoking and exercising are sufficiently highly correlated, then any change in 
Prob(H/S) can be counterbalanced by the preventative effects of factor X. Generally, all 
counterexamples to the claim that causes increase the probability of their effects involve 
showing that there is some other causal factor which dominates in this particular case. So, 
the only way out is that the population should be selected such that, with the exception of 
C, it is causally homogeneous with respect to the effect. Cartwright uses Camap's concept 
of a state description to pick out the causally homogeneous population, a technical twist I 
will not elucidate further. The definition is as follows: 
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(3.20) C caused E iff Prob(E/CX) > Prob(E/K). 
Where K. is the set of state descriptions over (CI. ), and (CI. ) satisfies certain requirements: 
(a) If Ce (Cd, then C causes or precludes (prevents) E. 
(b) C is not included in (C. }. 
(c) VD(if D causes or precludes E. then D=C, or De 
(d) If CA e (C ), then it is not the case that C causes C 
Apart from (d), these are self explanatory, (a) guarantees causal relevance, (b) ensures that 
only the relevant factor C, is heterogeneous in the population, and (c) ensures all causally 
relevant factors are included. (d) is there to ensure that any factors in the causal chain from 
C to E are not held fixed. This is of course circular as a reduction of C causes E, as this 
locution occurs on both sides of the definition. All other causal factors have to be identified 
in order to establish whether one factor possesses the desired statistical property. 
(ii) A directly analogous situation emerges in defining an effective strategy for reaching a 
particular goal in decision theory. Again the idea is that if S is an effective strategy to reach 
goal G, the conditional probability, Prob(G/S) should be greater than the probability of G 
alone, Prob(G), ie. 
(321) S is an effective strategy for G iff Prob(G/S) > Prob(G. 
The problem again arises that in "populations where the strategy state is correlated with 
other factors causally relevant to the goal state" (Cartwright, 1983: 34) the conditional pro- 
bability will fail as a good measure of effectiveness. So again it must be ensured that the 
population is not causally heterogeneous with respect to the goal state, apart from the par- 
ticular strategy in question. So, identical restrictions have to be placed on (3.21): 
(3211 S is an effective strategy for obtaining G in situation L iff Prob(GIS. KL) > 
Prob(GIKL). 
All the above restrictions (a) - (d) then apply to (Cý. ), ie. the causally relevant factors for 
G. And again this involves appeal to causal properties and therefore defining an effective 
strategy makes ineliminable appeal to objective causal dependencies. 
The reduction of particular causal statements via general causal laws and probabilistic laws 
of association fails. The question which Cartwright takes the turn into effective strategies to 
answer, is what difference do casual laws make? They make a crucial difference to the 
effectiveness of the goal directed strategies of an agent. Cartwright does not deny that sta- 
tistical analysis can aid in discovering causes, it is just that to do so presupposes causes are 
already objective features of the world. Perhaps, then the counterfactual route can proffer a 
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reduction? It is interesting, but perhaps not all that surprising, that the argument that leads 
Stalnaker (1984) to the view that causal dependencies are objective features of the world 
sounds very similar to Cartwright's. 
3.2.7 Stalnaker 
Stalnaker (1968) defines a new conditional connective (">") in which the content of the 
antecedent and consequent remain the same as for the indicative but the subjunctive mood 
of the verb is moved into the conditional: 
(322) If a match is struck it lights. (indicative mood, unmarked): 
(a match is struck) => (it lights) 
(323) If the match were struck, it would light. (subjunctive mood): 
(a match is struck) > (it lights) 
"=>" is used to distinguish the indicative from the material conditional ("->"), as it is 
unlikely that the latter is a sound analysis of the former (Nute, 1984). Stalnaker then 
defines a possible worlds semantics for this connective, ie. they are treated as dyadic modal 
operators. The models employed are extensions of the monadic case. Getting the formali- 
ties over with quickly will permit a ready understanding of Stalnaker's argument. 
A simplified Stalnaker model (Nute, 1984: 397) is an ordered quadruple <I, R. s, []>, where 
I is a non empty set of possible worlds; R is the binary accessibility relation which is 
reflexive in Stalnaker's model; s is a world selection function which assigns to a subset A 
of I and a member i of Ia subset s(A, i) of I; [] is a function which assigns to each sen- 
tence 4' a subset [4'] of I, [4'] is then said to be the proposition expressed by 4'. The truth 
conditions of a conditional 4' > yr are defined as follows: 
(i) "> yr is true iff 0 :0 s([$l. 0a [W]. 
(ii) "> yr is false iff s([ý], i) d [W]. 
(iii) ý> yr is undefined iff sl[4], i) =0 
In some accounts (Lewis, 1973) 0> yr is treated as true in the case where s([4], i) is 
empty. 
The core of this semantics is the grounds on which s selects worlds in which to evaluate a 
conditional. The idea is that it should select worlds which are as similar to i as possible in 
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which 4 is true. Let us take the example above to illustrate what is going on: 
(3.24) If the match were struck, it would light. 
Informally the idea is that taking i to be the real world in which the match is not struck, 
then (24) is true if in all worlds most similar to i except that the match is struck, the match 
lights. That is, the consequent is evaluated in all and only the worlds most similar to i 
except for the fact that the match is struck. So the selection function takes as arguments, i: 
the real world in which the match was not struck, [4]: the subset of worlds in which the 
match is struck and returns the subset of worlds most similar to i in which the match is 
struck. ie. s([f]. i) a [4]. If in all these worlds the match lights, ie. s([4], i) a [N'], then 
(24) is true. 
Several additional intuitively correct restrictions are place on the items of the model, eg. all 
the worlds selected by s must be accessible from i, ie. for all je s([4)], i), <i, j> e R, and if 
" is true in i, then i is the only world selected, ie. if ie [4)], then s([4)], i) = {i). It can be 
the case that the range of the selection function is empty, ie. no other worlds are accesible 
from i in which case on Stalnaker's account 4) < yr is undefined for all V at i. However, 
concern centres on the basis on which comparative similarity between worlds can be taken 
to offer a reduction of particular causal statements. 
Two preliminary observations can be made. First, the proposed reduction does not look 
very promising. The reduction hoped for by Goodman was of a problematic concept, objec- 
tive causal dependencies, to an unproblematic concept, counterfactuals and scientific laws. 
However, notions like overall comparative similarity between possible worlds, seems more 
rather than less problematic than the concept of causal dependencies themselves. Nonethe- 
less. Stalnaker identifies this Humean reductionist project with attempts by Lewis to expli- 
cate the respects of comparative similarity that are relevant to assessing counterfactuals. 
Broadly this is still the old Humean project, ie. the attempt to vindicate empiricist skepti- 
cism concerning the idea of necessary connection in the world. Second, in Inquiry Stal- 
naker provides a conceptualist interpretation of his abstract semantic theory which he takes 
to aid in understanding its relevance to inquiry. Before outlining the argument for objective 
causal relations, it is important to clarify the main points of Stainaker's project. 
Stainaker takes s, the selection function to be an abstract characterisation of how people 
transit from one belief state to another. Rather than proof theoretic steps performed on sen- 
tences of mentalese, a la Fodor, propositions are to be treated, as in the semantic theory, as 
subsets of possible worlds. These can be regarded as abstractions from the idea that beliefs 
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constitute possible ways an agent thinks the world could be. In this respect the selection 
function constitutes an abstract characterisation of peoples dispositions to alter their beliefs 
in response to new information. The relation between indicatives and counterfactuals is a 
central part of the analysis. What Stalnaker refers to as "open" conditional sentences (in the 
indicative mood) are statements of dispositions ie. methodological policies to alter beliefs. 
Possessing such a conditional belief involves being disposed to alter ones beliefs in accor- 
dance with it. Making explicit what Stalnaker has in mind when he says that belief in con- 
ditional propositions involves projecting those methodological policies onto the world will 
involve exampling the main idea. 
Suppose I have the following methodological policy: 
(325) If someone is a Tory, then they are immoral. 
then on learning that Nigel is a Tory I will be disposed to believe that Nigel is immoral. 
Now suppose I believe the conditional proposition that: 
(326) If Nigel hadn't been a Tory, he would have given more money to the NHS. 
is true. There will be all kinds of reasons why I could believe this to be true, including of 
course all my knowledge about the policies of the opposition parties etc. This is indicative 
of the fact that all my other factual knowledge and other methodological policies will affect 
how I evaluate a particular counterfactual. However hard it is not to project your own (ie. 
the reader's) beliefs onto the example, only those explicitly stated are operative. I also 
believe some other things: 
(327) The act "giving more money to the NHS" is moral. 
I also believe that 
(3.28) Only Tories are immoral (subsuming facists etc. ), ie. the connective in (325) is a 
biconditionaL 
Now in evaluating (3.26), I will be disposed on learning the antecedent to select those 
worlds most similar to the actual world where Nigel is not a Tory. Because of my metho- 
dological policies, (3.25) & (3.28), these will be moral worlds (the assumption is that noth- 
ing else is operative to determine other respects of similarity and difference), and because 
of (3.27) I will conclude that the consequent of (3.26) is true at these worlds. So the value 
of the function s is taken to be those worlds which are consistent with my particular metho- 
dological policies. But my actual belief that (3.26) is true is due to my projection onto the 
world of (3.25) and (3.28), ie. I take them to be the facts about the (social) world in virtue 
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of which (3.26) is rue. Whether they are actual facts or not, for me to assert that (3.26) is 
true at least requires that I believe them to be a factual. (I might add that although I 
represent these methodological policies as projections I think they are facts, which goes to 
show Stalnaker can't be too far off the mark). 
This is precisely where the reductionist can get a foot in the door. There are two possible 
reductionist moves here: one psychological the other analytic. Stalnaker's conceptualist 
move means that he could, if he wished, proffer a Humean psychological reduction: all he 
has done is to be a little more explicit in his characterisation of a habit of inference. Lewis 
on the other hand, who adopts a realist stance with respect to possible worlds, is offering 
an analytic reduction. Either way, I only have to believe that my methodological policies 
are factual, which by no means implies that they have a basis in fact. The example was 
deliberately picked as a blatant piece of prejudice to illustrate the point about projection. 
Moreover, the example has artificially constrained the respects of similarity that are relevant 
to s. For Lewis' reduction to go through he must show, in general terms, how the relevant 
respects of similarity and difference can be spelled out. 
The reduction suggests that causal relations are to be analysed in terms of the relational 
properties of possible worlds insofar as they resemble each other. Now to keep the reduc- 
tion honest, so to speak, the respects of resemblance must be with regard to the particular 
matters of fact upon which the reductionist supposes the causal relational properties of a 
world supervene. There must exist a pure factual level of description of the things in a 
world which subtracts out any "logical implications about their powers" (Ayer, 1972: 115). 
However, it is far from 
(3.29) "... clear that one can make sense of the idea of subtracting out from a property all 
'logical implications about their powers'. Consider any ordinary property such as 
the property of being blue, or having a mass of 73 grams. Now try subtracting out 
of it, not just a particular causal power associated with the property..., but all 
causal powers. I think that such thought experiments about examples suggest what 
is persuasively argued on more general grounds, that 'what makes a property the 
property it is, what determines its identity, is its potential for contributing to the 
causal powers of the things which have it' [Shoemaker, 1980: 1141. On this con- 
ception of properties, if we abstract away from the causal consequences of a pro- 
perty, there will be nothing left. The levels at which we describe the world are 
causal all the way down. " (Stalnaker, 1984: 159) 
Strong grounds would appear to exist, then, for treating the causal relation as a semantic 
primitive, as an objective feature of the world, along with individuals. Since the Humean 
view was derived from an outmoded semantic theory this resurrection into respectability 
seems long overdue. 
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3.2.8 Localism vs Globalism 
Certain metaphysical observations serve to connect some of the ideas in Stalnaker (1984) 
and Cartwright (1983), although once the connection has been made it will highlight a con- 
trast. Van Fraassen (1980) argues for an anti-realist philosophy of science. In so doing he 
wishes to banish counterfactuals as having no part in a proper description of the way the 
world is. His argument relies on the previously noted context-dependency of counterfactu- 
als: 
(330) "Tbe hope that the study of counterfactuals might elucidate science is quite mis- 
taken: scientific propositions are not context-dependent in any essential way, so if 
counterfactual conditionals are, then science neither contains nor implies counter- 
factuals. " (van Fraassen, 1980: 118) 
In arguing against this claim Stalnaker observes that: 
(331) "... the claim that scientific statements are never context-dependent seems to me 
questionable" (Stalnaker, 1984: 150) 
He goes on to claim that scientific practice must at the very least 
(3.32) "... provide a context for the interpretation of the language it uses to describe the 
world. " (ibid. ) 
From Cartwright (1983) an even more radical claim with regard to the context-dependence 
of scientific propositions can be added. Insofar as the most central propositions of science: 
scientific laws, are true, they are only true, ceteris paribus (strictly: "other things being 
equal", but as Cartwright (1983: 45) observes, more accurately "other things being right"). 
She derives this conclusion not from the usual "folk" science used in philosophical exam- 
ples but from an examination of the fundamental laws of physics. For example, Snell's law, 
that the angle of incidence = the angle of refraction only holds for isotropic mediums. Only 
theoretical entities, and the complex and localised laws which describe them, can be treated 
realistically, but the simple unifying laws of basic theorycannot. So, insofar as fundamental 
laws can be treated as true descriptions of the world, they are radically context sensitive. 
This kind of metaphysical local realism with respect to causal laws, emergent in the philo- 
sophy of science, is just the world view which situation semantics adopts and is attempting 
to capture formally. In this light situation semantics could be put forward as the first 
attempt to trace the consequences for semantics and therefore most of contemporary philo- 
sophy, from the adoption of a new local realist conception of the world. 
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The obvious term of contrast for a localist conception is a globalist conception of the 
world. Localism has been tied to context sensitivity and perhaps, therefore, is intuitively 
clear. However, subsequently, although not explicitly, much weight will be placed on a 
contrast between localist and globalist conceptions. Characterising the distinction can be 
best achieved by a quote from Ian Hacking (1983). At the end of a chapter supportive of 
Cartwright's views, he introduces the following evocative picture: 
(333) "God did not write a Book of Nature of the sort that the old Europeans imagined. 
He wrote a Borgesian library, each book of which is as brief as possible, yet each 
book of which is inconsistent with every other. No book is redundant. For every 
book, there is some humanly accessible bit of Nature such that that book, and no 
other, makes possible the comprehension, prediction and influencing of what is go- 
ing on. Far from being untidy, this is New World Leibnizianism. Leibniz said that 
God chose a world which maximised the variety of phenomena while choosing the 
simplest laws. Exactly so: but the best way to maximise phenomena and have the 
simplest laws is to have laws inconsistent with each other, each applying to this or 
that but none applying to all. " (Hacking, 1983: 219) 
A globalist might adopt the following view. Once the simple unifying laws of science are 
specified and the initial conditions surrounding the origins of the universe identified, then 
the dynamics specified by those laws will run without exception predicting all that has hap- 
pened and all that will happen in the future. In contrast the localist will always being ask- 
ing what state is this part of the world in now. The initial disposition of the universe may 
involve many different states all of which may require different mutually inconsistent 
dynamic laws to apply. Once they have applied a new local state will emerge which may 
require the application of laws which are inconsistent with the laws that lead to the present 
state. 
In predicting such a world an organisms inferential mechanisms, which attempt to track 
reality, will have to be sensitive to changes in the circumstances of an inference. People 
may maintain laws which are mutually inconsistent but which have their own appropriate 
domains of application. This is a surprising contention when related to the laws of physics 
but it is surely the norm regarding social conventions. For example, at club A you may 
have to wear a tie to get in, whereas at club B you may have to not be wearing jeans, at 
club C you may have to wear jeans, at club D... etc. However, there is no unifying higher 
level generalisation which truly describes what happens at all clubs. There is a general 
heuristic to the effect that most clubs have entrance restrictions relating to dress, so its 
probably a good idea to check if any are in force at the club your going to. However, this 
heuristic is not part of the true description of the social conventions in operation. This 
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argument mirrors Cartwright's against a realistic interpretation of the fundamental unifying 
theoretical laws of physics. These laws play a unifying role but almost in virtue of this fact 
they cease to contact reality. To see how high level theory can be applied to any particular 
case requires various mathematical simplifications and approximations. Nothing in the 
theory validates those approximations, but if anything is true it is these particular 
phenomenological laws connecting theory to the phenomena. The same piece of theory may 
connect to different phenomena via different simplifications and approximations. This may 
lead to different and inconsistent phenomenological laws. 
As described in Cartwright (1983: 19) and quoted in Hacking (1983: 219), the globalist pic- 
ture of the human mind echoes Duhem's vision of the minds of French physicists while the 
localist picture echoes his vision of the mind of an English physicist: 
(3.34) "The French mind sees things in an elegant, unified way. It takes Newton's three 
laws of motion and the law of gravitation and turns them into the beautiful 
abstract mathematics of Langrangian mathematics. The English mind, says Duhem, 
is in exact contrast. It engineers bits of gears, and pulleys, and keeps the strings 
from tangling up. It holds a thousand different details all at once, without impos- 
ing much abstract order or organisation. " 
3.3 Below "causal" constraints and attunement 
Stalnaker withholds from abandoning possible worlds because he still retains a moderate 
empiricism, whereby although he accepts that some methodological policies are causally 
grounded, most probably are not. On his conceptualist interpretation, he can still handle the 
latter using the Humean projection strategy. What, though, can the situation semanticist say 
about, what will be called below causal constraints? Two main issues are raised by con- 
straints which don't obviously appear to be part of the ultimate causal structure of the phy- 
sical world. First, how they are "grounded"? For causal constraints, the assumption is that 
they are, at some level, grounded in the physical make up of the world and ultimately pos- 
sess a description in the vocabulary of physics or the special sciences. However, other con- 
straints involving dispositions, promises, moral obligations etc. do not seem similarly 
grounded. Second, how do people acquire or become attuned to these constraints? For the 
causal case, enumerative experience of the instantiations of causal laws seems the most 
obvious mechanism, but could this work for, say a conditional promise?. A further problem 
concerns the possibility of error. It would appear that the causal constraints which hold 
between states of affairs in the world and mental states (cf. diag. 2.1), may not leave room 
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for being mistaken. This problem will be looked at first. 
3.3.1 Error and projectibility 
In the section "Inference and information gain" (cf. 2.4) constraints holding between mental 
states and the world were treated as bona fide constraints. This circumvents early objections 
to a semantic theory which takes the meaning of an utterance, eg. '"There is smoke" to be a 
constraint holding between the utterance type ('"I"") and situation types where there is 
smoke ('1), C: "1'" => T. In some circumstances T may not be actual which creates the 
problem of error (Dretske, 1985). The problem of error involves one of the relata of a con- 
straint not being actual. It applies equally to erroneous mental states and is created by the 
situation in diagram 3.1: a is in mental state ̀YT(1)", where the content of this mental state 
reflects a's awareness (not necessarily conscious) of the environmental circumstances. His 















`YT(1)" is insufficient to decide between these states of the world. If the information is 
then extended such that a is in mental state ̀ YT(2)" the content of which is that he was on 
candid camera, then mental state ̀YT now unambiguously indicates that T. There are really 
two constraints: (i) `PT _> T1 T(3)", and (ii) `YT ==> TI T(2)". Mental state ̀ PT(1)" a 
is ambiguous between ̀ YT(2)" and '' T(3)". a may nonetheless default to T(3)" from 
TT(1)", ie. the most familiar context, to derive the interpretation T (or perhaps survival 
related due to other constraints to which a is attuned). Error is possible because the relation 
between a word or mental state and the objects and relations they denote is naturalised in a 
way that mirrors the context dependent relations between other states of affairs. 
The meaning of, say "green", can be conceived of as a causal relation between objects in 
the world which reflect light of thus and so wavelengths and the effects that that reflected 
light has on an organism with thus and so perceptual equipment. As long as, in the 
appropriate circumstances, objects which reflect light of around 510 nm tend to produce the 
same effects in organisms like us then the predicate annexed to that relation will be projec- 
tible. Both the intrinsic properties of the object and peoples' specific cognitive equipment 
enter into the meaning of the term. "Green" does not attach to the sensation produced by 
objects which reflect these wavelengths. Rather, the causal role of these mental states 
(caused by these objects) in the whole functional economy of constraints to which a person 
is attuned determines the internal meaning of "green", ie. its cognitive significance. A 
predicate like "grue" would involve that relation changing such that light at these 
wavelengths produces different effects after the year 2000 a. d. This is sufficient to main- 
tain - an asymmetry between projectible predicates like "green" and non-projectible predi- 
cates like "grue". 
3.3.2 Dispositions and conditional promises 
Some examples will first be introduced. Each example is a particular indicative conditional 
which suggests a particular methodological policy or constraint for dealing with information 
about different domains of human activity. In each case it will be shown that each can be 
used to license counterfactuals and, therefore, each needs to be treated as fact stating on the 
assumption that the corresponding counterfactual is true. Therefore, an issue arises concern- 
ing how they are actually grounded. 
Dispositions 
(3.35) If I go to work. I always buy a newspaper. 
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(335) My wife contemplating her lack of a newspaper and my laziness: 
If he had gone to work, he would have got a newspaper (... and I would not have 
to go and get one). 
Conditional-Promises 
(336) If you cook tonight, I will wash up for a week. 
(3361 To my wife a few days later, she is complaining about it being her turn to wash 
up again: 
If you had cooked a few days ago, I would have washed up all week. 
The situation created by these examples is diagrammed in Diag. 3.2(a). At the end of 
chapter 2, it was argued that a clear distinction should be retained between mental state 
transitions and the constraints upon which they are grounded. To keep this distinction clear 
the symbol "->" will be used in the text to describe transitions between mental states. 
However, as we will see, it can be the case that one persons state transitions are ulitmately 
grounded upon another individuals action guiding state transitions or dispositions. In which 
case, the first individual's disposition provides the grounding for the second individual's 
state transitions or habit of inference. In diagram 3.2(a), the state transition `PS: 'YT --> 
`VF' (the background types "I T" will be left implicit), and the constraints C': '"T => T, 
and C": `PT' _> T' are all actual, but it is questionable whether the constraint C: T ==> 
T' is also actual. Diag. 3.2(b) illustrates the projection strategy for dealing with this case 
suggested by Stalnaker. The twin arrows are the lines of projection on to the world. The 
situation in 3.2(b) is the Humean one, ie. there is no relational structure in the world. For 
Ryle, all we can talk of for philosophical purposes are T and T'. All the attempted analytic 
reductions looked at have tried to retain this picture while accounting for relational struc- 
ture as supervenient on the intrinsic properties of the relata. Stalnaker on the other hand 
falls half way between the situation in Diag. 2.1 and in Diag. 3.2(b). 
Examples (3.35) and (3.36) are relatively unproblematic, however, they do raise some 
interesting issues. For (3.35) the story that has been told so far can not hold directly. Sup- 
pose you regularly observe me buying a newspaper whenever I go to work. You therefore 
develop the disposition to infer that I will stop for a newspaper on discovering I am on my 
way to work. Let T: I go to work, and T': I buy a newspaper, then your disposition is 
described by the state transition'PSyou: you '-> 'you being actual. However, no C: T 
_> T' is actual. Rather your disposition `PSyou is grounded on my disposition to do T' 








Diagram 3.2: Grounding below causal constraints and 
the projection strategy 
grounded in an actual relation, ie. my disposition ̀ YCme. The picture now looks like that in 
Diag. 3.3. So, there is a causal chain connecting T and T', but it is mediated by my mental 
states and dispositions. This situation is no different from that in science, ie. unobserved (or 
unobservable) underlying causal mechanisms (referred to as "microscopic") are postulated 
which explain observed macroscopic regularities. As cognitive scientists, one may quibble 
over their precise computational nature, but one is unapologetically realist about the 
existence of certain inferential dispositions (cf. Stalnaker's observations on Dummett's 
(1978) assessment of the realism and reduction problem. Pace Dummett, proffering a reduc- 
tion, say to some sequence of computations, does not immediately imply anti-realism with 
regard to dispositions). 
However, there is a discontinuity between your disposition `I'SYOu and mine, `I'Sme, with 
respect to how they were acquired. In section 2.4, attunement was treated as a state, ie. the 
state in which a transition between mental states (which commutes with an actual constraint 
in the environment) was actual But how do people become so attuned? Is it bottom up and 










Diagram 3.3: Grounding Dispositions 
help answer some of these questions. First, it is fair to say that the received view is that 
getting attuned is some form of inductive process. However, such a process could only 
account for 'I'S, ie. your observations of my behaviour have attuned you to 'YSme But 
my possession of TS me can not 
be the result of my observations of my own behaviour! At 
some- time I must have made the conscious decision to stop for a newspaper. As I make 
this conscious decision more regularly it becomes sedimented into an automatic habit, just 
like learning to ride a bike. However, the element of conscious decision making can not be 
excised from an explanation of the process. The same may be said in your case: ie. it was 
your conscious decision to attend to my behaviour. But is this necessary? In ones percep- 
tually guided action in the world one can not always decide what to attend to and what not 
to attend to. You may only realise your attunement to `YSme when you feel surprise at my 
walking past the paper shop this morning. Examples like this tend to argue for an active 
top-down component as well as bottom up processes in people getting attuned to con- 
straints. (As observed above, Hume also erred in his over emphasis on passive bottom-up 
enumerative procedures as the primary source of habits of inference). 
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Example (3.36) poses new, but related problems. Suppose my wife believes that my prom- 
ise to wash up for a week if she cooks tonight is sincere, ie. a few days later, she is 
inclined to believe that (3.36) is true. What process could be responsible for (i) my posses- 
sion of this intentionally imposed constraint on my behaviour, and (ii) my wife's belief that 
I possess it, which inclines her to believe (3.36')? No habit forming process, involving 
active cogitation or not, has taken place. But it would appear that all relevant conditions 
concerning how we both handle information regarding this constraint are satisfied, ie. in our 
social dyad our behaviours are such that it would appear we are both attuned to this con- 
straint. This seems to argue for essentially "one-shot" processes of entering in to a state of 
attunement. No habit forming forming process either initiated by active decision making or 
from the environment has occurred. The active decision stands alone as the source of the 
attunement. Promising is simply another way (process) by which people can enter into a 
state of attunement to a constraint. This constraint is one of, what I will call, my fleeting 
dispositions, ie. the antecedent is tied to a specific space-time location. (Cf. above it was 
noted that not all constraints are general, some, like (3.36) can be specific, ie. they are tied 
to a specific space-time location). However, despite its specificity, when it comes to 
grounding the relation it causes no more problems than (3.35). If a visitor asked why I 
washed up all week, the reply: "I promised my wife that if she cooked the other night I 
would wash up all week" is appropriate and amounts to the assertion that this constraint, ie. 
my intentionally imposed disposition, is (was) actual. 
Not all bottom-up inductive factors are excised from this account, however. My wife's 
belief in my sincerity, is most obviously based on inductions from my past record of keep- 
ing promises. Moreover, active cogitation is probably even more implicated than at first 
glance. If my wife did cook that night, then my commitment to wash up that week may be 
based not only on my decision to commit myself to this disposition but also on my belief 
that one ought to keep ones promises. That is, the enforcement of this constraint in our 
social dyad is in part mediated by our joint assension to various moral obligations we 
believe to be in force. In other words it may rely on other types of constraint to which we 
are mutually attuned. This leads naturally to the next set of examples. 
3.3.3 Moral obligations and social conventions 
The same policy for introducing examples is followed as in the last section. 
Moral-Obligations 
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(337) If you borrow money, you ought to pay it back. 
(3371 If you had not borrowed the money, you would not have to pay it back. 
Social-Conventions 
(338) If you enter this club, you must wear a tie. 
(3.38') Replying to my friend's wife concerning his whereabouts, in the knowledge that 
he was last seen tie-less and she think's he has gone to the club: 
If he had entered the club, he would have been wearing a tie. 
The issue (3.37) and (3.38) raise is whether they can (or indeed, should) be treated in the 
same way as (3.35) and (3.36). In the case of both (3.35) and (3.36) the picture is as in 
Diag. 3.3. Although, there is no direct causal connection between T and T', there is an 
indirect one via the dispositions of other cognitive agents. Both (3.35) and (3.36) were to 
do with the contingent behaviour of individuals. However, examples (3.37) and (3.38) con- 
cein group behaviour about which there appears to be some independent necessitation. This 
does not appear to fit Diag. 3.3. Take (3.37), and translate it in to the terminology used to 
discuss (3.35). It seems most natural to say that C: T => T' is actual. The reasoning is as 
follows. It could be the case that (3.37) is explained as a generalisation of (3.35). Your 
attunement TS 
YOU 
'PT (borrow money] -> TT' OU[pay 
it back], is based not just on you 
observing me doing so, which is then grounded in my corresponding disposition TS me 
being actual, but on your observation of lots of other people also apparently being similarly 
attuned. So, the reason you find yourself compelled to repay loans is due to your attune- 
ment to the fact that most other people you observe do so. However, this clearly has an air 
of circularity about it. Dretske (1985: 12) observes, it, 
(3.39) "... is like trying to understand morality [moral constraints] in terms of the 'con- 
strained' behaviour of good people. Such behaviour is constrained, I suppose, but 
the interesting question is what constrains it. " 
However, just this form of circularity was invoked by Goodman in the entrenchment 
response to his new riddle of induction. On his pragmatic philosophy, such circularity can 
be tolerated. Perhaps this is because there are no specific institutions which prescribe cer- 
tain predicates and proscribe others with respect to their projectibility (although scientific 
institutions may be a candidate). However, in Society there are institutions which prescribe 
certain behaviours and proscribe others with respect to their moral rectitude. And it is the 
rules they lay down which ultimately ground moral obligations, ie. there is a C: T ==> T'. 
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(Note that the problems created by (3.36) can now be closed down. If the rule is on the 
club's books then thats that. ) However, the question Dretske is raising is why do we feel 
compelled to be constrained by these moral prescriptions? 
Grounding is not the problem. Various moral obligations are underwritten by institutions 
which also enforce them. Why we feel constrained to obey them seems to be a question 
that can also be asked of physically grounded constraints. For causal constraints the answer 
is obvious. Relative to physical survival it is adaptationally advantageous to allow ones 
behaviour to be constrained by the physical structure of the world. Adhering to these con- 
straints has associated benefits, eg. continued survival, and associated costs for ignoring 
them, eg. death or injury. However, as our physical survival becomes dependent upon 
societies, so the need for social survival drives the need for restrictions on peoples indivi- 
dual behaviour. Relative to social survival it is adaptationally advantageous to allow ones 
behaviour to be constrained by the conventions of that society. Adhering to these con- 
straints has associated benefits, eg. approval, emotional stability etc., and associated costs 
for ignoring them, eg. prison, emotional instability. Physical danger, and fear of not con- 
forming tend to have similar emotional, and physiological effects. It thus seems that the 
mechanisms responsible for people's compulsion to conform to the laws of society are 
likely to be similar to those responsible for peoples compulsion to conform to the laws of 
nature. 
That the constraints imposed by societies are properly grounded is going to make the same 
differences as those imposed by physical constraints being properly grounded. Cartwright 
(1983; cf. above) argues that the difference actual causal laws make is whether peoples 
goal directed strategies are effective or not. For example, stopping smoking is an effective 
strategy for prolonging life only if smoking is causally responsible for some life shortening 
ailment, in this case lung cancer. Similarly, wearing a tie is an effective strategy for getting 
into the club only if it is a rule that I must wear a tie to get in. 
Learning what is and what is not an effective strategy can be achieved in similar ways. 
However, things can go wrong. For example, I may be interested in building a lighter than 
air craft. If I believed that burning increased the weight of a compound substance because 
burning involves the substance losing a constituent of the compound which has negative 
weight (ie. I adopt the phlogiston theory) then I may be inclined to get some of it into a 
balloon. I may do this by burning a substance underneath the balloon and observe, con- 
sistent with my theory, that it floats. However, I then decide to collect and store some and 
find out that the cooled negative weight substance no longer makes my balloon float., So to 
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construct plans of action it is important to be in possession of the right predictive con- 
straints. But discovering what they are may only turn up in the long run as an active pro- 
cess of using them to make predictions. Similarly, I may be interested in getting into the 
club. I may pass the club regularly and observe everybody going in is wearing a tie. So. I 
go along one night wearing a tie expecting to get in but I am refused entry. Upon asking 
the question why? I am told that I am wearing jeans, and your not allowed in wearing 
jeans. So there is an asymmetry. In the case of the social convention perhaps the best way 
of discovering an effective strategy is to ask someone. Things are not so straightforward 
with the physical world. 
3.4 Induction and information gain 
Adopting a position on the nature of law-like relations is not independent of how people 
come to acquire them. In 3.2.4 it was stated as a putative desiderata that the epistemologi- 
cal issue of induction and the semantic issue of the meaning of causal statements should be 
kept separate. However, they are intimately related. Particular positions on the semantics of 
these statements condition the kind of answers obtained concerning how they come to be 
known. The role of causal laws in providing explanations constitutes another area where the 
semantic choices made have ramifications (Hempel, 1965; Bromberger, 1965; Salmon, 
1971; van Fraassen, 1980; Cartwright, 1983). Goodman's Fact, Fiction and Forecast 
summarise's many of the objections to a theory of confirmation based on the semantics of 
the material conditional and the idea that confirmation is deduction in reverse. However, 
this is not the place to explicate a full theory of explanation and confirmation as a rival to 
alternative philosophical positions. Rather the aim of this section will be to outline the con- 
ception of the inductive process underwritten by the view of constraints as the context 
dependent laws that allow information gain. As argued in the last section, no essential 
difference will be admitted between causal constraints 'and below causal constraints. The 
same implied mechanisms apply to both cases. 
3.4.1 The predictive cycle 
The best way to outline the process is by introducing a diagram. Diagram 3.4 is a generali- 
sation of diagram 2.1. Let us be absolutely clear concerning the function of the diagram. 
First, of all what it is not. It is not supposed to function as explication of precisely how 
people become attuned to predictive, information gaining constraints. Rather its function is 
-58- 
to elucidate the processes involved in determining the circumstances under which a con- 
straint to which someone is attuned allows information gain or, in other words, is predic- 
tively successful. All constraints are context dependent. The primary goal of induction is to 
establish predictively successful rules. Therefore, the processes which require explanation 
are how people come to identify their appropriate domains of application wherein the pred- 
ictions made are invariably successful. The distinction being cleaved to is familiar from the 
philosophy of science and holds between the context of discovery and the context of 
justification. The purpose of the diagram is to explicate the processes of justification once a 
hypothesis about a predictive constraint has been discovered modulo the context depen- 
dence of all such constraints. It will be found that procedures like falsification turn out to 
be maladaptive when the problem is cast in this way. However, a specification of a com- 
petence model of human inductive abilities would be incomplete without an outline of the 
processes of discovery. Four such processes were introduced in section 3.3. They are listed 
below: 
1. Bottom-up enumerative learning. 
2. Top-down enumerative learning. 
3. Bottom-up "one shot" learning. 
4. Top-down "one shot" learning. 
1 and 2 concern the repetitive and largely unconscious processes involved in acquiring a 
habit. In the case of 1, repeated observations of a regularity in the environment may lead to 
an attunement to a predictive constraint. Someone may only become aware of their attune- 
ment to such a regularity when it fails. 2 involves the way in which repeated conscious 
decision making may become sedimented into an unconscious habit. 2 and 3 concern the 
processes by which a constraint is suggested by a single salient experience. In the case of 
3, this may be given directly by the environment, ie. a particularly salient observation of a 
co-occurrence or sequence of events may lead someone to hypothesize that they always 
co-occur or one always follows the other. 4 involves the way in which simply being told 
that there is a rule in force, perhaps in response to a question or in a promise, can lead 
someone to use the rule to gain information. 
The purpose of inductive procedures is primarily to establish the circumstances in which a 
rule permits successful prediction. Organisms must predict their environment in order to 
survive in it. A corollary to this process concerns the fact that only those transitions 
between mental states which are grounded in an actual constraint will turn out in the long 
run to be predictively successful. Upon discovering what seems a plausible constraint, the 
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Diagram 3.4: The Predictive Cycle: Response to Predictive Failure 
and Constructing the Default Hierarchy. 
best way to discover its domain of application is to use it in making predictions. Diagram 
2.1 represents one predictive loop in which the prediction was successful, a gained infor- 
mation. Diagram 3.4 shows this cycle and what happens subsequently when a prediction 
fails. Response to predictive failure is the principle method of isolating the appropriate cir- 
cumstances in which a constraint is informational. The arcs in the diagram are labelled 
numerically to indicate the processing stage involved. 
The narrow arcs indicate the process up to predictive failure, the broad arcs indicate the 
subsequent response. At stage 1, a is in state ̀ YT which in the appropriate circumstances 
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`YT(1)", involves T. Given possibly overlapping circumstances, ̀ YT(2)", which a must 
assume ceteris paribus (interpreted a la Cartwright as "all other things being right") a tran- 
sits to mental state Y'T' [stage 2]. This leads to the expectation of T' (brackets indicate an 
expectation) [stage 3]. However, T' is not observed. This requires a to determine what 
additional condition could be in operation which could have precluded [arc 6] T' despite T 
being actual. The hypothetical mental state corresponding to this condition is marked as 
_1717, the negation sign indicates it is the dual of this background type which could pre . 
clude Wo. -'P Tl" could arise from any direction marked by the bi-directional stage 5 
arcs. The state transition 'PS: `PT -> `YT' is conditional. Prior beliefs concerning TT(2)'o, 
could function to suggest -, W, ", which could have blocked the transition to 'YT', and 
therefore the expectation that T' is actual. In which case -, ̀ Yrl" will derive from the back- 
11 ground type `YT(2)" [stage 5(a)/down]. This will suggest the hypothesis that -, 7r 1 is 
actual [stage 5(b)/down]. Alternatively, a may be unaware of any relevant conditions 
which could block `PS. In this instance some salient feature of the environment -, T1", may 
have been present when a observed T. This may be lead to mental state -, Y'T1" [stage 
5(b)/up]. -, ̀ YT1" is hypothesized to preclude TV [stage 6(a)/(b)], and could be encoded in 
the background type of Y'S [stage 5(a)/up]. So, despite T being actual, because of -, T, " 
T' was not, thus re-establishing the predictive completeness of the cycle [stage 7]. 
The predictive failure could have come about for two other reasons. First, a was mistaken 
about T being actual. When a makes the assumption that -, T' is good evidence for his fal- 
ling into perceptual error is the only time that an inference corresponding to modus tollens 
would appear rational. The only other grounds for T' not being actual are that the con- 
straint C is itself not actual. However, this is unlikely to be the preferred inference. The 
discovery procedures by which a came to be using `YS in an information gaining way have 
already given some independent reasons to trust that C is actual. In the light of the context 
dependency of predictive constraints, a is unlikely to give up `PS on the basis of one 
predictive failure. 
The process outlined in diag. 3.4 will now be exampled using a taxonomic and a non taxo- 
nomic constraint. First of all the appropriate mechanism of ignorance needs to be identified, 
ie. the factor which demands an inference in order to resolve ignorance. For non- 
taxonomic, dynamic constraints, time is the appropriate mechanism of ignorance, an organ. 
ism is attempting to predict an unknown future. For taxonomic, static constraints, the 
appropriate mechanisms are either language or space. An organism is either making infer- 
ences from an incomplete description or inferences about incomplete knowledge of a per- 
ceptual event which could be resolved by investigatory actions in space-time. 
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Taxonomic: An interlocuter informs you that tweety is a bird ("T"). Due to the conven- 
tional constraint between words and mental states you go into a mental state the content of 
which is that "tweety is a bird" [1]. Due to your attunement to the constraint that "birds 
fly", you make the default inference (ie. make a ceteris paribus assumption) to "tweety can 
fly" [2]. Which leads you to expect that tweety can fly [3]. However, you learn that tweety 
can not fly. This leads you to derive the default condition (-, ̀ PT(). that "tweety is a 
penguin" [4](it is implicit in your inference to "tweety can fly" that "tweety is not a 
penguin, hence the appositeness of marking this condition as the dual This could be 
because you have already discovered this default [5(a)/(b)/down], or because you now 
check tweety and discover that it is particularly salient feature of tweety that he is a 
penguin [5(b)/(a)/up]. Either way, tweety being a penguin could preclude tweety flying 
[6a, 6b], which re-establishes the predictive completeness of the cycle [7]. 
Non-Taxonomic: At t1 (0900) you are in mental state ̀YT the content of which is that "Fred 
is passing your window"; this involves T being actual [1]. Due to your attunement to the 
constraint that Fred passing your window at 0900 means Fred is going to buy his moaning 
paper, you make the default inference (ie. make a ceteris paribus assumption) to "Fred is 
going to buy his morning paper" [2]. Which leads you to expect that Fred is going to buy 
his morning paper [3]. However, you learn, at t2, that Fred walked straight past the paper 
shop. This leads you to derive the default condition (-, 'YT1"), that "Fred is trying to get to 
work early" [4]. This could be because you have already discovered this default 
[5(a)/(b)/down], or because you remember that it was particularly salient feature of Fred 
that he was on his bike which he only rides when he is in a hurry [5(b)/(a)/up]. Either way, 
Fred being in a hurry to get to work could preclude him stopping for a newspaper [6a, 6b], 
which re-establishes the predictive completeness of the cycle [7]. 
Deriving the appropriate defaults in the background type functions as an answer to the 
question "Why -, T" on the assumption of T and that C is context sensitive. The answer to 
this question is the relevant default condition, -, T1 ". The default condition functions as an 
explanation of why -, T' given T and that C is context sensitive. The explanation works 
because the relevant condition, -, T1", precludes (is negatively causally related to) V. 
Furthermore, if T' is actual, then a good explanation for this, ie. a good answer to the ques- 
tion "Why T'? ", is that T, and the constraint C was actual. There is an asymmetry between 
reasoning in the predictive direction and the explanatory direction. It is adaptationally 
advantageous to be able to correctly predict the world. If one is to do so then it must be 
assumed that on learning T, all the circumstances are right to infer T', even in ignorance of 
whether the assumption holds. However, explanations are always post hoc, nothing 
-62- 
immediately depends on them, so the question concerning which conditions held and which 
didn't can be considered at leisure. Moreover, in assessing a constraint one will be con- 
cenned primarily with predictive success. The situation that doesn't matter is where there is 
a many - one relation between T. and T' (ie. many constraints lead to T). But a one - 
many relation between T and Ti' is predictively less advantageous as then T is ambiguous. 
However, the former situation will lead to explanatory ambiguity, ie. T' may be explained 
by the occurrence of any T,. In general, reasoning to the best explanation of T' is a less 
reliable process given the primacy of successful prediction. 
3.4.2 Are constraints falsifiable? 
Can a hypothesis about a constraint ever be falsified?. Context sensitivity blocks a straight- 
forward Popperian falsification strategy. An instance of T and -, T' does not falsify but 
drives the construction of the default hierarchy within the background type. Popper (1959) 
tended to undervalue the importance of the evidential basis given by the discovery of the 
constraint (cf, above). If it was the product of many observations of a regularity or you 
were told about the constraint by a particularly reliable individual you are unlikely to give 
it up on observing one predictive failure. And again, the adaptational importance of predic- 
tion means that the possession of any rule, however limited its domain, is preferable to no 
rule at all; with no predictive constraints to guide its behaviour an organism is an impotent 
pawn of its dynamic, changing environment. 
The need to predict an ever changing world indicates that falsification of a constraint may 
occur but it is only likely after a long run of persistent predictive failures. This conclusion 
is a result of general considerations concerning the adaptational requirements of an organ- 
ism relative to a changing environment. It may prove more convincing if the line of argu- 
ment was also reflected in a conception of scientific method. Psychological work on condi- 
tional reasoning has taken its competence models from philosophical/logical work on 
scientific methodology. This work has been taken to underwrite the nonnativity of the com- 
petence models and thus provide the psychologist with a definition of error. The conception 
of scientific method which has driven the psychological work I will go on to consider in 
the next chapter, has been Popper's (1959). However, there have been many subsequent 
developments in the area of methodology (Kuhn, 1970; Lakatos, 1970; Feyerabend, 1975; 
Putnam, 1974; Hacking, 1983). Most of these developments have questioned the plausibil- 
ity of falsification in the light of the historical evidence on scientific progress. One of the 
most recent developments is due to Hacking (1983). Hacking's work is closely related to 
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Cartwright's and to Peirce's pragmatism. 
Philosophical arguments over method centre on two issues (i) scientific realism, and (ii) 
rationality. The issues are intimately related. Does scientific method allow inquirers to dis- 
cover the true structure of reality, and does it provide a rational procedure for fixating 
beliefs (theories). The positivist position, "results from the conception that seeing is believ- 
ing" (Hacking, 1983: 63). Truth is a correspondence to an external reality which is given in 
perception. This leads to positivist anti-realism with regard to unobservable theoretical enti- 
ties and, for familiar Humean reasons, causation. Hacking on the other hand, argues for a 
realist account of causation and theoretical entities. The existence of theoretical entities is 
not necessarily tied to their direct observability but rather to the process of inquiry wherein 
the causal effects of a theoretical entity are regularly observed and manipulated. Hacking 
argues that the conception of inquiry he advocates derives directly from the pragmatism of 
Peirce. For Peirce, reality is 
(3.40) "... that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally result in, 
and which is therefore independent of you or me. " (C. S. Peirce, 1868, Some 
consequences of four incapacities, quoted in Hacking, 1983: 58).. 
To fixate beliefs requires, "... a method which is internally self stabilizing, which ack- 
nowledges permanent fallibility and yet at the same time tends to settle down" (Hacking, 
1983: 59), "truth is whatever in the end results" (Hacking, 1983: 61). 
Inquiry is a dialectic process between theory (reasoning) and data (information). For Hack- 
ing the truth of a law or the existence of a theoretical entity is determined by peoples' abil- 
ity to regularly use those laws or causal properties to actively change and manipulate the 
world. Or, by way of paraphrase, when they become part of our repertoire of effective stra- 
tegies for achieving our goals. Making this determination can only be achieved in the long 
run of using rules/laws relating observables to observables, or unobservables to observables 
in making predictions, designing machines or generally in intervening or acting in our 
environment. 
In consequence, Hacking (1983) emphasises the role of experimentation in science. Experi- 
ment is characterised, on the basis of many actual examples, as having a life independent of 
theory. On a falsificationist methodology the paradigm of experimentation is the crucial 
experiment, ie. an experiment which decides between competing hypotheses. A paradigm 
case of is the Michelson-Morley experiment which on Popper's interpretation decided 
against the absolute Newtonian view of space-time and for relativity theory. As Lakatos 
(1970) also observes, this constitutes a post hoc rationalisation of what Michelson and 
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Morley took themselves to be testing which was between two rival views (due to Stokes 
and Fresnel) of the behaviour of the aether near the earth's surface (Hacking, 1983: 254-61). 
It was relative to the aether that absolute measures of the earth's velocity were to be 
obtained. Scientific experiments may have various functions of which acting as a crucial 
test may be one. However, they are hard to find in the actual historical record. Purported 
paradigm cases turn out to have had very different functions. 
Crucial experiments are only possible modulo competing theoretical positions which make 
contrary predictions. However, Hacking observes that much experimentation proceeds 
independent of theory. A great deal of experiment involves establishing the precise cir- 
cumstances under which certain effects are observable, or to establish more precise meas- 
ures of physical or other constants. Relative to my subsequent psychological interests it 
would be an interesting turn around to offer a descriptive analysis of experimentation on 
the Four Card problem. The principle phenomena concerned the failure to observe a Pop- 
perian falsification strategy. However, this was not taken to falsify a Popperian view of 
what subjects should do. Rather further experiments were designed to test the domain of 
the phenomena. It would appear that work in this area proceeds with a meta-theory which 
is inconsistent with object theory under test. What researcher's subject's should do has not 
been taken to determine what the researcher should do. 
Falsification would appear to be a product of the process of inquiry which can only emerge 
in the long run. Actual scientific experimentation is not always aimed at the attempt to fal- 
sify hypotheses, but rather, as in the model of the predictive cycle, is often aimed at estab- 
lishing the appropriate domain of the phenomenon under investigation. People do not tend 
to actively falsify hypotheses but rather as their utility to achieving their goals diminishes, 
ie. they fail to be predictively useful, they get used less and therefore fail to be re-enforced 
as part of an organism's adaptive predictive repertoire. However, if an organism needs to 
act in novel domains then the situation may emerge where its existing repertoire of con- 
straints ceases to be predictively useful. Thus an agent may need to acquire new constraints 
which may make contrary predictions to existing constraints. These will require testing to 
assess the relative utilities of existing constraints against newly discovered constraints 
which may well lead to eliminative falsificatory reasoning. 
Summary 
In this chapter a foundation for the concept of a constraint has been suggested which 
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locates this situation theoretic concept in both recent conceptions of scientific laws and 
method, and within the semantic literature on conditional logics. It was seen how various 
attempts to reduce causal laws to other less problematic concepts failed. In part this is due 
to arguments concerning the possible worlds semantics for the conditional provided by Stal- 
naker (1968,1984). In providing a metaphysical grounding for his abstract semantics it was 
seen that the selection function is often grounded in the causal relation. It was also shown 
how, pace Stalnaker, other constraint types can also be given a similar grounding. Once a 
conception of natural law as local and real has been adopted, the possible consequences for 
scientific method were traced through, grounded in the work of Nancy Cartwright and Ian 
Hacking. This suggested the model of the inductive process embodied in the predictive 
cycle. 
In the next chapter, the discussion of competence will turn to more psychological concerns. 
Some assumptions concerning the force of nonnative models of confirmation and partial 
interpretation will be re-considered. The chapter will begin by offering a classification of 
types of inference. This will serve to locate and contrast the present competence model 
with other normative theories employed in psychological research. Some of the distinctions 
drawn in chapter 2 will also be shown to be reflected in the psychological data on condi- 
tional reasoning. 
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Chapter 4: The Selection Task: Re-interpretation 
4.1 Introduction 
The role of the preceding chapters has been to motivate a competence model of inference 
and induction which can provide the rational basis for subjects observed patterns of reason- 
ing. The restrictions of presentation have demanded that this model be developed without 
direct appeal to the psychological data which provided the focus for identifying which 
aspects of the normative literature could be instructive. In this chapter this imbalance will 
be redressed, thereby motivating some further distinctions in the way certain normative 
theories have been taken to provide or, more importantly, fail to provide a rational basis for 
subjects behaviour on conditional reasoning tasks. Two principle domains of competence 
will be looked at. 
First, the attempts to formally define a confirmation relation. It will be argued that the para- 
doxes which beset confirmation theory are less paradoxical when the domain of a generali- 
sation is restricted to a small finite set of objects. Experimental results which prima facie 
indicate subjects are falsifying may be interpretable in terms of the adoption of a strategy 
of confirmation which is appropriate to small surveyable domains. Second, the implications 
of partial interpretation will be discussed modulo the observation of a defective truth table 
in many conditional reasoning tasks. Subjects tend , to treat 
false antecedent instances as 
irrelevant to the truth or falsity of a conditional. Prima facie the phenomenon of defective 
truth tables can be provided with a sound rational basis in partial interpretation. It will be 
suggested that the consequences of defective truth tables/partial interpretation have been 
seriously underestimated in the literature. A corollary to this discussion will include some 
comments on Johnson-Laird's (1983,1986b) claim that there can be syntactically 
equivalent semantic schemes. 
However, this chapter will begin by making explicit the kind of inferential behaviour which 
the competence models of the last two chapters are designed to capture. This will make 
precise the contrast between the treatment of conditionals which the present model adopts 
and the treatments which have usually been taken as normative with respect to the psycho- 
logical data on conditional reasoning. The dependence of the present treatment on content 
will then be exampled and discussed. Some experimental data which can be provided with 
a rational grounding directly within the present model will then be introduced. The reason 
being that this data bears most directly on the some of the central concepts of the com- 
petence models. 
4.2 Inference: Deductive, Eductive and Inductive 
There are several well established distinctions in which to frame the question concerning 
the status of an inference (Trusted, 1979). The first is between ampliative and non- 
ampliative inference. An ampliative inference amplffies or goes beyond what is logically 
entailed by the premises. Therefore, by definition, deductive inference is non-ampliative. 
However, this distinction, as is often pointed out, is an unfortunate one. It is frequently arti- 
culated in terms of information: an ampliative inference yields information, whereas an 
non-ampliative one does not. However, a complex chain of deductive inferences can surely 
be informative. It can reveal information not initially explicit in the premises. It will be 
allowed that deduction can be informative in this sense. Perhaps a better way to express the 
distinction is that a non-ampliative inference fails to go beyond what is logically explicit in 
the premises. Then "ampliative" can be used to describe inferences which permit informa- 
Lion gain. 
Normally ampliative inferences are further subdivided into eductive inferences those that 
reason from known particulars to unknown particulars, and inductive inferences, those that 
reason from particulars to generalisations. Again this may be an unfortunate distinction. 
Someone's warrant for predicting an unknown particular from a known particular is nor- 
mally given by some general law which subsumes those particulars. So, the ability to make 
eductions depends upon prior inductions. The terminology has changed from the last 
chapter but basically the distinctions are the same: to make predictions about particular 
events (eductions) requires knowledge of general laws, ie. constraints (inductions). The 
model of the predictive cycle simply makes the relationship between eduction and induction 
explicit. Repeated eductions, ie. predictions of the unknown from the known, constitute the 
basis of induction ie. establishing the generalisation which provides the warrant for those 
eductions. Ampliative deductions however, do not allow either of these two forms of rea- 
soning. Eductions are information gaining in a sense which goes beyond making explicit 
what is logically implicit in a statement. An eduction permits predictions about future unc- 
ertain events. Subsequently in discussing the information gaining role of a conditional 
describing a constraint, we will be concerned with information gain only in the eductive 
sense. 
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Could deduction capture the inferential mode of inference from particular to the general?. 
There is a rule of universal introduction (V) in natural deduction schemes. Perhaps when it 
is valid to universally generalise then there is a deductive argument from the particular to 
the general. However, it is only valid to universally generalise when the particular in ques- 
tion does not depend on any non-logical properties. For example, if one argues about a par- 
ticular triangle in order to establish a general conclusion about all triangles, then the argu- 
ment, to be deductively valid, must not rely on any assumptions concerning the properties 
of that particular triangle (Thomason, 1970). Proofs by mathematical induction proceed in 
this way. If the argument only works for equilateral triangles the argument is not valid for 
all triangles. However, inductive inference is to argue from the instances of Fa to the con- 
clusion that VxFx when Fa is provided on non-logical grounds. The rule of Universal 
introduction explicitly excludes such cases. Induction is an argument from what one might 
call assumptive particulars to generalisations. 
Within inductive inference Trusted (1979) identifies three subcategories: 
(4.1) Spontaneous inductions. 
(4.2) Inductions arrived at by reflective common sense. 
(43) Inductions arrived at through critical scientific study. 
Both (4.1) and (4.2) may be corrected by the more critical methods of justification available 
in (4.3). This classification conforms to the distinctions drawn in the last chapter between 
discovery procedures (4.1,4.2) and justificatory procedures (4.3). 4.1 corresponds to what 
was labelled "bottom-up" learning, and 4.2 to what was labelled "top-down" learning. 
Constraints are the law like relations which permit eductive inferences from known particu- 
lars to unknown particulars in an uncertain world. The competence models which have typ- 
ically been taken as normative with regards to the psychological data on how people fixate 
conditional beliefs have been based on falsification (Popper, 1959). This conception of 
belief fixation derives directly from the logic of the conditional and the universal quantifier. 
Reasons why this procedure fails have already been discussed in chapter 3 and a more pre- 
cise explication of the reasons for its failure will be looked at later on in this chapter in dis- 
cussing the implications of partial interpretation. However, the view that conditionals 
describe constraints serves to contrast the present competence model of human reasoning 
abilities with more conventional models. The contrast is highlighted by considering 3 
sources of the inferential behaviour of a conditional. First, are the rules of inference, for 
example modus ponens and modus tollens. These syntactic rules allow various inferences 
based on the logical form of the sentence. Second, truth conditions, given the truth or fal- 
sity of the constituents of a complex proposition conclusions can be reached concerning the 
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truth or falsity of the whole proposition. Syntactic rules of inference and truth conditions 
govern the logical behaviour of the conditional. However there is a third view; in the real 
world people require rules which permit information gain, in the sense outlined above. 
They need to predict future events, ie. to make eduction. The core hypothesis of this thesis 
is that only once psychology is in possession of a competence model of the information 
gaining or eductive behaviour of conditional rules will a rational basis for subjects inferen- 
tial behaviour be forthcoming. The transitions between mental states which are subse- 
quently grounded in the operative constraints in the world are eductive inferences. Eductive 
inference relies on relations between content, ie. constraints, not logical relations. It is 
unsurprising, therefore, that how beliefs about these relations are fixated relies crucially on 
pragmatic content. 
4.2.1 Content and information gain 
Goodman's grounds for rejecting any attempt to formally derive a confirmation 
relation was based on an argument from the influence of content on induction (cf. ' 
chapter 3). Knowledge of which predicates are projectible is a crucial determinant 
of framing hypotheses which are capable of inductive support. The dependence of 
induction on content can also be illustrated by the fact that spontaneous inductions 
to particular hypotheses are not independent of pragmatic world knowledge. Formal 
attempts to define a confirmation relation was concerned with justificatory pro- 
cedures subsequent o discovery (cf. next section). The idea was to define a relation 
between particular instances and a general hypothesis, such that once discovered 
only those instances which are deductive consequences had the potential to confirm 
(cf. below). However, how a hypothesis is initially framed relies on particular prag- 
matic world knowledge over and above whether the predicates are projectible. For 
example, logically Fa & Ga instances seem equally to suggest the hypothesis that: 
(4.9) Vx(Gx -> Fx) (eg. All black things are ravens) 
or the hypothesis that 
(4.10) Vx(Fx -> Gx) (eg. All ravens are black) 
But it would be absurd to suggest that observations of black ravens equally invite the spon- 
taneous induction to all black things are ravens as well as all ravens are black. Knowledge 
of black non-ravens makes only the latter hypothesis reasonable. The asymmetry here is 
given partly (cf. below) by knowledge of the respective sizes of the domains specified by 
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the predicates. 
(4.10) is a nomic taxonomic constraint: 
Ti <<Raven, x; 1» 
T'r: <<Black, x; 1» 
(4.11) «[n1]=>, T. Tr.; 1» 
The order of indicating type and indicated type encodes information about the relation 
between these predicates (unary-relations). The asymmetry observed between (4.9) and 
(4.10) also reflects the natural subject/predicate order. Although logically both relations 
function as predicates, raven functions naturally as an object identifier, and black as a 
qualifier. This is also a pragmatic function of the predicates which is reliant on content. 
There would appear to be a natural classification of predicates into those which identify 
particular classes of individuals and those which qualify the properties of those individuals 
which may be shared by many classes. This establishes the order of predicates in a 
hypothesis which allows predictions. If you know its a raven you can predict it will be 
black, but if you know its black you can't predict it will be a raven. The relation which 
holds between these classes in virtue of pragmatic world knowledge can only be class 
inclusion. The domain of objects identified in the indicating type cannot be smaller than the 
domain of the qualifier in the indicated type. The relation of class inclusion prototypically 
licenses inferences which accord with falsification. Central to this mode of reasoning is the 
concept of single "instances", or relative to a unifying relation like "traveling" (cf. chapter 
2) single occurrences, possessing various properties. 
In a taxonomic constraint the instance in question is identified in the indicating type and 
qualified in the indicated type. This is why the class inclusion relation is appropriate. 
However, in a non-taxonomic constraint discrete occurrences of events are related by a 
higher order relation, like cause, enablement, permission etc. (Although the possibility 
must be admitted that dependent on pragmatic world knowledge the relation which does 
exist may permit inferences which concur with those licensed by class inclusion. ) In non- 
taxonomic constraints there is a discrete indicated type. For example. 
TE: «Turn light_switch: x; 1» & «Switch_A, x; 1» 
T' : «Light on. y; 1» & «My_hall_light. y; 1» 
(4.12) «[n]=>, T., T 'r. T' r.; 
1» 
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(4.12) expresses the nomic constraint holding between turning switch A and my hall light 
coming on. T' Z will include background types like the electricity is not cut off, the bulb 
is working etc. T. and T',, are discrete events which are causally related. The asymmetry 
is in part mediated by pragmatic knowledge of this causal relation. However, unlike the 
taxonomic constraint it seems that the indicated type can also be educted from the indicat- 
ing type. If the light is on I can educt to the switch A having been turned. However, the 
asymmetry is partly re-established by the causal/temporal asymmetry which means that 
when the eduction tracks causality it is called prediction and when it reverses this direction 
it is called explanation. This too is a function of pragmatic world knowledge. 
Constraints license eductive inferences from known to unknown. In particular circumstances 
a constraint will license an eduction which reverses the temporal/causal order. For example 
a causal constrain can possess a corresponding explanatory constraint which reverses real 
order. Explanatory constraints, while licensing eductions, reverse real order and are parasi- 
tic upon the actuality of the causal case. You can explain an effect by its cause but not a 
cause by its effect (but cf. below on teleological explanation). 
Conventions are slightly different. Two forms of a convention can be distinguished: 
(AP) If AC ION, then PENALTY, and 
(PA) If PRE-CONDmON, then ACTION 
They are related insofar as a failure of PA is likely to transitively involve an Al', eg. driving 
a car (action) without a driving license (precondition) is likely to incur a stiff fine (penalty). 
Prima facie AP mirrors the causal case. The incursion of the penalty can be explained by 
the performance of the action, but the performance of the action can not be explained by 
the incursion of the penalty. Unless it was someone's intention to incur that penalty, ie. this 
was the goal he had in mind when performing the action. There is a distinction between 
causal explanation and teleological (goal directed) explanation. Relative to goal directed 
explanations the order of indicating and indicated types may be reversed. However this 
applies equally well to causal constraints which are employed in teleological explanations. 
For example, (it is assumed that an explanation is an answer to a why-question: cf. van 
Fraassen, 1980). If the question is posed, "Why did she whip him? ", the explanation may 
be that she wanted to cause pain, ie. it invokes the causal relation between lacerated skin 
and pain. The pain is caused by the lacerated skin, although the explanation of her action 
was the effect, not the cause. Teleological explanations, reverse the "natural" ordering of 
events (actions) in time. 
-72. 
However, even goals are directed, to achieve them you must do one thing before the other 
teleological explanations still rely on the natural ordering of events/actions in time. There is 
also ample psychological and linguistic evidence that unless explicitly marked to the con- 
trary, either by tense or modality, or countermanded by pragmatic world knowledge, the 
antecedent-consequent order in a conditional encodes the natural casual/action/temporal or 
predictive order (Akatsuka, 1986; McCawley, 1980; Evans & Newstead, 1977; Evans, 
1977; Evans, 1982). So unless there are contrary indications, it can be assumed that condi- 
tionals reflect this due to the natural ordering of constraints. However, the particular educ- 
tions, transitions between mental states, which constraints license can go in either direction. 
Henceforth, "Reasoning in the explanatory direction", will be used to refer to the use of a 
constraint to educt to a prior cause, reason, or precondition. 
The asymmetry between a constraint and its converse explanatory constraint is again given 
by pragmatic world knowledge. Furthermore, this knowledge influences the way a non- 
taxonomic constraint and its corresponding explanatory constraint can be used. Two issues 
are raised in reasoning in the explanatory direction. First, given (4.12) if the light is not on 
this is not necessarily explained by switch A not being turned, the electricity may be shut 
off, the bulb has blown etc. So the context sensitivity of the constraint invalidates infer- 
ences by modus tollen. Second, if the light is on this is not invariably explained by switch 
A having been turned. As it so happens, in my hall there is another light switch, lets call it 
B, which also operates the hall light. So, there is an additional constraint in operation, 
which acts as an additional possible cause of the light being on. If the light is on, it could 
have been because switch B was turned. In general, events tend to have many possible 
causes which legislates against unrestricted reasoning in the explanatory direction (cf. 
3.4.1). Unrestricted explanatory reasoning from the non-occurrence of the indicating type 
(known) to the non-occurrence of the indicated type (unknown) or from the occurrence of 
the indicated type (known) to the occurrence of the indicating type (unknown), would only 
be rational in very constrained circumstances. This contrasts with the taxonomic constraint 
in (4.11), where the scarcity of albino ravens renders a modus tollen inference rational, but 
the knowledge of the respective domains renders an inference corresponding to affirming 
the consequent unreasonable. 
Situation theory facilitates the regimentation of the distinction between taxonomic and non- 
taxonomic constraints which permits the ready classification of the asymmetry in the kinds 
of inferences warranted by each. Formal attempts to define a confirmation relation fail due 
to the incursion of content into the inductive process. Possessing a conception of laws as 
the structural relations in our world which license information gain, allows encoding these 
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contentful relations and provide some concept of how they mediate inductive inference (cf. 
the predictive cycle). In the next section, constraints, taxonomic and non-taxonomic, will be 
shown to provide a rational basis for some of the behaviour observed in Wason's task. 
4.2.2 Disjoint vs unified rules and belief bias 
In this section some empirical evidence will be considered for the distinction between the 
way subjects perform on the task modulo the very concept of a constraint and the distinc- 
tion between taxonomic and non-taxonomic constraints. Prior to a discussion of the relevant 
experiments (Wason & Green, 1984), the standard selection task will be re-introduced. 
Wason's (1966) task concerns how people assess evidence relevant to the truth or falsity of 
a rule expressed by means of a conditional sentence, normally using the if... then linguistic 
construction. Subjects were presented with four cards each having a number on one side 
and a letter on the other. On being presented with a rule such as, "if there is a vowel on 
one side, then there is an even number on the other" and four cards, one with each of the 
following letter showing on the upwardly turned face: 
A(P) K(-np) 2(q) 7(-, 9) 
they would have to select those cards they must turn over to determine whether the rule 
was true or false. The original assumption was that this assessment would be dependent on 
the form of the construction used to express the rule. Subjects responses should be predict- 
able from truth tables which supply the meanings of the various logical terms. A condi- 
tional, P -> q is true just in case either p is false or q is true, conversely it is false just in 
case p is true and q is false. So, the rule is true if and only if ("iff') all cards either have 
consonants on one side or all have an even number on one side, or some mixture of both 
such that each card has one or the other or both. Conversely, it is false if one card has a 
vowel on one side and an odd number on the other side. Either way, only the "A" card and 
the "7" card must be turned over. If a subject is exhaustively trying to make the rule true 
then these are the only undecided cases. If a subject is trying to make the rule false then 
these are the only cases with the potential to do so. Typical results on this task were p and 
q cards (42%), p card only (33%), p, q, -, q cards (7%), p and -, q (4%) (Johnson-Laird & 
Wason, 1970). The preponderance of p, q and p only cards was taken as evidence for sub- 
jects adopting a verification principle, ie. they are looking just for pq instances. 
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Wason & Green (1984) identified a distinction directly related to that between taxonomic 
and non-taxonomic constraints as an important determinant of subjects performance in a 
reduced array version (RAST) of the selection task (Johnson-Laird & Wason, 1970). In the 
RAST subjects are only allowed to make selections concerning the consequent cards. In 
their experiment 3, the materials used were either coloured shapes and a rule such as: 
(4.13) All the triangles are red. 
which they referred to as the unified condition, or cards divided in two with a shape on one 
half and coloured on the other half, with a rule such as: 
(4.14) All the cards which have a triangle on one half are red on the other half. 
which they referred to as the disjoint condition. A "mental" version of the RAST was used. 
Subjects had to imagine that the shapes were in a case. Their task was to prove the relevant 
claim true by requesting information about the various coloured shapes using the smallest 
number of instances. Significantly more falsificatory responses were observed for the 
unified condition over the disjoint condition. On the suggestion of Johnson-Laird, Wason & 
Green also repeated the experiment correcting for sentence complexity (4.14 is considerably 
more linguistically complex than 4.13); the same pattern of results was obtained. 
Rule (4.13) is directly analogous to (4.10), so analogous predictions would be expected of 
this taxonomic constraint. By parity of reasoning, with only consequent cards to choose 
from, subjects should select -red cards. An instance which is -, red can not be a proper 
anchor for a triangle given the restriction in the indicated type, ie. they stand in a class 
inclusion relation, with the restriction as the superordinate category. The domain of red 
objects can be assumed to be larger by parity of reasoning with ravens example and so the 
red card is not turned. However, there is a distinction between (4.13) and (4.10): the 
objects in Wason & Green's experiment form a closed finite domain The domain is made 
explicit by the prepositional phrase in (4.15): 
(4.15) All the red things in the case, are triangles. 
In subsequent sections this will be identified as a further major determinant of subjects 
apparently falsificatory behaviour on this version of the task. 
(4.14) is pragmatically ambiguous. The disjoint nature of the materials means that the rule 
is expressed as if it were a non-taxonomic constraint relating discrete events. The natural 
subject/predicate ordering has been broken up in the process. Both predicates now qualify 
different parts of a single object. This creates ambiguity because the only relation which 
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can exist between antecedent and, consequent is class inclusion. That is, those cards with a 
triangle on one half are included4the class of cards which are red on one half. However, the 
disjoint expression of this taxonomic constraint appears to override this interpretation. And 
in the absence of any other constraints which could possibly block a prediction (explana- 
tory direction) from red to triangle they request information relevant to confirming the rule. 
How would (4.14) be regimented in situation theory? Despite its disjoint expression, the 
antecedent and consequent of (4.14) are about the same thing, ie. the cards. This satisfies 
the criteria for a taxonomic constraint. In chapter 2, taxonomic constraints were defined as 
those were the paramters of the indicated type were included in the indicating type. Argu- 
ment roles and restrictions encode the type-token hierarchies in which the objects that can 
be assigned to these roles are located. Similarly, the minor constituents of a relation are 
parts of a state of affairs of a type identified by the major constituent. The relation between 
major and minor constituents encodes certain restricted part-whole hierarchies. Given a par- 
ticular relation the minor constituents are the logical (or perhaps analytic would be more 
felicitous) constituents of the relation. It seems unobjectionable to use the same mechanism 
to encode contingent physical part-whole relationships. Allowing the card halves to function 
as argument roles (4.14) could be regimented as in (4.16): 
Ti <<Card, one-half.: x, other-half: y; 1» & <<Triangle, x; 1» 
Ti: «Red, y; 1» 
(4.16) «[nd=>, T., T 'Z., 1» 
(4.16) is still a taxonomic constraint. However, to grasp the inclusion relation subjects must 
treat the card as providing the unifying object of which the sides are parts. The disjoint 
expression of the rule seems to legislate against such an interpretation, which would be 
equivalent to suppressing the first conjunct in the indicating type, leaving just the restriction 
in the second conjunct. This of course, results in a non-taxonomic interpretation. Since, if 
the first conjunct is suppressed then it is no longer the case that the parameters of the indi- 
cated type are included in the indicating type. This is not to suggest a psychological 
mechanism but merely to illustrate the plausible interpretational effect of the disjoint rule 
expression. 
Further empirical results seem rational form the perspective of the competence model. This 
is the work of Pollard (1979) and Pollard & Evans (1981) on truth status effects and belief 
bias. The asymmetry observed between 
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(4.9) All black things are ravens, and 
(4.10) All ravens are black 
is exemplary of belief bias. (4.9) is not a hypothesis subjects are likely to believe to be 
true on the basis of their beliefs about the world. Rules believed false would be more likely 
to yield falsificatory responses. If you don't believe (4.9) you are likely to believe that 
there are black non-ravens and so look for non-ravens which are black. Pollard (1979) 
explicitly varied subjects familiarity with a pack of cards such that it was invariably the 
case that, say an A always had a2 on the other side. Affirmative rules which suggested a 
correlation between A and cards other than 2, yielded significantly more falsificatory 
responses than rules which conformed with subjects experience of the pack. Pollard & 
Evans (1981) conducted a similar experiment using contentful or thematic material and 
observed similar results. It would appear that prior beliefs concerning whether a positive or 
negative correlation holds between antecedent and consequent will effect subjects perfor- 
mance. 
Pollard and Evans (1981) suggest an associational explanation for these results. Learned 
associations between antecedent and consequent mediate subjects strategies for confirming 
rules. Being attuned to a constraint just is using the learned associations between events in 
the world to make predictions. Constraints may be positive or negative. In the later case a 
preclusion relation holds between these events (cf. chapt 2, chapt 6). It would be fair to say 
that what this thesis is attempting to do is work out a pragmatic (Evans, 1982: 212) associa- 
tional account of this data which is as rigorous as possible while allowing that (i) the stan- 
dard task is inductive, (ii) task behaviour is reliant on pragmatic world knowledge, and (iii) 
the real world relations subjects' reasoning depends upon are context sensitive. 
The distinction between taxonomic and non-taxonomic constraints and their usual modes of 
expression appear to critically influence subjects selection task performance. When the rule 
is expressed in a way which permits conceptualisation of the described situation in terms of 
instances, the class inclusion relation appropriate to a taxonomic constraint is evoked. Infer- 
ences are therefore licensed which apparently concur with falsification. However, when the 
rule is expressed disjointly, thereby identifying a non-taxonomic constraint different modes 
of thought are engaged. Rather than identifying instances which have the various properties, 
this elicits a predict and explain strategy appropriate to determining whether one discrete 
event is a good predictor of another (cf. above). In all standard selection tasks the require- 
ment to display only one side of the card or otherwise restrict information, means that the 
rules are always expressed disjointly. This ambiguity will prove central to explaining the 
results on standard versions of the task. The closed domain employed in Wason & Greens's 
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task will also be identified as influential in determining task performance. This will be dis- 
cussed in the next section, where it will be shown that certain paradoxes which beset 
confirmation theory (cf. chapter 3) may appear less paradoxical in small surveyable 
domains. It will be shown how the factors involved provide a rational basis for subjects 
behaviour in versions of the task similar to Wason & Green's (1984). The purpose of this 
discussion will be to highlight the differences in these tasks and the standard version. The 
remainder of the thesis will then concentrate solely on explicating the rational basis of sub- 
jects divergent behaviour in standard versions of the task. 
4.3 Confirmation, surveyable domains and the COST 
The modal response of p and q cards observed in standard versions of the selection task 
was taken to argue that subjects are attempting to verify the rule (Wason, 1966; Wason & 
Johnson-Laird, 1972; Evans, 1982). The normative competence model assumed in interpret- 
ing this data has been Popper's principle of falsification. This lead to a verificatory pro- 
cedure to be labelled a bias. However, attempts to formally define a confirmation relation 
were discussed in the last chapter. The reasons for the failure of these formal systems are 
highly instructive concerning the kinds of strategies appropriate to closed domain selection 
tasks like Wason & Green's (1984). 
Nicod's criterion involved a property restriction on the domain of the implicit universal 
quantifier. Another type of restriction is an objectual restriction, where the domain of the 
quantifier is restricted to a limited finite set of objects. Von Wright (1957) introduced such 
a restriction, known as the Postulate of Completely Known Instances, in articulating the 
elliptically present premises required to tam induction into deduction. Goodman also makes 
use of the distinction in explicating the difference between an accidental generalisation and 
a scientific law. In order to confirm an accidental generalisation, eg. all the coins in my 
pocket today are silver, all the coins in my pocket would have to be surveyed before it 
could be confirmed. However, a putative scientific law may be accepted without all the evi- 
dence being available. 
The domain of the quantifier in Wason's task is explicitly restricted to just the four cards. 
Therefore, the rule would appear to be a prototypical accidental generalisation. However, 
the. cards are not completely known so without turning the cards the truth of the rule cannot 
be deduced. Nonetheless, the restricted domain does appear to lessen the paradoxical status 
of the Ravens example. In a domain of only 4 cards, relative to the eile If vowel one side, 
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even number on the other. the information that a card which has not got an even number 
on one side also has not got a vowel on the other, is confirmatory. It does not disconfirm 
and hence confirms. What it is rational to treat as confirmatory in a finite surveyable 
domain may be irrational in a potentially infinite or at least very large and unsurveyable 
domain. In the latter case the set of potential non-disconfinning instances will be prohibi- 
tively large. For example, the set of non-black non-ravens is far larger than the still unsur- 
veyable set of ravens. The paradoxical status of the ravens example may only be attribut- 
able to the unsurveyable domains of a scientific law. Despite this subjects do not look at 
the cards which could correspond to --p, -, q instances (K & 7), rather they appear to ver- 
ify, ie. look for only potential p, q instances. 
However, it has been observed (Beattie & Baron, 1988) that selection of an A-card on the 
task is ambiguous between verification and falsification. This card could be selected 
because of its potential to falsify. It can also be observed that in tasks like Wason's & 
Green's (1984, expt. 3/4), where subjects appeared to falsify and there was a small finite 
domain of objects, selection of -, q instances is similarly ambiguous. Subjects could be ask- 
ing for this instance because if the rule is true they expect -gyp on the other side, ie. they are 
looking for -, p, -q instances to confirm. Tasks like the selection task and Wason and 
Green's (1984) RAST do not permit identification of whether subjects are looking for -, p, 
-, q instances to confirm or p, -, q instances to falsify. Hence, Wason's & Green's result 
may be due to the finite domain of cards which encourages a confirmation strategy (as 
opposed to verification). The strategies subjects' employ can not be distinguished between 
on the basis of this data. 
One way around this problem is to elicit protocols concerning subjects justification for 
selecting a card. However, it has often been observed that subjects' verbal justifications do 
not match there actual task behaviour (Evans & Wason, 1976; Evans, 1982). This has lead 
to the suggestion of dual processes in subjects reasoning (Wason & Evans, 1975; Evans, 
1980a, 1980b). Rapid automatic processes operate to determine subjects initial responses 
but higher level conscious processes are implicated in their subsequent verbal justifications. 
This distinction will have a role to play later on in discussing the processes which are 
responsible for determining subjects rule interpretations. However, Wason's and Evans' 
arguments concerning protocol data tend to argue against its employment in determining the 
strategies subjects are actually adopting during the selection phase of these experiments. 
However, Beattie & Baron (1988) introduce a procedure which could potentially distinguish 
between confirmation in small finite domains and falsification. They employed a similar 
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task to Wason & Green (1984) (experiment 3). In both tasks the domain is explicitly 
closed, ie. objectually restricted. To mark this I propose a new term for these experiments: 
Closed domain Selection Tasks (COSTS). Wason & Green's version employed a reduced 
array: COST 
a. 
Beattie & Baron's instructions were to fully identify the cards which they 
thought would be informative, specifying both sides of the cards. They call this procedure a 
multi-card task: COS mu. Four cards were drawn from a pack of 21 cards penning all the 
possibilities of numbers 1 to 3, and letters A to G. These four cards were placed in a bag. 
Subjects had to construct, write down, all the cards they would want to see that could be 
informative concerning the rules truth or falsity. Given an affirmative rule, if A, then 2, if 
they were falsifying, they should look for p, -q instances, and if they were confirming in a 
finite domain they should look for -9, --, q instances. Subjects predominantly chose falsify- 
ing instances, almost no -,, -, q instances were chosen. However, the same subjects invari- 
ably made the standard verification selections in an abstract selection task. 
In spite of this apparently conclusive data, perhaps what subjects are doing is not purely 
falsificatory. Beatie & Baron classified subjects responses as falsificatory on the basis of the 
following observation: 
(4.17) "Many subjects argued that one should first look for any potentially falsifying 
cards, indicating that their presence would prove the rule false. However, if none 
was found, one should then check that at least one A-card was present, lest the 
rule be vacuous. We felt that this argument successfully demonstrated the princi- 
ples of falsification and hence scored it as correct" 
However, the strategy subjects reveal here is wholly consistent with confirming in a finite 
domain. Subjects could be asidng for instances with the potential to disconfinn, as long 
they don't, they confirm. But there must be at least one positive instance "lest the rule be 
vacuous". 
In real world inquiry in a finite domain this strategy is wholly rational. For example, in a 
hardware shop Johnny is asked to check that all the 1" pipes are threaded. Johnny reasons 
thus: he knows that most of the pipes are threaded (they are supposed to arrive from the 
factory that way), given this information he is far better advised to check all unthreaded 
pipes to check they are not 1", than all 1" pipes to check they are threaded. As long as this 
is the case, he can report back that indeed all the 1" pipes are threaded. But if the reason 
for the check is that threaded 1" pipes are needed, then he better make sure there are at 
least some 1" pipes. In a finite domain this procedure leads to certain knowledge of the 
truth of the hypothesis. It also relies on some prior knowledge of the likely distribution of 
threaded and unthreaded pipes. But this is incidental when it is considered that the accepted 
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grounds for adopting a falsificatory strategy is that one can never be certain that a 
hypothesis is true, but one can falsify with certainty (Popper, 1959). But in a small survey- 
able domain this is false. Falsification is considered rational because the domains under 
consideration are unsurveyable and hence truth can never be guaranteed. But in a small 
finite domain, relative to knowledge of prior distributions, confirming by discounting poten- 
tially falsifying instances is rational. 
Wason's task was devised as a test of subjects ability to evaluate scientific hypotheses 
(Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972). Such hypotheses are stated without objectual restrictions 
on the domain of the implicit universal quantifier. Scientific laws and constraints are 
required to allow prediction in as yet unknown, unsurveyed domains and not just particular 
restricted, surveyable domains. The strategies appropriate to each are different. The putative 
evidence for falsification functions equally as evidence for a particular confirmation stra- 
tegy. To demonstrate falsification would require subjects not to accept any positive 
instance as confirmatory. This renders falsification implausible as a psychological pro- 
cedure. albeit arguably the counterintuitive procedure scientists should adopt with regard to 
their hypotheses, such an unremitting commitment to fallibilism is not wholly rational. The 
context sensitivity of most constraints or laws means they may not be susceptible to direct 
falsification (cf. below and Putnam, 1974). 
Evidence from the COSTS is equivocal with regard to whether subjects are adopting a 
falsificatory procedure. If the domain is closed then strategies of confirmation may be eli- 
cited which appear consistent with falsification. It is important to identify the factors which 
are responsible for the divergent behaviour on the standard selection task. The rest of this 
section is devoted to determining the relevant respects of similarity and difference between 
these tasks and the standard version. It will be argued that the circumstantial manipulations 
of the task affect subjects interpretations of the rules, and therefore their subsequent stra- 
tegies of confirmation. 
In Beattie & Baron's task subjects knew all the relevant instances and had to evaluate 
whether an instance would be informative with regard to the rules truth or falsity. In 
Wason & Green's task subjects could ask about only the colour of the card. Wason & 
Green (1984) also observed facilitation on the task when using a" more concrete procedure 
where information about the cards was restricted by the use of masks, which argues 
strongly that the unified rule condition was responsible. However, Beattie and Baron used 
only disjoint rules but still observed a facilitation in a COST. Which argues that the closed 
domain is also *responsible for the adoption of apparently falsificatory procedures. So, then: 
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was facilitation for disjoint rules in a COST in Beattie and Baron (1988), but a correspond- 
ing failure to observe facilitation in a COST using disjoint rules by Wason & Green (1984). 
The discrepancy can be plausibly resolved by considering the response procedures 
employed. Beattie & Baron's task was not a RAST, subjects had to evaluate pairs in imagi- 
nation as relevant or not to the truth or falsity of the rile. The closed domain functions to 
elicit the consideration of "falsifying" pairs. In Wason & Greeen (1984), subjects had to 
identify one half of the pair, which is equivalent to having to use' the rule to explain whats 
on the other half. 
Beattie and Baron (1988) observed that a frequent misunderstanding made by subjects was 
the belief that the four cards in a selection task represented a sample of a much larger 
population. They discuss this factor as a possible determinant of the discrepancy observed 
between the same subjects COSTmu performance and standard selection task performance. 
However, they conclude that it is probably not the crucial factor. They reason that in the 
four card problem there are many more potential combinations as the domain of numbers 
and letters is not fixed as in the COSTmu. On the back of any letter there is a potentially 
infinite number of possibilities and 26 on the back ofeach number. They argue against the 
hypothesis that respective domain size is important based on an unpublished experiment 
where they restricted the letters to A&B, and the numbers to 2&3. They observed worse 
(less "falsification") performance, albeit not significantly. 
This procedure fails to identify the relevant dimensions of the domain. It is not the number 
of possible numbers or letters which is important, but the size of the domain of possible 
instances functioning as tokens of the type mentioned in the eile. The rule is inherently 
general, it states that cards which are tokens of the type such that there is an A on one 
side, are also tokens of the type which has a2 on the other side. It is the size of the 
abstract classes, relative to the fact that there may be many tokens of the stated type, which 
is important not the fact that many numbers are members of the class not-2. The cards are 
drawn from a pack containing the set of possible instances which represents the appropriate 
dimension of generality that needs to be controlled. The critical manipulation would be to 
remove the generality and observe more "falsificatory" responding. This could be achieved 
using the past tense indicative, rather than the present tense. Conditionals in the present 
tense and the indicative mood (all rules used in this task are of this linguistic form) usually 
express generalities. However, take: 
(4.18) If there was an A on one side, then there was a2 on the other. 
The task-cards are then hypothetical instances of this single card, subjects have to identify 
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which hypothetical instances of this single card could prove the asserter of (4.18) right or 
wrong. (This suggestion is not actively explored here, but subsequent work will look at this 
hypothesis). 
It would appear that in the COST the closed domain functions to license a strategy of 
confirmation appropriate to a limited surveyable domain which allows instances which do 
not disconfirm to confirm. However, a unified rule expression also permits the 
identification of a falsificatory strategy even if it is ambiguous as to whether the domain is 
open or closed. In most versions of the selection task the rule is disjointly expressed and on 
the assumption that subjects take the rule to apply to an open domain then the predictive 
cycle -strategy is appropriate. This will form the basis of providing a rational foundation for 
subjects standard selection task behaviour in the next chapter. The task versions surveyed 
here indicate that various manipulations are affecting subjects actual interpretations of the 
rules, including the domain of the implicit universal quantifier. However, these manipula- 
tions are not all concerned directly with the rule expression it self. It seems as though cir- 
cumstantial pragmatic features of the task are entering into subjects rule interpretations 
which subsequently affect their strategies of inquiry. This argues that logical semantics may 
provide to narrow a definition of "interpretation". to function as a standard for judging 
psychological performance. It would appear that such pragmatic factors are directly impli- 
cated in subjects rule interpretations. In the area of sentence processing it has been esta- 
blished that any distinction between semantics and pragmatics is purely a matter of formal 
convenience and need not imply autonomy at the cognitive level (Crain & Steedman, 1985; 
Marslen-Wilson & Tyler, 1980). Perhaps then circumstantial features of the specific tasks 
enter into subjects rule interpretations. Such circumstantial determinants of subjects perfor- 
mance may also derive from their prior beliefs concerning sizes of respective domains, and 
the relationships asserted to exist between antecedent and consequent. 
In Barwise & Perry's terminology interpretation also depends upon an individual 
interpreter's resource situation, ie. the disposition of the environment (the task require- 
ments) and his prior beliefs. The strategies appropriate to fixating conditional beliefs will 
vary as a function of these manipulations because they affect the interpretation of the rule. 
This implicitly rejects the idea that there is one and only one normative strategy for fixating 
conditional beliefs. However, the bulk of the variation may well operate in small finite 
domains relative to differences in known a priori distributions. For example, Johnny may 
have no prior knowledge concerning whether there are more threaded or unthreaded pipes. 
Concern then centres on the . respective distributions of 1" and other pipes. If there are 
likely to be far less 1" pipes than others, then looking for 1" pipes to check that they are 
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threaded is more rational than checking the unthreaded pipes to see that they are not 1" (cf. 
Klayman & Ha, 1987, and below). However, in open domains where often such a priori 
knowledge is unavailable fewer options present themselves. 
By considering the paradoxes which emerge for confirmation theory it has been shown how 
an account of task performance in the COST can be derived which does not indicate that the 
manipulations performed involve the facilitation of purely falsificatory behaviour. Closed 
domain tasks are however, non-standard. In the tasks standard form a disjoint rule is 
employed which countermands the consideration of instances in favour of a relation 
between discrete occurrences. Only the standard selection task will be considered in the 
rest of this thesis. 
In the discussion of confirmation theory (cf. chapter 3), it was mentioned that Belnap had 
defined a connective he called "conditional assertion". In the psychological literature this 
concept has been appealed to in accounting for the observation of a defective truth table 
(Wason, 1966). In some tasks, subjects behaviour indicates that they believe false 
antecedent instances of a rule are irrelevant to its truth or falsity. Prima facie partial 
interpretation provides a rational basis for this behaviour, which also implicates this obser- 
vation as the principle determinant of the why falsificatory behaviour is not usually rational. 
However, in the psychological literature the observation of defective truth tables has not 
been influential. The reasons for this will be explored in the next section where it will be 
shown that partial interpretation has far reaching consequences for the rational interpretation 
of this data. 
4.4. Partial interpretation and defective truth tables 
If Johnny finishes his check and reports back to his boss that indeed all the 1" pipes are 
threaded but he didn't check to see whether there were any 1" pipes, what would his 
bosses reaction be on arriving at a job and discovering he had no 1" pipes? I suggest his 
response would be unprintable. If the rule is vacuous, the boss is unlikely to concede its 
truth. This is no doubt mediated by the fact that a rule which is "true" vacuously does not 
permit the effective planning of subsequent action. Or, perhaps, more felicitously it may 
elicit inappropriate action. If Johnny's boss knew the rule was "true" but vacuous, rather 
than go on the job, he would have ordered more 1" pipes. Possessing the right information 
is crucial to planning appropriate action. Since this is the case, just looking for -p, -, q 
instances may well be confirmatory, but only if there are some p instances. 
$4- 
I 
Wason (1966) proposed that subjects may reason with a defective truth table which assigns 
the value irrelevant ("? ") to false antecedent instances. Several truth table tasks have sub- 
sequently borne out this observation. In a truth table task subjects are either asked to 
evaluate instances as true, false or irrelevant (Johnson-Laird & Tagart, 1969; Evans, 1975; 
Evans & Newstead, 1977; Evans, 1983b), or are asked to construct verifying or falsifying 
instances (the irrelevant category being inferred, cf. chapter 6) (Evans, 1972). Wason's con- 
ception of a defective truth table was based on the Quine-Rhinelander idea concerning con- 
ditional assertion which motivated Belnap's (1970) definition of a non-contraposing condi- 
tional connective. This proposal may get round Johnny's problem. -gyp, -, q instances are 
irrelevant, and hence do not disconfinn. Perhaps then it can be allowed that if he only dis- 
covers -p, -, q instances he can report that the rule is confirmed but vacuously so, and 
therefore the truth of the rule is undecided. This proposal is legitimate since the 
confirmation relation relates an instance to a generality, it does not relate all instances to 
that generality. If the domain extends to all pipes, wherever they may be then a different 
question is being raised which goes beyond Johnny's epistemic resources to decide upon. 
Hence, although each instance confirmed, taken together all the instances (in the pipe box) 
do not legislate positively with regard to the truth of the hypothesis. 
Situation theory captures this phenomenon by the use of partial interpretation relative to a 
limited situation. The rule Johnny is checking concerns a taxonomic constraint about 1" gas 
pipes which should be threaded. 
Ti «1 "pipe. x; 1» 
T 'z.: <<Threaded, x; 1» 
(4.19) C: «[n1]=>. T.. T'r 1» 
Let the situation under consideration s be that given by the content of the pipe box. If s 1= 
C, then for any anchor f such that s 1= T(j] it is also the case that s 1= T'(/]. Whether a con- 
straint holds in not reducible to the right hand side of this statement, necessary and 
sufficient conditions are not being specified. First, there may be no anchor for the indicat- 
ing type, in which case C may hold or not, but equally there may be an unthreaded 1" pipe 
but other relevant conditions are operative which means that C still applies, ie. there could 
be a particular background type was not fixed in s. For example, suppose Johnny, observes 
some 1" pipes which are unthreaded. Relative to the situation s as he currently individuates 
it, s 1= C is false. But he did notice that all the unthreaded 1" pipes were bends. So when 
he reports back to the boss he says, "Not all the 1" pipes were threaded, but all the 
unthreaded pipes were bends", the boss replies "Thats OK, the bends are never threaded". 
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This new information changes the situation, as long as the unthreaded 1" pipes are bends, 
the new situation s' supports C. Partial interpretation captures the context sensitivity of peo- 
pies reasoning. 
"1 
Wason's proposal that people possess a defective truth table has not been influential in 
psychological theorising about the selection task, despite the existence of corroboratory evi- 
dence. This appears to be due to the assessment that it should not affect subjects perfor- 
mance. This clearly contradicts the view presented here, hence an argument is required to 
demonstrate why this assessment may be wrong. 
The above interpretation relies on capturing the appearance of truth value gaps in a particu- 
lar way. Certain partial states of the world enter into the semantic analysis to encode con- 
text (as observed in chapter 2, Veltman (1985,1986) achieves a similar result by appealing 
to epistemic information states). Relative to these bits of the world the truth functions 
which take propositions into truth values are partial. However, some logicians have sug- 
gested that a third (or more) truth values should be admitted in order to capture truth value 
gaps. Rarely do the other value(s) share the same status as true and false, they tend to 
have rather specific connotations dependent on the philosophical/logical purpose to which 
they are being put (cf. Haack, 1975: Appendix). For example, Kleene's (1952) third truth 
value has a meaning given by the concept of a partial function, it simply means undefined. 
This is because he was proffering an analysis of recursive functions. Reichenbach's (1944) 
third truth value was assigned to sentences "about entities which, in certain conditions, it is 
impossible to measure" (Haack, 1975: 172). This was because he was concerned with issues 
surrounding the measurement problem in Quantum physics. Truth tables for all the connec- 
tives are defined in these systems. 
Johnson-Laird & Tagart (1969) observed that subjects responses in a truth table task were 
consistent with a defective truth table for the conditional. They argue that on this interpreta- 
don the contrapositive does not hold but that the -, q card is, "a required choice on any rea- 
sonable interpretation of the conditional, including even the non-standard interpretation of 
the present experiment. " (Johnson-Laird & Tagart, 1969: 372), ie. falsificatory behaviour is 
still to be expected. Let us assess this argument. The contrapositive fails immediately: for 
the equivalence to hold the formula p -> q and -, q -> -+p would have to be assigned the 
same truth values for every combination of assignments to p and q, but given the defective 
truth table this is no longer the case. However, as usually articulated falsification relies on 
the validity of modus tollen, ie. p -> q, -, q I= -p. Prima facie this is no longer a tautol- 
ogy because there is no assignment which satisfies both p -> q and -, q, they can never be 
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true together. p -> q is only true (on the defective truth table account) when q is true 
(hence -q false) and p true (hence -p false). Unless the definition of tautological implica- 
tion (1=) (cf. Enderton, 1972) is altered, this means that modus tollens is not valid when a 
defective truth table is countenanced. However, to make a proper determination of this 
claim requires the irrelevant category to ramify throughout the logic in the appropriate way. 
It may be the case that when the connectives are fully defined for a third truth value then, 
modus tollens is valid. For example, in Kleene's strong 3-valued system modus tollens is 
valid; in Reichenbach's scheme for alternative implication it is not (cf. Haack, 1975). In 
Veltman's (1985,1986) data-logic, modus tollens is generally invalid, except in the limiting 
case when a chain of information states is complete and "->" gets the meaning of material 
implication. 
Does falsification rely on modus tollens? As usually articulated, yes. But falsification con- 
cerns hypotheses which are universally quantified, as are all the rules in the selection task. 
As long as the same instances of a conditional are false, then a universal claim stated over 
some set of objects will be false dependent on the semantics of the quantifier. Relative to 
the domain of the model, a universal claim is true if all substitutions of the objects for the 
variable bound by the quantifier possess the pro perty made in the claim. So, in the domain 
of ravens, a claim Vxblack(x) is true if each raven is black, it is false if one raven is not 
black. Restricted quantification as articulated in Nicod's criterion is equivalent to the claim 
that the antecedent implicitly identifies the non-empty domain of the appropriate model. But 
what value is assigned to the quantifier when the domain is empty. This is just the same 
question as what value do we assign the conditional when the antecedent is false!. By con- 
vention and to preserve bivalence, in these vacuous circumstances the quantifier is assigned 
true. But this assignment is unlikely to impress Johnny's boss, if there are no 1" pipes he 
needs to know that the rule is vacuous. 
The interpretation of the quantifier depends on the domain of the model. When this is 
fixed, the appropriate context of the generalisation has been identified and when this is the 
case a p. -, q instance falsifies. Let us return to Johnny, who has just observed that some 1" 
pipes are unthreaded but that they are all bends. Relative to the domain of all 1" pipes in 
the box, the claim that "all 1" pipes are threaded" is false, but when his boss replies, '"Mats 
OK, the bends are never threaded", the domain over which the generalisation is stated has 
implicitly changed to all pipes in the box less the bends, in which case "all the 1" pipes are 
threaded" is now true. Normal human reasoning is non-monotonic; additional information 
can render sound formerly unsound inferences or vice versa. The logical axioms and infer- 
ence rules of a system with quantifiers are stated over all models. Non-logical axioms are 
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going to be tied to particular interpretations, ie. models. Change the model and an inference 
licensed by one non-logical axiom will no longer be valid. Systems like situation theory 
and Veltman's data-logic attempt to capture this behaviour via partial interpretation, partial 
bits of the world or knowledge states explicitly identify the relevant context of interpreta- 
tion. 
In general, falsification is only guaranteed to arrive at certain knowledge once the domain 
of the generalisation has been fixed in advance. This is not an objectual restriction but a 
property restriction. Falsification is an open system strategy, but it assumes that all the 
relevant properties of the objects involved have been fixed. So, in the case of Johnny the 
extra property of being bends is not admitted as relevant, so the generalisation is just false. 
But in real human inquiry, people can never be sure a priori what the relevant properties 
are. Rather, as in the predictive cycle, instead of taking the hypothesis to be falsified, the 
predictive failure triggers further inquiry into the proper domain of the generalisation (cf. 
Johnny noticed that it was particularly salient that all the unthreaded 1" pipes were bends). 
With regard to the certainty which can be obtained, this places falsification on the same 
level as confirmation. Inquirers can be no more certain that a hypothesis is false, given a 
predictive failure than they can be certain it is true given a predictive success. However, 
given a predictive failure the process of delimiting the domain of applicability can be ini- 
tiated. If, in the long run, all such attempts fail, then the hypothesis will (i) in the case of 
individuals, simply fall into misuse, or (ii) in the case, say of the scientific community, 
become a Kuhnian puzzle. 
The possible consequences of partial interpretation as evidenced in defective truth tables 
apply to an argument put forward by Johnson-Laird and re-iterated by Evans (1972). The 
argument is that even if modus tollens is no longer valid, as the result of a defective truth 
table, inferences corresponding to modus tollens are still valid because reductio ad absur- 
dum can be used to derive similar inferences. Two observations need to be made. First, the 
observation of a defective truth table can not be allowed just to affect the conditional at 
pain of sacrificing compositionality. Once a third truth value or partial interpretation has 
been conceded it must be allowed to ramify through out the logical system. Second, reduc- 
tio ad absurdum depends on another logical law: the law of the excluded middle. However, 
in a three valued system the law of the excluded middle is not normally valid. For example, 
it is not an axiom of Kleene's strong three valued system (Haack, 1975), although modus 
tollens holds in that system. Moreover, it was a rejection of the law of the excluded middle 
and its role in apparently vacuous mathematical existence proofs which motivated the 
development of intuitionistic logic (Haack, 1975). Similarly, in Veltman (1985) data logic 
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the law of the excluded middle only holds when a chain of information states is complete, 
ie. all the information relevant to the truth or falsity of a claim is available and all relevant 
propositions can be assigned a determinate truth value. 
The assessment of the psychological implications of the observation of "defective" truth 
tables for subjects reasoning may have been premature. The logical consequence of this 
observation is a view of the interpretative process which is inherently partial and which 
fails to license falsification as any more rational than confirmation. Moreover, the conse- 
quences are consistent with intuition (ef. Johnny and the pipes), the model of the predictive 
cycle, and with the psychological data so far reviewed. The importance of this observation 
should not go under-estimated. In the chapter 6, data on Evan's negations paradigm will be 
introduced. Evan's (1972,1982,1983b) provides arguments for retaining standard logic in 
the interpretative component of the cognitive mechanism, on the grounds that the observa- 
tion of irrelevant responses can be put down to a non-logical response bias, called match- 
ing. However, once the rational basis for this behaviour has been identified, via the 
specification of an appropriate competence model, the data must be re-interpreted in that 
light This will be done in the following chapters. 
4.4.3 Philosophical postscript on falsification 
The observations on the inadequacy of falsification have been principally motivated by 
semantic considerations concerning context dependence and partial interpretation. In this 
section therefore, it will be shown how these semantic considerations directly reflect long 
standing doubts within the philosophy of science concerning the coherence of falsificatory 
procedures. It will also be shown how this affects some recent psychological arguments 
concerning the positive test heuristic (Klayman & Ha, 1987). 
A paper by Hilary Putnam (1974) best exemplifies the problems which beset 
falsificationism. The paper demonstrates that Popper is wrong to conclude that science can 
do without induction. Putnam addresses the question of how predictions are derived from 
theories? Using Newton's Universal Theory of Gravitation (UG) as an example Putnam 
demonstrates that the derivation is not direct, ie. predictions are not deductive consequences 
of theories alone, as they were characterised above in discussing the work on confirmation 
theory. Rather predictions are only derivable from a theory taken in conjunction with a set 
of boundary or initial conditions, which Putnam calls Auxiliary Statements (AS). Typically 
these constitute certain simplifying assumptions, eg. if we take UG and the following ASs: 
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(i) No bodies exist except the sun and the earth. 
(n') The sun and the earth exist in a hard vacuum. 
The sun and the earth are subject to no forces except mutually induced gravitation- 
al forces. 
then from their conjunction Kepler's Laws can be deduced. Moreover, "By making (i), (ii) 
and ('iii) more "realistic" - ie. incorporating further bodies in our model of the solar system 
- we can obtain better predictions" (Putnam, 1981: 65). However, the ASs do not constitute 
part of the theory, they are simplifying assumptions about what the theory applies to, or its 
explanatory domain. The laws in question are the covering laws of a unified theory, which 
as Cartwright observes are unlikely to be true. Only the ceteris paribus laws which con- 
nect these covering laws to the actual phenomena are likely candidates for truth. 
This effects Popper's doctrine immediately. Theories are not strongly falsifiable. The falsity 
of a prediction can not percolate directly back too the falsity of the theory: the ASs may be 
wrong. For example, UG was accepted as unquestionably true by the scientific community 
for over 200 years. Yet, when predictions concerning the orbit of Uranus were derived 
from UG in conjunction with the AS that all the (then known) planets were all there were, 
they turned out to be wrong. Rather than regard UG as therefore falsified, Leverrier in 
France and Adams in England predicted that there must be another planet. And indeed 
another planet, Neptune, was observed in 1846. So, in this instance, not only did scientists 
not falsify, they were right not to. It was similarly correct not to regard the perihelion of 
Mercury, another predictive failure, as falsifying the theory. As in the case of Uranus, the 
possibility could not be dismissed that there were other unknown forces acting on the 
planet. From examples like this, it is clear that what scientists do (their inferential prac- 
tices), simply do not conform to the Popper's falsificationary prescriptions, but they are 
wholly consistent with the standard view "that scientists try to confirm theories and ASs by 
deriving predictions from them and verifying the predictions. " (Putnam, 1981: 68). 
Putnam goes onto demonstrate the compatibility of these observations with the Kuhnian 
concept of a paradigm. A paradigmatic theory is one that is not allowed to be falsified. 
"Normal" science goes on within a paradigm by assuming the veridicality of the theory and 
trying to determine what the relevant ASs are, given a body of "to-be-explained" data. 
Ironically, despite Kuhn's emphasis on revolutionary science, ie. when a new theory comes 
to predominate, his views demonstrate what an essentially conservative enterprise science 
must be to attain progress. 
Putnam's closes the paper with some observations on practice which can be interpreted as 
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highlighting the fact that a sound inference should enable successful practical action, ie. 
action in the real world. The generalisations from which inferences are made must accord 
with the world sufficiently well-to facilitate action within it. The extent to which it does, 
increases confidence that they are sound. This can be the only real criteria of judging a 
theory. For Putnam and Goodman attempts to formalise this testing of theories, by eg. Car- 
nap, Popper and Qwmsky, are simply misguided. The relevant auxiliary assumptions in 
Putnam's terminology translate directly into the background conditions which need to be 
present for a constraint to hold in a situation. Once the appropriate eduction is performed 
and found to yield a predictive failure, this does not entail that the constraint does not hold, 
it could be that the relevant background conditions were not present. To constitute sound 
action guiding rules, the eductions performed by a cognitive agent must be grounded in the 
actual structure of the world, only then will efficient and effective action be possible. 
These considerations from the philosophy of science also bear on some recent arguments 
put forward by Klayman and Ha (1987). They argue that positive tests, ie. looking for 
instances which verify, may indeed be rational because such a procedure can lead to a 
higher probability of receiving falsification. They point to an important distinction between 
modes of disconfirmation. An inquirer may either seek instances which are predicted not to 
have a certain property, or seek for instances which are most likely to falsify rather than 
verify the hypothesis. This point is demonstrated by appeal to Wason's (1960) 2-4-6 rule 
discovery task. Subjects are presented with a sequence of numbers and must formulate a 
hypothesis concerning the target rule known only to the experimenter which describes this 
number sequence. The target rule could be as general as "three consecutive even numbers" 
or just "ascending numbers". Subjects must then suggest possible sequences to determine 
whether their hypothesized rule matches the target rule. The experimenter provides feed- 
back concerning whether or not the suggested sequence matches the target rule. Once sub- 
jects have generated a hypothesis, they typically ask for verificatory sequences rather than 
those which are false instances of their hypotheses. 
Klayman & Ha demonstrate that since subjects are ignorant of the target rule they are also 
ignorant of the relationship between their hypothesized eile and the target. Four possibili- 
ties present themselves. Since each rule can be thought of as defining a space in the 
domain of possible triples the relationship can be described as holding between sets. The 
hypothesized rule is either included in the target set, or vice versa, they overlap, or they are 
totally disjoint. The desiderata is, of course, perfect coincidence. Given these possibilities, 
Klayman & Ha observe that in some cases it is possible to receive conclusive falsification 
using either positive or negative tests (disjoint or overlapping), but in one (hypothesized set 
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included in target set) only negative tests yield conclusive falsification, and in the remaining 
case (target set included in hypothesized set) only positive tests can yield conclusive 
falsification. They then demonstrate that under various boundary conditions, an assumption 
of a minority phenomenon re. the probability of the target eile applying in the population 
is less than 0.5) and an assumption that the probability of the hypothesis is roughly equal 
to the probability of the target, then it can be shown that the probability of obtaining 
falsification using positive tests is higher than using negative tests. The tests described all 
involve what Klayman & Ha (1987) refer to as Htests, ie. testing instances hypothesized to 
(not) possess the target property. However, in real world inquiry concern may equally focus 
on Ttests, ie. testing instances known to (not) possess the target property to determine 
whether they also possess the hypothesized property. By parity of reasoning with Htests 
they also show that +Tests are more likely to result in falsification than -Ttests. 
There are several points to be raised concerning this demonstration of the falsificatory 
power of positive testing. First, the analysis assumes as a premise that falsification is the 
rational procedure subjects should adopt, be this achieved by negative or positive tests. 
However, the arguments from both partial interpretation and the philosophy of science 
invalidate this claim. Since this is the case the rest of their argument need not be taken as 
an adequate characterisation of the rational basis of subjects' inferential behaviour. Reiterat- 
ing Popper (1959), they claim that: 
(420) "Put somewhat simplistically, a lifetime of verifications can be countered by a sin- 
gle conclusive falsification, so it makes sense for scientists to make the discovery 
of falsifications their primary goal. " (Klayman and Ha, 1987: 214) 
However, the examples from the philosophy of science indicated above show this claim to 
be false. Within periods of normal science, which predominate, it is not rational to allow 
putative falsifications to penetrate to basic theory. The range of coverage possessed by the 
theory can render such an inference from a falsification in an isolated domain wholly irra- 
tional. The History of Science is replete with examples of putative falsifications being 
ignored, suppressed or covered by ad hoc hypotheses. The perihelion of Mercury was 
ignored for more than a century, the observation of double refraction was covered by the ad 
hoc addition of "sides" to the particles in Newton's corpuscular theory of light. The 
Michelson-Morley experiments were only taken as crucial some 30 years after the event. 
The list is endless. Only once a better theory is available would it be rational to abandon 
the old. 
It was also observed above that Popper underestimated the force of evidence which nor- 
mally accompanies the discovery of a rule/hypothesis. The processes by which people 
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discover likely hypotheses are many and varied but in the 24-6 task rule discovery is little 
more than guess work. Actual rule discovery in science is a far more sophisticated process 
which often imbues a hypothesis with some sound reasons to believe it. For example, 
Kepler's laws which describe the planetary motions was tested and matched against the 
wealth of data available from Tycho Brahe's observations. The form the laws could take 
was tightly constrained by the data, but it still required a great deal of intellectual effort to 
derive elliptical orbits. This contrasts radically with the 2-4-6 task in which the form of the 
rule is massively undetermined by the data. In deriving the Universal laws of gravitation, 
Newton already possessed Kepler's three laws to constrain the form they could take, but 
the inverse square law was still far from transparant. In deriving the equations which 
govern the behaviour of electromagnetic phenomena, Maxwell discovered an analogy 
between the laws he was be constrained to employ and the laws which describe the 
phenomena of light, thereby unifying two disparate domains of inquiry. In each case, (i) the 
rule discovered embodied its own evidential support via its ability to cover the phenomena, 
and (u) the intellectual effort which went into their discovery was immense. Just coming up 
with one rule which achieves some coverage is a formidable achievement. Once a rile is 
discovered then further assessing its range of application is by far the most rational strategy 
to adopt. And indeed if a anomaly is detected, eg. the orbit of Uranus, it is best ignored 
until a better theory is forthcoming. 
Klayman & Ha (1987) also apply the +test heuristic to the selection task. It is shown how 
+Htests and +Ttests could lead to the standard selections on the abstract version. However, 
they observe that because the rule only describes a sufficient condition there is only one 
falsificatory instance and therefore subjects should not really adopt the +test heuristic but 
use a Ttest. They also propose that thematic content may facilitate this realisation. In gen- 
eral subjects abstract task behaviour is still deemed irrational, precisely because the 
assumption is still made that they should falsify. In the following chapters it will be shown 
how the predictive cycle and the concept of interpretation embodied in situation theory pro- 
vides a unified rational basis for subjects behaviour on this and related tasks. 
4.4.4 Syntactic vs semantic proof procedures 
Johnson-Laird (1983,1986a, 1986b) argues for an asymmetry between a connective's logi- 
cal properties and its meaning. Syntactic rules of inference, eg. modus ponens and modus 
tollen, represent logical properties and truth tables, semantic properties. An asymmetry is 
observed between these properties insofar as, "a statement of the truth conditions of 
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conditionals co strains the form of inferences that are valid, but a statement of the form of 
valid inferences leaves conditionals open to a number of distinct semantic interpretations" 
(Johnson-Laird. 1986a 57). Given the truth table for the material conditional both modus 
Peru and modus tollem will be sound. But if these two rules of inference are taken to 
govern the conditional then it could have the truth conditions of either the material condi- 
tional or a defective truth table. It is conceded that on the latter interpretation contraposition 
would no longer bold but both rules of inference would remain sound. 
Johnson-Laird & Tagazt (1969) is cited as the relevant reference which establishes this 
claim. However. in that article no argument to this conclusion is offered. It was argued 
above that modus tol ens is not sound under the defective truth table interpretation. To 
reiterate. prepositionally for any inference to be valid the premises must tautologically 
imply (-) the conclusion. ie. whenever the premises are true so is the conclusion. On the 
truth table for the material conditional modus tollen is valid because the only assignment 
which satisfcs both premises (p -> q. -, q) is when both p and q are false, in which case p 
is true. However. for the defective truth table there is no assignment top and q which 
satisfies both the premises. This is because the conditional is now only true when p and q 
are both assigned true, in which case -+q is false. This does not represent a knock down 
argument. it simply points out that these may be insufficient grounds upon which to estab- 
lish the desired conclusion that there is an asymmetry between the syntactic and semantic 
characterisations of a connective. 
However, them may be further grounds on which to question the coherence of the distinc- 
tion to which Johnson-Laird"a argument appears to make appeal. The distinction in ques- 
tion is between syntax and semantics. Although this distinction has a clear basis in say 
natural language processing it may not be the case that the distinction is as obvious when it 
comes to defining a logic. 77he first question that needs to be raised is what is a logic? 
Johnson-Laird appears to define a logic as a set of syntactic rules for constructing deriva- 
tions. Semantics Is distinct in the sense that it describes the objects and relations which can 
be assigned to the syntactic formalism Semantics is about the world. In this sense there is 
a clear distinction which is insisted upon in most textbooks. However, psychologically we 
art concerned with issues of process rather than the distinction between the language in 
which the world is described and the described world. The contrast between syntax and 
semantics is meant to capture the distinction between syntactic procedures for inference and 
semantic procedures for inference. not the distinction between a language and what it 
describes. 
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In more recent accounts, a logic is defined as an abstract consequence relation (Scott, 
1971). That is, pairs of formulae (or sequences of formulae) of a language can be abstractly 
characterised as standing in a relation, which is designated a consequence relation, ie. 4) I= 
V. Two questions that can then be addressed. First, can a procedure be defined for deriving 
formula j, from formula 4). Second, is their an efficient implementation of that procedure 
once defined. It is a demonstrable theorem of the theory of symbolic computing machines 
that any program is equivalent to some logical derivation (Howard, 1980). However, the 
efficiency of the algorithm will depend on what kind of procedures are adopted. So, let us 
return to the first question. The consequence relation can be characterised either syntacti- 
cally or semantically. However, the procedures defined are equally formal, ie. they are 
defined over the symbols of the language. Whether is or f 's are being assigned to atomic 
formulae or syntactic inference rules applied, bears not one jot on the question of the for- 
mality of the operations. The question that can now be posed is whether Johnson-Laird's 
argument makes sense in this framework. The argument seems to amount to the claim that 
although there may be many semantic characterisations of a consequence relation, there can 
be only one syntactic characterisation. This claim is false. There can be many different syn- 
tactic characterisations of a consequence relation just as there can be many semantic charac- 
terisations. 
The first thing to note is that whether characterised semantically or syntactically the logic is 
given by the consequence relation, not by its characterisations. Semantic proof procedures 
are as logical in this sense as syntactic procedures. It is perhaps a counter-intuitive product 
of this conception of a logic that soundness and completeness proofs are not establishing an 
equivalence between syntax and semantics. Rather any characterisation of a particular 
consequence relation can be sound and complete with respect to another. So two'semantic 
characterisations could be sound and complete with respect to each other, further blurring 
any useful distinction between syntactic and semantic processes. Second, the statement of 
the truth conditions of a conditional for example, does not immediately constrain the set of 
inference rules which are included in a syntactic characterisation. For example, on the 
semantics for the material conditional, modus ponens must be included in the syntactic 
characterisation, only if the deduction theorem, ie. if 0 I= yº, then I= 0 -> yr, holds for the 
particular consequence relation. But syntactic proof theories may be defined which do not 
include modus ponens, while retaining this semantic characterisation of the conditional. 
This will mean that to syntactically derive an inference which accords with modus ponens 
may entail a rather more complex derivation than when modus ponens is included. This 
leads back to the second question concerning the efficiency of one system of proof over 
another. This question is complicated by the fact that a particular pair consisting of a 
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language and a consequence relation may be isomorphic to another pair. However, they 
may not be equivalent with respect to the complexity of the derivations employed. Hence, 
although 
'a 
particular syntactic characterisation, eg. natural deduction, yields derivations of 
thus and so length, there may be a more efficient syntactic proof theory which yields 
semantically the same set of valid conclusions but with less consumption of computational 
resources. This point will be raised again in the conclusions. 
It would appear that when concern centres on issues of process, the asymmetry Johnson- 
Laird seeks is unavailable a priori. Nonetheless it may be available a posteriori, ie. the 
empirically observed complexity of human inferential procedures may be incompatible with 
syntactic methods of proof. However, as will be discussed in the conclusions, once the 
asymmetry is seen to be spurious, then the possibility of mimicking the empirically 
observed complexity by either semantic or syntactic procedures has to be admitted. 
Summary 
This chapter has located the concept of inference embodied in the competence model of the 
preceding chapters in a general classification of modes of inference. Constraints are the 
generalities which license information gaining eductive inferences. Some of the properties 
of this inferential mode were shown to be reflected in subjects conditional reasoning 
behaviour. It was also shown how some conditional reasoning tasks, where apparently 
falsificatory behaviour was observed, can be provided with a rational basis when the small 
surveyable domains over which the generalisations stated in the rules are taken into 
account. This observation serves to place these tasks in a different category to other selec- 
tion task data and they will not be discussed again in this thesis. It was then argued that 
partial interpretation provides a rational foundation for the observation of defective truth 
tables which also renders unsound the strategy of falsification. Some preliminary comments 
were also made concerning the foundations of Johnson-Laird's semantic account of human 
reasoning. 
This chapter concludes Part I, on competence. In Part II, the implications of the com- 
petence model of eductive and inductive inference for psychological performance will be 
outlined. This will begin in the next chapter by considering the data obtained on Wason's 




Chapter 5: The Affirmative Selection Tasks 
5.1 Introduction 
In turning to Performance in the following chapters certain psychological assumptions will 
begin to enter in to the discussion. Competence has implications for performance, over and 
above justifying the rational basis of behaviour. Specifically, to explain performance it must 
be assumed that the cognitive system manifests knowledge of the competence model. This 
does not mean however, that the competence theory is directly implemented in the cogni- 
tive system. Rather the principles upon which the system works respect the competence 
model and in this sense can be said to embody knowledge of the competence theory. A 
performance theory which (i) respects the competence model, and (ii) can be seen as 
causally responsible for the observed behaviour must embody the sources of information 
which the competence model implies are necessary to perform various inferences. It must 
also provide explanations of the processes involved in deploying those informational 
resources. The competence model of Part I takes the principle source of information which 
determines inference to be pragmatic contextual knowledge. Later on it will be suggested 
that these sources of information are unlikely to be deployed and utilised in inference at the 
level of conscious decision making. The requirement to introduce some assumptions about 
the device indicates the need to distinguish the position to now be developed from the com- 
petence models of Part I, so it will now be given a name: Pragmatic Context Theory. 
The results from Wason's Selection Task fall roughly into three conceptual groups: 
(i) The abstract results. 
(ü) The thematic "facilitation" results. 
(iii) The Evans negations paradigm results. 
Their order of presentation does not reflect their order of appearance in the literature, but it 
does reflect the recalcitrance of the results obtained to rational charaterisation. In this 
chapter the results obtained from Wason's selection task using only affirmative rules will 
be analysed within the framework of Part I. The basic abstract results will be dealt with 
first. This will include a discussion of the various therapy experiments (Wason, 1969, 
Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1970). The results from thematic versions of the task, which use 
"contentful" material will then be discussed. However, Part II will begin with a presentation 
of two examples from the last chapter which will be worked through in detail in the context 
of the four card problem. This will render explicit the assumptions which Pragmatic Con- 
text Theory relies upon in accounting for the data on Wason's task. These worked 
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examples will be appealed to later on in accounting for the actual data. 
5.2 Examples 
5.2.1 Non-taxonomic case: My hall light 
To example the strategy of inquiry which would result from a non-taxonomic constraint the 
example of my hall light arrangement will be schematised. There are some rather obvious 
artefactualities about this example. Nonetheless, it functions to highlight the important 
features of the account and moreover makes the artefacts obvious. 
The world 
The situation of my hall lights can be described as a disjunctive Boolean function, ie. a 
function of two arguments f A, B), corresponding to the two switches, each is a binary vari- 
able 1= ON, and 0= OFF. Let the domain of the function (<0,0>, <0,1>, <1,0>, <1,1>1 
be denoted 11, for space time location 1. The range of the function (0,11 are the states of 
my hall light (L), let these be denoted 12, for space time location 2,12 follows 11: 11 < 12. 
By case the function is a disjunction, ie.: 
(5.1) jtA, B)=0(ie. L=0), ifA=0 andB=0. else }(A, B)= 1. 
This does not fully describe the situation in my hall since there are various conditions 
which must hold like the electricity is on, the bulb works etc. This can be added, making a 
function of three arguments, the third value is false if any one of the background conditions 
is false (ie. they are conjoined). This variable will be called C; the function is then: 
(5.2) f(A, B, C)=0, ifA=0 andB=O, ORC=0, else f(A, B, C)=1 
This situation was described situation theoretically in the last chapter, I repeat that in full 
below. 
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Situation theoretic description 
The constraints and eductions holding between the light switches being turned and the 
lights going are described as follows. 
T1: «Turn_light_witch, 1, x; 1» & «Switch_4,11, x; 1» 
T': «Light on, 12, y; 1» & «My_hall light, 12, y; 1» & <<Follows, 12' 11; 1» 
C1(PS1): «[n]=>, T1, T', T"; 1>>/'YT1 -> `YT'I ̀ YT" 
The constraint holding between light switch B being turned and the light going on simply 
replaces Tl with T2: 
T2: <<Turn_üght switch, Il, x; 1» & «Switch B, 11, x; 1» 
C2('YS2): «[n]=>, T2, T, T"; 1»/ `P T2 -> Y'fl `YT" 
The types in these constraints are clearly very local and non-general, the generality is given 
by the space time location parameters. 
Each of Cl. and C2 potentially has a corresponding converse constraint and eduction: 
CC1(`PCS1):. 
. «[n]=>, T'. T1, T"; 1»! 'PT' ->'YTII TT" 
CC2(VCS2): «[n]=>, T', T2, T"; 1»/ 'PT ' ->'YTZI `YT" 
Assumptions 
Now some assumptions: 
(1) A crucial assumption is that the inquirer is ignorant of what precisely the set up is. He 
is, after all inquiring into the nature of his world, he has no God's eye perspective. 
(2) Moreover, his strategy will be an open system strategy, the domains of the location 
parameters are not tied to only those articulated in the examples. 
(3) The predictive cycle strategy indicates that subjects should attempt to make eductions 
using the constraint. Each situation that will be considered is independent of the others. 
This is the normal situation an inquirer finds himself in. In any given situation he will 
attempt to gain information the best way he can. However, in each new situation he can not 
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be certain that the same background, conditions hold or whether other constraints, ý perhaps 
to which he is not attuned are operative. Since the four situations to be considered 
correspond to the the four cards in Wason's task, it is appropriate to observe that the card 
selections have been demonstrated to be statistically independent (Evans, 1977). 
(4) For a non-taxonomic constraint, the indicating and indicated types describe discrete 
events. Therefore the cards can not be conceived of as instances of unified objects to which 
properties are being assigned. This is carried over to the cards in the selection task where 
each side is taken to represent a different space time location (cf. below) 
(5) The constraint being investigated is Cl, I denotes the inquirer. 
The four situations 
The four possible situations, corresponding to the four card, in which an inquirer may be in 
various states of ignorance about the system of lights are illustrated in Fig. 5.1. For each 
which eductions are sound and for what reasons will be outlined. 
P-card In this situation s1 at 11, A=1. This means there is an anchor f for 11: f. 11 I-> 11' 
Since A=1, the proposition that s1 I= T1[f] is true. This leads to the eduction (N'S, ) that at 
12, s1 I= T'[g], where g extends f such that: g: 12 1-> 12. That is, at the time of observing 
that light switch A is turned I (our inquirer) uses `I'S1 to educt to the expectation that at a 
later time 12, the light will come on. He does this in ignorance of whether the background 
conditions hold since he is ignorant if any actually do hold, a predictive failure would ini- 
tiate inquiry in to what they were. 
-, P-card In this situation s2 at 13, A=0. This means that although there is an anchor f for 
Il: f: Il I-> l3. Since A=0, the proposition that s2 I= Ti[t] is false. Since this is the case 
perhaps I could educt to the falsity of s2 I= T'[g], where g extends f such that g: 12 1-> 14. 
The grounds for not making the specified eduction is the general assumption that other con- 
straints, eg. C2 could be operative. If this is the case, then if B=1, then the eduction 
(`PSZ) to L=1 could be made (by parity of reasoning with P-card). Since this is the case 
eductions which assume T1 to be necessary for T', are unsound. Subjects in the task are 
told to only turn the cards they must, ie. only those which are licensed by the constraint, in 
this situation 'l'S 1 would not be expected to yield information. 
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Figure 5.1: My Hall light: The Cards 
role. When predicting future events which track the natural causal/action/temporal order, 
these are the only constraints relevant and of themselves they license no eduction in the 
converse direction. For the consequent cards, subjects are performing a different task, they 
are having to ask whether in a situation where they know something about what happened 
at a later time, whether they can explain this event. (This distinction is borne out in the 
psychological literature where data on the consequent cards is often equivocal. Manktelow 
& Evans (1979), for example, hypothesize that this is due to only subjects' antecedent card 
selections being logically determined. ) However, this involves utilising the different con- 
verse constraints. Generally, the 33% of subjects (cf. chapter 4& Table 5.1, below) who 
don't turn any consequent cards are attending to the initial task requirements more dili- 
gently than subjects who take their role to be to see whether explanations for these events 
can be derived. However, many subjects may well assume that the mere presence of the 
consequent cards indicates that they should seek explanations. Again in considering these 
cards, it will be shown how different contextual assumptions may drive differing selections. 
Q-card In this situation s3 at 16, L=1. This means that there is an anchor f for 12: f. 12 1-> 
16. Since L=1, the proposition that s3 1= T'[fj is true. Since this is the case perhaps I 
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could use ̀ YCSI to educt to s3 I= T1(g], where g extends f such that: g: 11 I-> 15. I is now 
attempting to explain the light being on. If he assumed that there are no other constraints 
operative which could also possess corresponding converse constraints, eg. CC2, then he 
could educt to A=1. However, if he assumes other constraints are operative, namely CC2, 
then that L=1, only allows the eduction ('YCS1 & `YCS2) to A=1 or B=1 (note that 
since L=1, it must be the case that C= 1). So, even if I were to assume that he should 
attempt to explain the consequent card events, he would still have grounds not to turn the 
q-card. However, if he also assumed B=0 then again he could educt using'I'CS1 to A= 
1. In general, the results (cf. below), indicate that subjects do tend to assume they can 
make this eduction. 
-, Q-card In this situation s4 at 1g, L=0. This means that although there is an anchor f for 
12: f 12 1-> 18 since L=0, the proposition that s4 1= T'[f] is false. Since this is the case 
perhaps I could use 'YCS1 to educt to the falsity of s4 1= T1[g], where g extends f such 
that: g: 12 I-> 17. The grounds for not making this eduction are that in this situation I can 
not assume that C=1. When L=0, either A=0 and B=0, or C=0. Since this is the 
case this eduction could not be expected to allow information gain. I is attempting to 
explain the fact that L=0. However, inquirers do not normally attempt to explain the non- 
occurrence of all the events which are not occurring at any given time. In I's purview most 
things are not happening. It only makes sense to attempt to explain the non-occurrence of 
an event if it was predicted to occur, as in the predictive cycle. However, if L=0 
represents a predictive failure, then switch A will have been turned!, ie. A=1, and concern 
will centre on which background condition failed. 
This example articulates the grounds, relative to general context dependence assumptions, 
upon which various eductions are performed and why others are not when a constraint is 
non-taxonomic. When looking at subjects actual task behaviour it is important to realise 
that the possibilities made explicit above are not intended to function as hypotheses con- 
cerning possibilities subjects actually consider. They are possibilities not explicitly ruled out 
by standard versions of the task. In describing the tasks below examples of possibilities left 
open analogous to those above will be mentioned. However, their function is purely illus- 
trative of possibilities always left open in peoples inquiry into the real world. The strategy 
attributed too subjects in the task and which license the selections they make, is a product 
of their normal strategies of inquiry. Unless, as in the various COSTs, additional cir- 
cumstantial features elicit different interpretations and hence strategies they will default to 
the predictive cycle strategy. 
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There is a very obvious degree of artefact in the above example. The problem with all toy 
models is that, by their very nature, they tend to make the simplifying assumptions which 
the account being developed here explicitly wants to avoid. The choice of example, was 
conditioned by the need to give a precise and exhaustive description. The problem with this 
is that when people are in possession of such a description they are able to reason about 
the situation in ways they cannot when dealing with the real world. The limited number of 
possible states and operative constraints, makes it very tempting to argue that other infer- 
ence patterns are licensed. Although, the reader has been exhorted to adopt I's point of 
view, ie. within each situation and ignorant of the state of the world, once you can assume 
a God's eye perspective it very hard not to do so. 
5.2.2 Taxonomic case: Johnny and the pipes 
The same basic schema will be used here as for the last example. Presenting this taxonomic 
example serves to illustrate the various strategies introduced in chapter 4 in discussing the 
COST and to provide the motivation for an ambiguous result found in the thematic versions 
of the selection task, due to Wason & Shapiro (1971). 
The world 
Providing a description of the set up of the world is less complex here. There is a box of 
pipes of various dimensions, some threaded some not, some are also bends. Let P be the 
set (P1I Pi is in the pipe box). Certain subsets of P will prove of interest, ie. the set 1": (P. 1 
P, is 1") and the set Th: (P1I Pi is threaded). In working through the different strategies 
available another dimension of the sets will prove relevant, ie. their size or cardinality, 
specified, eg. IPI. Apart from the claim that, IPI is small (in the case of the four card exam- 
ple it will be 4), it will only be the relative cardinalities of the various sets which will be 
of concern. It could be the case that P is a sample of a larger population P, ie. PcP. 
Situation theoretic description 
The only constraints operative are as follows: 
T1: «1 "., pipe, x; 1» 
T': <<Threaded, x; 1» 
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Cl «[n1]=>, T1, T'; 1» 
and 
T2: <<Bend, x; 1» 
C2: «[n1]=>, T2, -, T'; 1» 
Note relative to the treatment of duals in chapter 2, the negation in C. carries the 
information that it has a smooth bore and this precludes being threaded, ie. in this context 
threaded and unthreaded are antonyms. 
Assumptions 
(1) One point of contrast between taxonomic and non-taxonomic constraints is that the 
former provides a unified object to which various properties are being assigned. This allows 
a coherent interpretation in terms of instances (cf. the discussion of Wason & Green, 1984). 
This renders coherent the concept of an objectual restriction on the domain of objects 
which makes less sense in the non-taxonomic case. This also works for unifiers which are 
relations, for example, "if I travel to Manchester I take the train" is objectually restricted to 
my travelings to Manchester in my life time. Or it may just be known that I only ever trav- 
eled to Manchester 4 times. 
(2) Given a closed domain of instances, allows the prior assessment of the force of each 
instance. The relevant situation is given by the box of pipes. Johnny, can not conceive of 
each instance as an isolated opportunity to use the constraint to make an eduction. Rather 
given the situation, the pipe box, he must determine relative to knowledge of the prior dis- 
tributions (or a lack of such knowledge) which strategy to adopt in determining the truth or 
falsity of the constraint 
(3) A taxonomic constraint encodes a limited type-token relationship between indicated and 
connecting type. The indicated type is a restriction on the appropriate anchors for one or 
more parameters in the indicating type. Relative to peoples natural taxonomies this relation 
may be obvious, eg. All ravens are black. However, situations do arise, like Johnny's, 
where there is uncertainty concerning the relative sizes of the domains. This is precisely 
why the strategies appropriate alter, when different background knowledge about those 
domains changes. 
(4) A similar cautionary note applies to this example as to the taxonomic case. The 
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strategies that Johnny may adopt are ones natural to his situation given the various back- 
ground knowledge he may or may not possess. On performing a selection task the most 
obvious, real world strategy is to turn all the cards. However, the exhortation to turn only 
the cards you must, indicates that only those licensed by some other more reasoned and 
parsimonious strategy of inquiry, should be turned. The example is worked through on the 
assumption that subjects are importing strategies which they would use in real situations. 
When Johnny is given his instructions, he must use his prior knowledge or lack of it to 
determine the appropriate strategy. This simply involves determining what kinds of 
instances he wants to look at. The situation analogous to the 4-card problem is illustrated in 
Fig. - 5.2. The analysis will not be presented card by card but strategy by strategy. For 
each, the cards he should turn will be described. For each strategy the background 












Figure 5.2: Johnny and the Pipes: The Cards 
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Closed Domain 
1. Positive Confirmation: Johnny knows that IThl = ITh'I, where "'" is the contrast class 
operator, ie. Th' is the set of smooth pipes. However, he also knows that there are many 
other sizes of pipes in the box and hence it is most likely that I1"I < I1"1. Given this infor- 
mation, it follows that it is most likely that I1"I < ITV by some orders of magnitude, thus 
looking exhaustively for 1" pipes to check they are threaded has the most labour saving 
potential. In this case he would select only Pl. However, the limited situation provided by 
the cards means that there is only one instance such that Pi e Th, ie. P3. Generally, since 
IThl = ITh'I, looking at threaded pipes as well as 1" pipes would prove labour intensive. So, 
he would also turn P3. 
2. Negative Confirmation: Johnny knows that IThl < IThI, ie. most pipes are threaded. 
However, he is ignorant of I1"I and hence 11"1. He, therefore looks for unthreaded pipes to 
check they are not one inch, so he would turn P4. However, lest the rule be vacuous, he 
also checks Pl. What would happen in this case if Johnny found that P4 e Th', ie. it was 
unthreaded? Well if he also discovered that it was a bend, and he was told that C2 is opera- 
tive, then even this would not falsify. Only if it can be assumed that P is not subdivided in 
other ways which are relevant to his determination of the truth of Cl, will his discovery of 
a "falsifying" instance, retain its falsificatory status. Even in an objectually closed domain 
this can not be guaranteed and in an open domain it is a positive expectation that this is 
unlikely to be the case. 
Open Domains 
In an open domain, where Johnny knows that the pipes in front of him are simply a sample 
of a much larger population, the characteristics of which he is unsure of, then the normal. 
predictive cycle strategy will apply. If he discovers any unthreaded 1" pipes then this will 
initiate inquiry into whether, for example, C2 holds. 
The artefact in this example, concerns the fact that in normal inquiry another factor is 
important which may affect the strategies adopted. This is the ease of property determina- 
t on. Along with the respective domain sizes, the relative ease of determining whether an 
object possesses a certain property is important. For example, suppose that the various 
dimensions of the pipes are quite close, and therefore a measuring instrument has to be 
employed. However, the "threadedness" of the pipes is easily determined, eg. they are 
external threads. In this situation, even given the relative domains which license positive 
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confirmation, it would be an unreasonable strategy to adopt. People need to adapt their 
information gaining strategies such that they are appropriate to effective and efficient action. 
This issue will be raised again in discussing the thematic results. 
The basic abstract results will now be provided with a rational grounding in the same terms 
as the two examples. 
5.3 The abstract results 
The standard paradigm for these experiments was described in chapter 4. For perspicuity, 
table 5.1 below shows the standard results. Over the years there have been many permuta- 
tions of this basic abstract result with the logically correct p. -, q selection sometimes rising 
as high as 19% (present experiments). However, for the standard paradigm without any 
further manipulations table 4.1 represents the data to be accounted for. The only manipula- 
tions which had a facilitating effect, other than certain therapy conditions and various 
COSTs (which have been discussed above), will not be dealt with until the section on the 
thematic facilitation results. 
Providing an account of the data will involve attributing various sources of information to 
the subjects. These are not to be thought of as consciously available to subjects in the 
course of their task performance. The contextual information which enters into their final 
interpretation is processed at an automatic and preconscious level. Certain results of the 
process are of course available to consciousness, but the basic. mechanisms involved which 
muster the information sources determining a particular interpretation are not. This is a 
wholly familiar view of the processes involved in parsing which are not assumed to be 
available to conscious introspection, although the products of the process are (Marslen- 
Table 5.1 
Standard Abstract Selection Task Results 
(Johnson-Laird & Wason, 1970) 
p and q cards 46% 
p card only 33% 
p, q and -, q cards 7% 
p and -q cards 4% 
others 10% 
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Wilson & Tyler, 1980; Crain & Steedman, 1985; Wanner & Maratsos, 1978). It is also 
assumed that in standard selection tasks subjects interpret the rule as applying to an open 
system (cf. above). In which case other contextual assumptions may be bought to bear on 
interpreting the rules which influences the inferences subjects take the rule to license. Those 
inferences (eductions) will in turn influence the preconscious processes of belief fixation 
embodied in the predictive cycle. This follows Wason & Evans (1975) and Evans (1980a, 
1980b) interpretation of the protocol data. ' Interpretation and confirmation strategies are 
processes which in the first instance are preconscious and automatic. The products of these 
processes can be made available to consciousness, but their primary function is to extract 
information appropriate to guiding action. This establishes points of direct comparison 
between the theoretical account being developed here and Wason & Evans' dual process 
theory. In the next two chapters the positions will be contrasted over the issue of the nature 
of preconscious processing which Evans (1972,1973,1982,1983) views as relatively 
insensitive to interpretational factors. 
For the standard abstract version, an exhaustive analysis will be provided on the same lines 
as the examples. The purpose is to establish the consistency of the competence account 
with the actual data. This will only be done once. For each card an account will be pro- 
vided of why a subject would be expected to make the selections which are reflected in the 
modal responses observed in the data. Where a rational basis for other responses seems 
forthcoming, and hence need not be put down to pure error, they will also be mentioned. 
The situation theoretic interpretation of the rule will first be provided along with some elu- 
cidatory comments, then the grounds for selecting each card will be outlined. Often a back- 
ground rule is provided in these task, in the standard task it was as follows: 
(5.20) There is an number on one side of each card and a letter on the other side. 
The cards employed on the task showed the following letters and numbers: 
A(P) K(- p) 2(q) 7(-+q) 
And the foreground rule was as in (5.21) 
(521) If there is a vowel on one side of the card, then there is an even number on the 
other side of the card. 
This rule is ambiguous between a stating a contingent taxonomic constraint (cf. (4.16)) (the 
corresponding eductions will be assumed for this discussion): 
Ti <<Card, one-side: x, other-side: y; 1» & <<Vowel. x; 1» 
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T'E,: «Even number, y; 1» 
(5.21 D «[c1]=>, T., T'Z.; 1» 
or a non-taxonomic onstraint: 
Ti «One_side: x; 1» & <<Vowel: x; 1» 
T'e,: «Other side, y; 1» & «Even number: y; 1» 
(5.21 ")<4c]=>, T., Tr T" 
Z-; 
1» 
Unless prior beliefs can be appealed to in order establish the unity of instances, the disjoint 
non-taxonomic interpretation predominates (cf. Wason & Green, 1984). Subjects assume 
that that are confirming in an open domain (cf. Beattie & Baron, 1988). Therefore, they 
treat the cards as a sample of a much larger population. Hence, (i) subjects will adopt the 
open system predictive cycle strategy, and (ii) they will not assume that the domain is fixed 
in advance, other predicates may apply to alter the context of the generalisation, and other 
constraints may be operative determining the distribution of letters and numbers on the 
cards. These assumptions are not explicit, they simply reflect the subjects normal epistemic 
relationship to the open system which is their world. 
The model of the predictive cycle predicts that subjects should use the rule/constraint in 
order to see if it permits information gain. ie. use it to predict what is on the other side of 
the cards. Constraints can license eductions in either direction, the predictive or the expla- 
natory. However, the circumstances which allow unrestricted eduction in the explanatory 
direction are different. If an assumption concerning the existence of other predictive con- 
straints is unwarranted, then subjects may consider it appropriate to check whether the con- 
straint licenses an eduction in the explanatory direction. The foreground rule does not expli- 
citly mark any reversal of causal/action order, nor does any prior pragmatic world 
knowledge suggest such a reversal. Therefore, subjects must assume the antecedent- 
consequent order tracks the predictive causal/action order. 
Each card can be thought of as a situations in which the subject is attempting to discover 
whether the constraint holds. It should be understood that in the non-taxonomic case each 
situation is treated independently. Each situation presents an opportunity for a subject to 
make an eduction using the rule, ie. to test its predictive utility. 
A-card The constraint states that even numbers can be predicted from vowels. Since A is a 
token of the type vowel, subjects select this card to see if a predictive success results. This 
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is required even in ignorance of whether or not any background information needs to be 
fixed to allow successful prediction. Identifying those conditions is only initiated by predic- 
tive failure. 
K-card Situations in which the indicating type of a constraint does not hold bear neither 
one way or the other on the truth or falsity of that constraint. This is a function of partial 
interpretation. Hence the K-card is not turned. 
2-card (5.21) has a corresponding explanatory constraint which suggests the possibility of 
educting from an even-number to a vowel (E => V). The actuality of this constraint E => 
V, does not bear directly on the actuality of (5.21), although it does bear on its explanatory 
utility. Behaviour on this card is also mediated by an ambiguity in interpretation dependent 
on which contextual assumptions are bought to bear. If other perhaps more specific con- 
straints are operative, eg. x => 2, then subjects would be unlikely to turn the 2 card, since 
whatever they find will not bear on the original constraint. So, there is a division between 
subjects: 
(i) The majority, assume that explanatory utility bears on the information gaining 
potential of the original constraint. This functions to detract attention from the pos- 
sibility that other constraints may be in operation. However, if they turn the 2-card, 
whatever they find bears neither way on the original constraint. 
(ii) The minority, assume that other constraints may be in operation. And that 
therefore whatever is on the other side bears neither way on the original constraint. 
These subjects do not turn the 2-card. 
7-card All constraints are context sensitive. Hence, as has already been extensively argued, 
explanatory eductions from the non-occurrence of the indicating type (7) to the non- 
occurrence of the indicated type (odd-number) are unsound. Moreover, inferences from the 
occurrence of the indicated type without the indicating type (predictive failure) to the falsity 
of a constraint (general rule) are similarly unsound. Therefore, subjects need not turn the 
K-card. It may well be that on turning this card a subject discovered a "y", and concluded 
the rule was false only to discover that the experimenter had not intended "y" to be 
included in the set of vowels. 
Some early manipulations of the task could have been predicted to fail in their goal of eli- 
citing falsificatory behaviour. Wason (1969) focused on the possible confusion bought 
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about by the fact that conditionals in natural language are often used to encode information 
concerning either a causal or temporal relation holding between antecedent and consequent. 
"Hence, the simultaneous presentation of values of them could have induced considerable 
perplexity" (Wason and Johnson-Laird, 1972: 176). In an attempt to avoid this, the rule was 
changed to "Every card which has a red triangle on one side has a blue circle on the other 
side". No facilitation was found. One plausible reason for this was that subjects were inter- 
preting "one side" in the antecedent as the upwardly turned face and in the consequent as 
the downwardly turned face. Consequently, Wason and Johnson-Laird (1970) altered the 
task materials such that all the information was on the upwardly turned face. Each card had 
a shape in its centre and a number of borders. The partial nature of the information avail- 
able to the subjects was retained by the use of masks. The rule retained the universally 
quantified form used in the above experiment: "Every card which has a circle on it has two 
borders round it". No facilitation was found for this variant of the task, and the results sim- 
ply reflected those obtained in the standard form. 
The procedure used by Wason and Johnson-Laird (1970) only eliminated the 
upward/downward directionality, but not the known/unknown directionality. Eliminating the 
latter would, of course, destroy the task. Moreover, if the upward/downward directionality 
was the critical factor then one would expect the p card only as the modal response in the 
standard form, which was not observed. Since the crucial directionality involved in the task 
is the known/unknown directionality, which requires the subjects to perform an eduction, 
this manipulation would have been predicted not to facilitate falsificatory responding. 
53.1 The therapy experiments 
The first manipulations to produce a notable facilitation were introduced in the "therapy" 
experiments of Wason (1969) and Wason and Johnson-Laird (1970). The basic idea of 
these experiments, as their label suggests, was to provide therapeutic procedures to enable 
subjects to see where they were going wrong without giving the whole game away. The 
method was to engage subjects in a dialogue concerning their task performance exposing 
them by degrees to inconsistencies "between their initial selections of cards and their subse- 
quent independent evaluations of specific cards as falsifying or verifying the rule" (Wason 
and Johnson-Laird, 1972: 179). These experiments were not wholly successful, even when 
subjects were subjected to the most concrete inconsistency, ie. turning the -, q card to reveal 
ap on the other side, only 42% got it right although 78% now selected the -, q card as 
opposed to only 6% in the initial condition. However, certain graded effects were observed 
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which Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972) subsequently incorporated into their "insight" 
model. 
Two such models were proposed by Johnson-Laird and Wason (1970). The first reflects 
the order of responses in the standard results, and attempts to explain them in terms of two 
forms of "insight". Lacking either form, subjects are postulated to attempt verifying the rule 
which leads them to select only the p and the q cards. Possessing insight (a) only, leads 
subjects to only check those cards which could verify to see if they could falsify, ie. they 
select only the p card. Possessing insight (b) only, leads subjects to select those cards 
which can verify and of those cards which do not verify, those which could falsify, ie. they 
select the p, the q and the -, q cards. Possessing both, will lead to the correct selection of 
the p and --, q cards, as the two insights are assumed to be additive. Wason and Johnson- 
Laird (1972: 183) point out that this model "is almost certainly grossly wrong". Failing to 
select -+q (lack of (b)) occurs far more frequently than selecting q (lack of (a)). They 
observe that although the two errors have the same logical status they may have different 
psychological sources. And they surmise that the selection of just p "may not be the result 
of the (non-trivial) insight that verifying cards should be rejected if they could not falsify, 
but merely (my italics) signifies that the subject does not assume that the converse of the 
rule holds" (Wason and Johnson-Laird, 1972: 185). The therapy experiments also enhanced 
the implausibility of the original model. Hypothetical contradiction, where the subject sim- 
ply says that p on the other side of the -, q card would falsify, induced a switch in selec- 
tions from p only to p, q and -, q. This corresponds to a simultaneous loss of insight (a) 
and gain of insight (b), which as they observe is "psychologically implausible and bizarre". 
Gaining insight (a) alone, ie. switching from p and q, to just p was also very rare in the 
therapy experiments. 
The revised model accounted for these observations and results as follows. Subjects were 
assumed to initially focus only on the cards which are mentioned in the rule. Dependent on 
whether they believe the converse to hold or not, they select only those cards which could 
verify, ie. p and q or p only respectively. Two interdependent levels of insight then deter- 
mine subsequent responses. Possessing partial insight, leads subjects to test all the cards 
selecting those which could verify and those which could falsify, ie. selecting p, q and -, q. 
Possessing complete insight, consists in the realisation that only cards which could falsify 
the rule need to be selected. 
As observed by Bree (1973) and reported in Evans (1982), there is an inconsistency in the 
revised model. The claim is that subjects initial no insight choices are determined in two 
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stages, (i) look only at cards mentioned in the rule, (ii) verify under the constraint that 
either the converse holds (turn p and q) or only the implication holds (turn p only). Admit- 
ting the converse is equivalent to treating the rule as material equivalence, which, when in 
a state of partial insight, should lead subjects to turn all four cards, a response barely ever 
observed. This observation lead to several modifications of the insight model (Bree and 
Coppens, 1976; Smalley, 1974). On Smalley's model, which incorporates the defective 
truth table (Wason, 1966), subjects either initially adopt a defective implication or 
equivalence interpretation, and subsequent responses are determined by whether they per- 
ceive the reversibility of the cards or not and what level of insight they attain. 
Evans (1982) criticises these models in part because of the protocol data upon which they 
are partly based and in part because they fail to deal with results he obtained when incor- 
porating negative components into the rules. The latter will not be dealt with until the 
chapter on the Evans' negations paradigm. My own criticism centres on the non- 
explanatory invocation of the concept of "insight" in these models. "Insight" as it originally 
appeared in the Gestalt literature (eg. Wertheimer, 1945; Duncker, 1945; Kofflca, 1935; 
Luchins, 1942) referred to a particular phenomenon: "the famous "Aha! " experience of 
genuine (understanding)" (Wertheimer, 1985) not an explanatory construct. The "insight? " 
question diamonds in the flow charts used by Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972) to illustrate 
these information processing models should be replaced by clouds indicating processes as 
yet undefined or unknown (Colin, 1980: 73). The sub-processes which would have to 
replace the clouds would need to involve how people represent the task and how those 
representations change in order to generate the representations and operations appropriate to 
solving the task correctly (Wertheimer, 1985). It is this productive generation of representa- 
tions and operations appropriate to solving, or partially solving, a problem which the Ges- 
talt psychologists originally felt captured the concept of "insight". The models do not deal 
with representational issues but outline a computational process for producing the appropri- 
ate responses, assuming people interpret the rules and cards in various different ways. A 
full explanation would have to outline what is represented and how, and also how those 
representations and/or their content altered so as to produce the various stages of insight. In 
providing a rational basis for this data attention will concentrate on articulating the changes 
of content which could occur in response to the therapies and which would function to alter 
subjects' performance. 
The modal transitions described below come from Wason (1969). Two responses predom- 
inated in the initial choices: p card only (50%) and p and q card (41%). These responses 
constitute the baseline from which it was hoped the therapies would produce some 
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alterations in performance. Pragmatic context theory has the virtue of connecting subjects' 
initial responses to their subsequent transitions in inferential behaviour. The main transi- 
tional sequences were: 
m p=>p, q&-, q=>p, -, q" 
(II) p, q => p, q&-, q => p, -+q. 
The secondary sequence was very rarely completed. Out of the 15 subjects who finally 
adopted the "correct", p, -q, response, only 3, chose p, q initially, whereas, 10 chose p 
only initially. p, q => p transitions were very rare, and the modal transition from an initial 
choice of p only was, p => p, q& -+q, indicating the scarcity of p => p, q transitions. 
The materials used in Wason (1969) were coloured shapes. These materials produced no 
significant alterations in initial performance over the standard version. The rule interpreta- 
tions are the same as the non-taxonomic case above (5.2l'), with appropriate substitutions. 
All the assumptions made in accounting for the modal responses in the standard task are 
also operative. Each sequence is dealt with separately. 
Sequence I These subjects begin with the assumption that the system is completely open 
and hence all contextual factors could be operative (cf. card by card analysis above). In 
response to the therapies, they first move to an interpretation involving no contextual 
assumptions being in force, ie. they can educt freely in the explanatory direction. This leads 
to them to make eductions from q to p, and from -q to -p (cf, above). In response to 
further therapies, these subjects, then make the transition to assuming that there may be 
other constraints in operation, which prevents eductions from q. This entails admitting 
some contextual assumptions concerning the possibility of other constraints involving the q 
card, while dismissing another, the general context dependence of the rule. Making 
assumptions which allow one contextual variable to be operative while dismissing another, 
may be responsible for the fact that only 42% of subjects finally made falsificatory 
responses. However, sequence I subjects have already conceded that other constraints may 
be operative in their initial selections (p card only), so it may be reasonable for them to 
assume that they are supposed to now reject that assumption in response to the therapies. 
This contrasts with subjects in sequence II. 
Sequence II These subjects begin by assuming that there are no other constraints operative 
which could invalidate an eduction from q to p. In response to the therapies, they then 
move to assuming that the rule is in general not context dependent and so they can educt 
from -, q to -p. However, these subjects began with the assumption that no other 
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constraints were operative involving q, they would, therefore, be less inclined than 
sequence I subjects to abandon this assumption and therefore adopt the set of contextual 
assumptions which yield a falsificatory response profile. This interpretation is borne out in 
the data where out of the 42% of all subjects who finally made falsificatory responses, only 
20% where in sequence II while 67% were in sequence I. Initial selections were p card 
only, 50% and p and q cards, 41%. This indicates that the conditional probability of mak- 
ing a falsificatory response given an initial p selection was 0.56, the conditional probability 
of such a final response given an initial p and q card selection was 0.2, ie. subjects were 
2.8 times as likely to make a final falsificatory response given an initial p card only selec- 
tion than ap and q card selection. 
Subjects' response to the therapies can be characterised as asking the question, "Have I got 
the circumstances right? ". Their responses are determined by adjusting various contextual 
factors which, dependent on the initial assumptions made, will determine whether subse- 
quent responses which accord with falsification are forthcoming. Note that the locus of the 
therapeutic procedures was wrong. Asking subjects to concede that p, -q instances were 
false instances of the rule, could not be taken to promote a falsificatory strategy. p, -q is a 
false instance of the rule but it does not necessarily falsify the rule. Since this is the case, 
the therapies would not be expected, of themselves, to elicit many falsificatory responses, 
as was observed. However, subjects have taken the therapies to have a purpose, and have 
made various interpretative adjustments. Pragmatic context theory makes clear predictions 
concerning the kind of manipulation which would be expected to elicit falsificatory 
responses, ie. explicitly manipulate subjects contextual assumptions. 
5.4 The thematic facilitation results 
The first experiment to use thematic material was conducted by Wason & Shapiro (1971). 
They used the rule which has been employed throughout the preceding chapters as an 
example of a relational taxonomic constraint, ie. 
(5.10) Every time I go to Manchester, I travel by train. 
In this experiment 63% of subjects made responses consistent with falsification. Early 
interpretations of this result centred on the ability of realistic content to access the appropri- 
ate logical rules, ie. to facilitate insight. Another early experiment used a postal rule and 
instead of cards, envelopes (Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi & Legrenzi, 1972). The rule was: 
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(5.10) If a letter is sealed, then it has a fifty lire stamp on it. 
Rather than cards the task materials consisted of four envelopes, sealed, unsealed, one with 
a fifty lire stamp and one with a forty lire stamp. 81% of subjects made responses which 
accorded with falsification. 
Several further studies leant additional empirical weight to the argument that realistic 
materials facilitated reasoning on the task (Bracewell & Hidi, 1974; Gilhooly & Falconer, 
1974). These latter studies also attempted to separate out the determinants of this facilita- 
tion into either thematic content or the employment of a realistic relation, but with equivo- 
cal results. Manktelow & Evans (1979) presented the first data to seriously raise doubts 
about the validity of the thematic materials effect. In a series of experiments no facilitation 
was observed. Experiments 1 to 4 employed rules such as: 
(5.12) If I eat haddock, then I drink gin. 
They also systematically permuted negations in the rules, a procedure which will not be 
discussed until the next chapter. However, their failure to replicate was not a artefact of 
pooling the data across the rule forms, no facilitation was observed even on the purely 
affirmative rule. Importantly, in experiment 5, they also failed to replicate the original 
Wason & Shapiro (1971) study. 
Although they do not refer to it as such, Manktelow and Evans (1979) were the first to 
broach the possibility that a significant proportion of the observed facilitation may be due 
to memory cueing. The rules used in many early experiments were in the specific experi- 
ence of the subjects. For example, a similar postal rule was in force in Britain at the time 
the experiments were conducted. This could allow subjects to simply remember the 
appropriate instances without having to engage in any reasoning at all (Evans, 1982). This 
possibility was further tested by Griggs & Cox (1982), who using the postal rule found no 
facilitation for American subjects not familiar with the rule. However, facilitation was 
observed for an under age drinking rule: 
(5.13) If a person is drinking beer then that person must be over 19 years of age, 
a law that would have been familiar to the Florida state University students who acted as 
subjects, since the law was in force in that state at the time. A related observation made by 
Pollard (1982) and Pollard & Gubbins (1982) concerns the possible effects of context. In 
the under age drinking experiment, and Johnson-Laird et al (1972), subjects were provided 
with a context or scenario. This involves asking the subjects to imagine they are either 
postal workers checking mail or policemen checking for under age drinkers. It could be that 
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the main determinant of subjects' responding is a function of context rather than thematic 
content per se. Recently, Pollard and Evans (1987) have attempted to separate out the 
effects of content and context, using similar materials to Griggs & Cox (1982) they 
discovered that appropriate context and content is necessary for a facilitation of the 
falsificatory response. 
The memory cueing hypothesis is , also consistent with the observation of truth status effects 
(Pollard, 1979; Evans & Pollard, 1981). If a cued memory indicated a negative association 
between antecedent and consequent, then in accordance with belief bias subjects should 
look for falsifying instances. However, two results did exist which tended to raise doubts 
about the memory cueing hypothesis. First, the postal rule was used on British subjects 
who could not be supposed to have had experience with Italian postal regulations. Since a 
similar rule was in force in Britain, perhaps some reasoning was involved if only analogical 
rather than logical. Second, a rule used by D'Andrade (reported in Rumelhart, 1980), could 
not have been in the direct experience of subjects although it produced a marked facilita- 
tion. A scenario was presented telling subjects to imagine they were store managers check- 
ing receipts, the rule was: 
(5.14) If any purchase exceeded $30, the receipt must have the signature of the depart- 
ment manager on the back. 
Since the imaginary store was Sears, this goes by the name of the Sears version. Almost 
70% of subjects made responses which accorded with falsification. However, the Sears rule 
and the under age drinking rule share a potentially important feature. Both relate to various 
obligations (or conventional constraints), ie. rules about which there is some independent 
necessitation, signified by the modal must. 
Cheng & Holyoak (1985,1986) develop this idea in their theory of Pragmatic Reasoning 
Schemas. Rather than insight into domain independent syntactic rules of inference or 
specific memory traces facilitating performance, domain specific reasoning schemas are 
hypothesized to mediate inference. The appropriate domain or context will invoke a schema 
which facilitates the identification of the implicit relation asserted to exist between 
antecedent and consequent. They tested the theory relative to a permission schema, but 
other causal, enablement, co-occurrence schemas etc. are hypothesized to co-exist in the 
cognitive system. A context was provided for subjects wherein they were to imagine they 
were customs officials using the rule: 
(5.15) If a passenger's form says "ENTERING" on one side, then the other side must in- 
clude "cholera". 
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Cheng & Holyoak (1985) ran this version in no-rationale and rationale conditions. In the 
rationale version they were given a reason for why they had to check the forms which 
could elicit search for counter-examples. In the same experiment a version of the postal 
rule was used. The subjects were divided into two groups one from Hong Kong, where a 
similar postal rule was in force, the other Michigan University students. Overall they 
observed very high rates of falsificatory responding in all conditions. However, the 
rationale significantly improved performance for all conditions except the postal rule for the 
Hong Kong group, whose responses remained at the rationale level even when none was 
provided. They hypothesize that this is due to memory cueing serving to elicit the appropri- 
ate rationale from memory. However, the crucial observation was that in rationale versions 
performance was at the same levels as the specific memory trace condition. This argues for 
domain specific reasoning processes which are not mediated by specific prior experience. 
Cheng & Holyoak (1985) also carried out an abstract version of the task, where a permis- 
sion rationale was provided. This produced a significant facilitation over a no rationale 
abstract version, where the rule was corrected for syntactic form, both rules included a 
modal must, and explicit negations were included on the cards. Facilitation was observed, 
which they surmise can only be attributed to the elicitation of the appropriate permission 
schema. Pragmatic reasoning schema theory is closely allied to the view of inference 
developed in situation theory. Constraints encode the specific relations which implicitly 
hold between antecedent and consequent. Moreover, the explicit provision of contexts of 
interpretation and rationales is consonant with the view that interpretation always proceeds 
with respect to a context, either explicit in the environmental circumstances of inference 
and comprehension or implicitly recruited from memory. It could be hypothesized that 
Pragmatic reasoning schemas provides precisely the data structures required to implement 
pragmatic context theory. However, there are points of divergence which will lead to the 
identification of a possible response due to Manktelow & Over (personal communication, 
but cf. Manktelow & Over, forthcoming). 
Interpretation always proceeds with respect to a context (Bransford & Johnson, 1972,1973; 
Bransford, Barclay & Franks, 1972; Bransford & McCarrell, 1975). If no context is expli- 
citly provided then people assume one, they recruit appropriate material form memory of 
similar, or otherwise related events. If they cannot, then a text may appear meaningless 
(Bransford & Johnson, 1972,1973), or subjects may mis-parse the text (Crain & Steedman, 
1985). The computational mechanisms by which people recruit only relevant experience 
from memory to provide contexts of interpretation is one of the most pressing problems of 
contemporary Cognitive Science. But that people do this is beyond question. What also 
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seems beyond question is that recruitment is mediated by similarity and analogical 
processes. If this is the case then there may be no need to invoke stored domain specific, 
but abstract reasoning schemas. An appropriate "schema" could be generated on the fly as a 
summation of the memory traces which a stimulus evokes either directly or by analogy (cf. 
Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland & Hinton, 1986). Similar processes may mediate the 
contextual effects hypothesized by pragmatic context theory without the need to explicitly 
invoke stored data structures like pragmatic reasoning schema. 
Moreover, the form of the schema Cheng & Holyoak (1985) provide invites another 
interpretation. The schema is hypothesized to consist of the following four production rules: 
Rule 1: If the action is to be taken, then the precondition must be satisfied. 
Rule 2: If the action is not to be taken, then the precondition need not be 
satisfied. 
Rule 3: If the precondition is satisfied, then the action may be taken. 
Rule 4: If the precondition is not satisfied, then the action must not be taken. 
The rules mirror the truth conditions for the material conditional. However, what meaning 
is to be attached to the modal terms in the productions? As things stand, their explanatory 
power is wholly parasitic on the readers pre-theoretic understanding of modal terminology. 
Before this production set could be treated as a computational theory, the terms must be 
provided with a semantics, either a denotational semantics, ie. truth conditions are provided, 
or a procedural semantics, ie. in terms of the causal role of these symbols in the overall 
production system architecture. 
A denotational semantics is perhaps ruled out by the claim that since the productions 
include modal terminology, and standard logic does not, there can be no mental logic. But 
this argument succeeds only on the assumption that there are no modal logics, which is 
false (Hughes & Cresswell, 1968; Stalnaker, 1968; Lewis, 1973). The specific modalities 
involved are deontic, and again systems of deontic logic exist (Castaneda, 1975). There is 
no reason to assume that Cheng and Holyoak's permission schema could not be formalised 
as perhaps the non-logical axioms. of a modal theory of a permission relation. Alternatively 
they may well function as the logical axioms governing the behaviour of a deontic condi- 
tional (Jackson, 1985, Manktelow & Over, personal communication). The theoretical issues 
raised here will be dealt with more thoroughly in the conclusions. But it is precisely 
because Cheng & Holyoak's explicit theory does not rule out this possibility that pragmatic 
reasoning schema, as articulated, seem inappropriate as the data structures in which to 
implement pragmatic context theory. 
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In summary, the conclusions derivable from the observation of the thematic facilitation 
effect would appear to have turned full circle. The rules which seem to elicit most 
falsificatory responses relate to deontic contexts where the rule expresses a conventional 
regulation of some form. As Manktelow & Over (personal communication) observe this 
implies that people may possess a mental deontic logic. However, there is one notable 
exception, ie. the original rule used by Wason & Shapiro (1971). Although there have been 
failures to replicate this result, a pure deontic reasoning account based on deontic logic or 
reasoning schemas seems, prima facie, unable to explain what population differences could 
account for this anomaly. Moreover, the results obtained using abstract rules and materials 
in the COST are wholly beyond the scope of such a theory (Johnson-Laird & Wason, 1970; 
Wason & Green, 1984; Beattie & Baron, 1988). 
5.4.1 Thematic facilitation and pragmatic context 
The conclusion which work on the thematic facilitation effect appeared to license was that 
peoples reasoning is content dependent and hence subjects were irrational. The latter infer- 
ence will not be discussed until the conclusions. However, all the preceding chapters are 
predicated on the assumption that it is rational to adapt ones strategies to the goal of suc- 
cessful action in the world, not to blindly follow the dictates of some formal inference 
regime. With this in mind, this section will present an interpretation of these results within 
the framework of pragmatic context theory. 
Prima facie the accounts offered for this effect fail to address two further issues. No rela- 
tion is admitted between the observations made concerning subjects truth table evaluations 
(Johnson-Laird & Tagart, 1969; Evans, 1983) and constructions (Evans, 1972) and their 
selection task performance. The observation of defective truth tables should connect to the 
theories which purport to describes how the conditional mediates inference. Second, there 
has been no discussion of the gap that exists between knowing the truth conditions of the 
conditional and knowing how to fixate a conditional belief. In the strategies outlined at the 
beginning of this chapter, the combinations which make the rule true or false remained the 
same, but dependent on varying contextual assumptions the strategies appropriate were very 
different. The observations made with abstract material have served to identify fundamen- 
tally different but contextually appropriate strategies for fixating conditional beliefs. How- 
ever, the thematic facilitation effect appears most efficacious only in contexts which drasti- 
cally alter the nature of the task: in these versions it is no longer an inductive task. 
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This tends to render the notion of "facilitation" redundant. Facilitation of a particular 
response in one task can't be demonstrated by the observation of that response in a 
different task. In the deontic tasks, subjects no longer have to determine the truth or falsity 
of the rule but rather on the assumption it is in force whether it has been violated (Yacha- 
nin & Tweney, 1982; Pollard & Evans, 1987). However, as Pollard & Evans (1987) 
observe, this is not simply a function of being instructed to look for violating cases. Similar 
instructions for the abstract case does not yield facilitation (Griggs & Cox, 1982). There are 
several observations that need to be made concerning the determinants of subjects 
behaviour, they relate to: 
' (1) The provision of thematic content. 
(2) The provision of an appropriate context. 
(3) The provision of a rationale. 
Cheng & Holyoak not only provided subjects with an appropriate context, within that con- 
text they provided an appropriate rationale, ie. a reason why subjects should make the 
check. Although this facilitated performance over the no rationale groups, it was the icing 
on the cake, so to speak. Subjects were already performing at around 60% correct, even 
without a rationale which however, raised performance to around 90%. By most metrics 
used in these experiments Cheng & Holyoak were already observing facilitation. So a 
rationale provides additional reasons to look for violations. What of the remaining 60% 
facilitation? 
Pollard & Evans (1987) have addressed this question. A two way factorial design incor- 
porated abstract and thematic material with a scenario (context) and without. They 
discovered a main effect for scenario but not for presence or absence of thematic content, 
and a significant interaction such that thematic materials plus a scenario produced the best 
performance. This seems to imply that both (1) and (2) are required to elicit the appropriate 
falsificatory response. Very little facilitation was observed for the abstract material with a 
scenario over the condition where it was absent. Their results seem to conflict with Cheng 
& Holyoak's finding that with the provision of an appropriate, but still abstractly stated, 
permission rationale for the abstract variant, facilitation was observed. However, there were 
differences. Cheng & Holyoak used modals in the rules, and the scenario quite repetitively 
emphasised that the people must obey the eile, and that fulfilling "P" is a prerequisite for 
performing action "A". The word "regulation" occurs three times in the instructions. It 
seems hard to imagine that subjects would not be able to generate sets of relevant experi- 
ences given this amount of prompting. In general, these tasks appear to indicate that the 
effect principally requires the right context or scenario. If this is prompted sufficiently it 
may well facilitate performance even on abstract versions. 
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The change in the task involves a switch away from attempting to determine whether the 
rule is true in an open or closed system to using the rule to guide a certain kind of action. 
The actions do not involve make eduction concerning what happens next in the world. 
Rather they involve subjects acting as an ann of the institutions which enforce conventional 
laws. The scenarios or contexts ensure subjects imagine themselves as performing appropri- 
ate actions, however one does not act unless one has an appropriate reason, ie. a goal. Pro- 
viding the rationale provides subjects with the appropriate goal or reasons for performing 
these actions. Moreover, they are going to want the rule in the form which is most condu- 
cive to performing the appropriate actions. 
Conventional constraints are often relatively ubiquitous. Although, violators exist, within 
their jurisdiction, conventional constraints are supposed to hold without exception. This 
moderates' the effect on inference of possible mitigating background conditions. For exam- 
ple, if Johnny is drinking under age he is still violating the law even if its his birthday, he 
didn't know the law: he thought he was in another state (even lack of attunement doesn't 
get you off the hook) etc. According to pragmatic context theory, these manipulations will 
have had an effect on subjects rule interpretations, the question is what effect? 
Conventional constraints are either of the form PA (if precondition, then action) or AP (if 
action, then penalty). All the rules mentioned are PA rules. The order PA is not the order in 
which the rules in these tasks are presented, they all have the following form: 
(521) If ACTION, then must PRECONDITION. 
However, once subjects adopt the point of view suggested by the scenario, they need the 
eile in the appropriate form. For example, checking for under age drinkers is not achieved 
exhaustively by checking all beer drinkers to see whether they are over 18. Rather, poten- 
tial violators who look like they are under 18 are checked to see whether they are drinking 
beer. This reflects the appropriate order of property determination (cf. 5.2.2): subjects 
require the rule to be interpreted in an action orienting manner. If the rules surface form is 
not appropriately action oriented, then they may convert to a contextually apposite 
equivalent which is. What appropriate equivalents does situation theory allow for deontic, 
conventional contexts? 
In situation theory the locus of modality is given by the constraints (cf. 3.3). Modal termi- 
nology usually signifies that some such relation is in operation. For example, (I am 
indebted to Ken Manktelow & David Over for this example) 
-123- 
(5.22) You ought to wear gloves. (said to a nurse who is cleaning up blood) 
(5.22) illustrates two features of modals. First, the modals relates two contingencies, one 
elliptically present in the context, as a conditional, ie. if you clean up blood you ought wear 
gloves because contaminated blood causes AIDS so wearing gloves can prevent catching 
AIDS. Similarly for Cheng & Holyoak's rationale, if you enter the country you must be 
inoculated against cholera, to prevent the native population catching the disease. 
Cheng & Holyoaks's rule could be stated in the form of their Rule 4. 
(5.24) Not being inoculated against cholera PRECLUDES entry to this country. 
All the deontic conditionals used express non-taxonomic constraints. By way of exampling 
the kinds of inferences licensed by (5.24) let us briefly return to the my hall light example. 
The background types bear the same relation as expressed in (5.24) to the indicated type, 
eg. the electricity not being on (E = 0) precludes the light coming on (L = 1), ie. they are 
negatively causally related: 
(525) E=0 =I L=1 
Equally, the light being on precludes the the electricity being off: 
(5.26) L=1 =1 E=0 <-> L=1 => E=1 
and this is equivalent to the constraint that the light being on involves the electricity being 
on. However, observe that the electricity being on (E = 1) does not involve or preclude the 
light being on (L = 1). nor does the light being off involve or preclude the electricity being 
on. 
The following set of propositions describe the situation with my hall light and the electri- 
city supply, taking T: «Electricity-on; 1» and T': «Light-on; 1» 
Rule 1': s I- «[n]=>, T', T. 1» 
Rule 2': s V= «[n]=>, -, T', T; 1» &s V= «[n]=1, -, T', T; 1» 
Rule 3': s V= «[n]=>, T, T'; 1» &s V= «[n]=I, T, T'; 1» 
Rule 4': s1 «[n]=I, -, T, T; 1» 
These propositions exactly mirror Cheng and Holyoak's (1985) pragmatic reasoning 
schema. However, they are not theoretical constructs but a characterisation of the content of 
peoples mental states. This characterisation is fitting since being inoculated is just one of 
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the many conditions you must satisfy to enter the country, others being, eg. that you want 
too because you have to go to a conference etc. The modal terminology has been systemati- 
cally replaced by the relations of involvement and preclusion. And the contextual grounds 
for rules 2' and 3, are made explicit. In the context of my hall light, the electricity being 
on does not involve my hall light being on: the switch may not be turned, and since the 
electricity being on is what enables the turning of the switch to turn on the light, the elec- 
tricity being on cannot preclude the light coming on. Similarly the precondition being 
satisfied does not involve taking the action, and it does not preclude it either. Observe that 
rule 4' is in the only rule supported in the situation whose discovery order matches the 
order in which I suggested subjects would need orient their rule interpretation to guide their 
actions once they have adopted the point of view suggested in the scenario. 
Generally, it is not the case that if T involves T', then -, T' precludes T. Rules 1' and 4' 
are not always or indeed usually equivalents. Recall the original my hall light example, 
switch A being turned involves the hall light going on, but the hall light not being on does 
not preclude switch A being turned, the bulb may be broken. It is only relative to other 
pragmatic factors concerning the ubiquity of the conventional constraints when in force (or 
the enabling relation between the electricity being on and the lights going on), which 
licenses 4' given an expression of 1'. 
To guide their actions appropriately subjects adopt the interpretation in 4'. When making 
inferences subjects need not have a whole pragmatic reasoning schema available, rather 
than this one interpretation. One highly resilient observation in selection task performance 
is the almost universal selection of the p card, in many studies the p card only as a selec- 
tion is the second most frequent If subjects were interpreting the rule as in 4', to guide 
their actions, and subsequently reasoning in the converse direction to select the p card then 
a reversal of this common result would be expected. The negation of the consequent of the 
surface form of the rule is now the antecedent in 4', hence rather than the observation of p 
card only selections, -, q card only selections would be expected. However, if a whole prag- 
matic reasoning schema were available, then subjects could use the productions in 1 and 4 
(above), and no switch would be expected. However, although Cheng & Holyoak do not 
report their results in sufficient detail to check this prediction, Pollard & Evans (1987) do. 
The prediction of some -, q card only selections was supported in their thematic/scenario 
version, where 21% of subjects selected the -, q card only, while no p card only selections 
were made. 71% of subjects made the p and -, q card selections. If subjects do make the 
conversion to the interpretation in 4', then modulo that interpretation subjects responses 
accord with verification. That is, the eductions licensed by 4' form a mirror image of 
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standard abstract selection task performance, as indeed do Pollard and Evans 
thematiciscenario condition data. So once the appropriate action oriented interpretation is 
adopted, subjects again are using the rules to make information gaining eductions. 
The anomaly of the original Wason & Shapiro (1971) result can be interpreted quite readily 
in terms of the rule expressing a relational taxonomic constraint. Since this is the case, a 
unified interpretation exists for the cards which could cue the negative confirmation strategy 
outlined for the taxonomic schema presented in section 5.2.2. The failure to replicate 
observed by Manktelow & Evans (1979), can only be put down to population differences. 
Perhaps Manktelow & Evans (1979) subjects made an open system assumption (cf. 5.2.2). 
This account clearly does not constitute an explanation of the replicative failure but it does 
provide a plausible account of the differences in the content of subjects' mental states, 
between experiments, which could characterise the differences in subjects' obsvered 
behaviour. 
Summary ýj 
This chapter began with a detailed account of the strategies licensed in Wason's selection 
task by a non-taxonomic and a taxonomic interpretation of a conditional. It was then shown 
how the disjoint expression of the rule in the selection task function to elicit the standard 
predictive cycle strategy which warrants eductive inferences which accord with the strategy 
of the verification. It was then shown how the account generalises to the therapy expert-, 
ment of Wason (1969). The thematic "facilitation" results were then reviewed and it was 
argued that the manipulations employed radically changed the nature of the task. However, 
once the appropriate action orienting interpretation is adopted it was shown that subject's 
eductive behaviour proceeded as predicted by pragmatic context theory. The exceptional 
case of the Wason & Shapiro (1971) result was also shown to have a rational explication in 
terms of a taxonomic interpretation of the rule employed. 
In the next chapter the data obtained form Evans' negations paradigm in the selection and 
truth table table tasks is reviewed. It is argued that the conclusion that irrelevant responding 
is attributable to either an attentional matching strategy or shallow linguistic processes is 
unwarranted. This discussion will provide the basis for experiments to be reported in 
chapter 7. 
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Chapter 6: The Evans Negations Paradigm 
6.1 Introduction 
In the preceding chapters the crucial feature of pragmatic context theory has been the 
demonstration that general considerations of context dependence motivate the concept of 
partial interpretation. In chapter 4, the consequences of partial interpretation for the strategy 
of falsification were outlined. It was argued that if this strategy is motivated either by 
appeal to modus tollen or the semantics of the universal quantifier, partial interpretation 
still rendered falsification an unsound strategy of confirmation. In chapter 5, it was argued 
that the interpretative process which incorporates varying contextual assumptions either 
given in the environmental circumstances or from prior beliefs, were preconscious and 
automatic, in line with Wason & Evans (1975) dual process theory. 
It was mentioned that Evans has- a different interpretation of these Type 1 processes. In 
experiments, which will be reviewed below, Evans systematically varied negations in the 
conditional and discovered that subjects appeared to ignore the negations and simply match 
named values. However, in protocol data (Wason, 1969; Wason & Evans, 1975) subjects 
were observed (i) to realise that a true antecedent and false consequent instance made a 
conditional false, and (ii) gave post hoc logically sound justifications for selections. This 
anomaly provided the principle motivation for the dual process theory. However, it also 
gains credence from distinctions between preconscious and conscious processes in the per- 
ceptual psychology literature (eg. Neisser, 1967). Matching bias was the result of selective 
attention processes (Evans, 1983a). One discrepancy between Evans' (1983a) view of pre- 
conscious processes and earlier conceptions concerns the difference between mental set 
(Duncker, 1945, Luchins & Luchins, 1950) and selective attention. Neisser (1967) identifies 
preconscious processes as pre-attentive. This is based on perceptual studies involving rapid 
holistic processes which occur automatically prior to selective attention picking out features 
for further processing. Evans (1983a) argument reverses this process: preconscious process- 
ing is determined by a mental set which directs attention to named values. The view that 
will be adopted here (cf. conclusions) is that the original distinction, whereby preconscious 
processes are pre-attentive and holistic better captures the early interpretative process where 
all sources of information enter into the determination of an interpretation prior to higher 
level Type II processing. 
Issues of process to one side, the principle reason for focusing on Evans negations para- 
digm involves the interpretation of this data as implicating an apparently non-logical match- 
ing bias as determining subjects irrelevant responses in truth table tasks. It has already been 
argued that the occurrence of irrelevants is a function of partial interpretation modulo the 
context dependence of the early interpretative process. Hence, there is a clear disagreement 
concerning the nature of Type 1 processes. Although pragmatic context theory concurs with 
the view that these processes are non-logical insofar as they are not determined by some 
standard logical inference regime, this does not mean they are not constitutive of the inter- 
pretative process. This implies that interpretative factors should be the principle cause of 
subjects behaviour even when negations are systematically varied. The interpretations 
licensed by pragmatic context theory will be non-standard, so the data on Evans negations 
paradigm stands in need of re-evaluation in the light of these interpretations. Of the many 
predictions derivable from pragmatic context theory, this was considered the most important 
to validate empirically since Evans' interpretation of these results casts doubt on the 
theory's central concept: partial interpretation. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In the next section the data on Evans negations 
paradigm will be critically reviewed and assessed. This will be followed by an account of 
the situation theoretic interpretations of conditionals containing negatives. In the last section 
the experiments which will be reported in the next chapter will be introduced, and the 
motivation provided for the procedures and materials employed. 
6.2 Critical review of work using Evans negations paradigm 
6.2.1 Truth table construction and evaluation tasks 
Some terminology fast needs to be introduced. The systematic variation of negatives in 
conditional rules means that the combinations of p and q and their respective negates -, p 
and -, q shown in Table 1 correspond to the Truefrrue (TT), True/False (TF), False/True 
(FT) and False/False (FF) combinations in the standard truth table for the material condi- 
tional. Most of the discussion of these tasks goes on in terms of these logical cases, rather 
than card cases. This already presupposes a recurring assumption made in analysing this 
data: there is no semantic interaction between negation and the conditional. Evans (1972) 
conducted a truth table construction task in which the first observations of matching bias 
were made. Subjects were presented with a4x4 array of cards containing various 
Table 6.1 
Combinations corresponding to standard Truth- table cases 
for Rules with Negated constituents. 
Rule TT TF FT FF 
(1) If p, then q p4 p', 9 ', p4 -, p-+4 
(2) If p, then -, q p-, 4 p4 -, p-, q -. p4 
(3) If -, p, then q -p4 -P-. I pq p-, 4 
(4) If gyn. then -4 -+n-l -+pq P-., q Pq 
coloured shapes (circle, triangle, cross, square; red, yellow, green, blue). The four rule vari- 
ants were presented one at a time and the subjects' task was too pick two of the cards from 
the array and place them side by side such that they made the rule true or false dependent 
on whether they had been instructed to verify or falsify it respectively. 
Two principle motivations for this experiment are cited by Evans (1972). First, Johnson- 
Laird and Tagart (1969) had claimed support for a defective truth table using an evaluation 
task. Evans (1972) observed that the evaluation procedure involves providing subjects with 
an "irrelevant" category for classifying whether instances falsified or verified a conditional 
rule. This invited the criticism that subjects may well have used the category simply 
because they felt they ought to. To avoid this Evans (1972) developed the construction task 
so that the irrelevant category could be inferred from a subjects' failure to construct an 
instance: Second, previous experiments in which negatives had been introduced preserved 
the p implies q logical relationship. This could allow truth and falsity to be confounded 
with affirmation and negation. Evans (1972) varied the rules as in table 6.1. He had also 
observed that inference by modus tollens is less often produced in the presence of negated 
antecedents (Evans, 1972a). It was therefore hypothesized that fewer TF cases would be 
constructed to falsify rules with negative antecedents. He observes (Evans, 1972: 194) that, 
"failure to make modus tollens is logically inconsistent with the belief that TF falsifies". 
The results of this experiment will be reported in some detail. Subject's initial response 
data (they were permitted to make as many constructions as they felt appropriate) is sum- 
marised in table 6.2. Only the first verifying and first falsifying construction was included 
in this table on the assumption that they, "would be the psychologically "strongest", on the 
grounds they occurred most immediately to the subject" (Evans 1972: 195). The prediction 
that fewer TF cases would be constructed to falsify rules with negative antecedents received 
confirmation (p = 0.0005, sign test) and there were significantly more TF cases constructed 
to falsify rules with negative consequents (p = 0.012, sign test). Evans (1972: 196) takes 
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Table 6.2 
The Frequency with which subjects gave each truth table case on their initial 
verification and initial falsification of each rule. ( n= 24) 
Verification Falsification 
Rule 
TT TF FT FF TT TF FT FF 
(1)Ifp, then q 24 000 0/w 17P 0 6 
(2) If p. then not-q 24 000 0 Pi 23 ry 0 0 7w 
(3) If not-p, then q 24 000 0 T-s 7 Tj- 15 rep 2r 
(4) If not-p, then not-q 22 002 0" 13 iw2 oat. "8 pa, 
these results as evidence that, "subjects prefer to match rather than alter the values named 
in the riles, which we shall refer to as matching bias". 
Is it legitimate to take only subjects first falsifying or verifying constructions into account 
in establishing this conclusion? In the discussion Evans observes that the overall results for 
the if -p, then q rule indicated that subjects were treating it as exclusive-OR. Exclusive-OR 
is equivalent to the denial of material equivalence, hence there are two potentially falsifying 
values TF and FT. Both will figure in subjects responses. That one or the other is initially 
preferred represents a bias which may be explained either by attentional or interpretative 
processes. If it is shown that subjects exclusive-OR interpretation was appropriate, then this 
tends to invalidate the matching bias conclusion. However, the bias may also be observed 
in the total response data. 
Table 6.3 shows subjects total response data, which was not reported in this form in Evans 
(1972), but it could be extracted from another table in which Evans constructed psychologi- 
cal truth tables form the total response data (cf. next chapter). To determine whether match- 
ing bias is observed in the total responses sign tests could not be used as the data was not 
Table 6.3. 
The total frequencies with which subjects gave each truth table 
case on veri fying and falsifyin g each rule. ( n= 24) 
R l 
Verification Falsification 
u e TT TF FT FF F 
(1) If p, then q 24 0 2 40 21 7 8 
(2) If p, then -q 24 0 5 10 0 23 1 1 
(3) If -p, then q 24 1 2 11 0 15 18 4 
(4) If -, p, then -, q 22 2 4 70 18 7 9 
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reported by subject. However, at least an indication can be gained using the albeit inap- 
propriate x2 test. The comparisons are falsification TF, (1) & (2) against (3) & (4), the 
difference was not significant ()? = 0.83, p>0.20), and falsification TF, (1) & (3) against 
(2) and (4), the difference was not significant ()2 = 0.21, p>0.20). There would appear to 
be little evidence for matching in Evans (1972) total response data. Evans (1972) does con- 
clude that the data provides support for the defective truth table account, generally 
irrelevant responses could be inferred for false antecedent instances. 
On the assumption that the exclusive-OR interpretation was in some sense appropriate what 
requires explaining is why subjects initially preferred FT when falsifying the if -p, then q 
rule since both pq (Fr), and -ip-, q (TF) falsify it. The twin observations of (i) subjects 
apparent XOR interpretation, which (ii) was the artefactual cause of the significant match- 
ing result in the initial response data, represent the primary motivation for subsequent repli- 
cation of this task to be reported in the next chapter. 
Evans (1982) returns to the original Evans (1972) data to motivate the claim that the 
occurrence of irrelevants on that experiment were actually a function of matching bias. The 
argument proposes that the standard logic of the material conditional be retained in the 
interpretational or logical component, with deviations being explained by non-logical biases, 
in a response-bias component of the cognitive system. Evans presents the data pooled over 
the four rules, by logical case, and by "matching" case, ie. card cases in the order pq (0 
mismatches), p-+q & --pq (1 mismatch), and -, p-, q (2 mismatches), as in table 6.4. Evans 
(1982: 140-142) observes that the modal responses (in italics) by logical case were clearly 
supportive of a "defective" truth table account (Wason 1966). However, looking in the 
"irrelevant" column for the data arranged by matching case reveals a trend towards these 
non-constructed choices as the number of mismatches increases, ie. subjects are more likely 
to construct instances whose items match those named in the rule. On this basis Evans 
(1982) adduces two alternative hypotheses to explain the high occurrence of "irrelevants" 
on the FT and FF cases: 
(i) People possess a defective truth table in the logical component. 
(ii) People weight the logical component less in these cases and therefore "irrelevants" 
arise from matching bias. 
Evans (1982) plumps for (ii) on the basis of the following considerations, "If we assume 
that the matching effect is really suppression of responding on mismatching cases, then we 
can resolve this problem. Is there still a higher irrelevant rate on false antecedent cases if 
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Table 6.4 
Evans' (1972) results pooled over the four rules and classified by (a) 
Logical Case and (b) by Matching Case. Results are percentage 
frequencies (N = 24). 
Case_ 
Classification 
True False Irrelevant 
(a) Logical 
TT 99 01 
TF 3 80 17 
FT 14 34 52 
FF 33 23 44 
(b) Matching 
pq 34 52 14 
p-, q 41 33 26 
, pq 40 27 33 
-, p-, q 34 25 41 
Table 65 
The percentage frequency of construction of each logical case on rules 
where they constitute a double match, pq, for Evans (1972) data. 
(N = 24). 
Logical Case Rule 
% Frequency 
True False Irrelevant 
TT If p, then q 100 00 
TF If p, then not-q 0 96 4 
FI' If not-p, then q8 75 17 
FF If not-p, then not-q 29 38 33 
we look only at rules where such cases match" (p141). Table 6.5 is the table produced in 
Evans (1982) based on the Evans (1972) data. 
Evans concludes, that "Although there is more "irrelevant" responding to FT and FF, it is 
relatively low in cases that match. Thus the evidence for the defective truth table account 
may be a partial artifact of greater susceptibility to response bias on these cases" (Evans 
1982: 141). However, this argument is not independent of the prior observation concerning 
subjects apparent XOR interpretation of the -, p, q rule form. It was observed above that 
this interpretation could be primarily responsible for the significance of the matching pred- 
ictions in subjects initial response data. It just so happens that when restricting the data to 
the double match cases, the fact that Fr was chosen most frequently as falsifying for this 
rule shows up as a suppression of irrelevant responding. However, it could equally be a 
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function of interpretational changes, as mentioned above. Moreover, although it is not clear 
cut in Evans data, a similar argument may account for the apparent suppression of 
irrelevant responding for the if -gyp, -+q rule form. 
However, Evans argues that if there were an interaction between negation and the condi- 
tional along the lines being suggested here, another observation is relevant. The TF case 
(cf. table 6.4(a)) also revealed a significant increase in irrelevant responding as the number 
of mismatches increased: 0-mismatches: 1 irrelevant; 1-mismatch: 3&4; 2-mismatches: 8. 
Evans does countenance the possibility that this is due to the difficulty of processing nega- 
tion (Wason, 1959,1961,1980). He observes, however, that matching seems to primarily 
affect false antecedent instances, ie. FP and FF, which argues against a general processing 
deficit. There is some inconsistency in arguing against a negations-conditional interaction 
on the grounds that irrelevants also increase for TF instances as a result of matching, while 
arguing that a negative processing deficit explanation won't do because the effect is only 
found for FT and FF instances. 
In chapter 2 it was observed that negation in situation theory functions to identify well 
defined contrast classes relative to dimensions of variation in which a negated constituent 
participates. If it is a binary dimension, ie. an antonym eg. hot/cold, then the negation 
identifies the antonym of the negated constituent. The antonymic relation can be contextu- 
ally defined, eg. in a set consisting of only Russians and Germans, -, German identifies 
Russian. Similarly, a whole dimension of variation may be defined, eg. -, tea, identifies a 
contrast class consisting of drinks (the superordinate category), but in a context where tea is 
being drunk, coffee is the most felicitous contextually defined opposite. However, if a 
negated constituent does not fall into some natural dimension of variation or taxonomy, 
then the contrast class is less determinate. In these cases the human interpreter may be 
unable to use his stored beliefs but rather the environmental circumstances in the attempt to 
pick out the relevant contrast class. In accordance with pragmatic context theory, this would 
be expected to affect interpretation. In Evans (1972), the card array could provide the cir- 
cumstantial means by which subjects attempt to determine the relevant contrast class. This 
view of negation is inherently constructive, given the negated constituent and prior beliefs 
or the environmental circumstances, the human interpreter must actively construct the con- 
trast class. The processes involved may well lead to characteristic errors and biases espe- 
cially when the contrast class is ill defined. Again the processes involved could be respon- 
sible for the observed matching phenomena. The experiments to be described in the next 
chapter attempt to distinguish between a negative-conditional semantic interaction account, 
a constructive negation account and matching. Precise hypotheses are formulated in the last 
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section of this chapter. 
Evans (1983b) hypothesizes a possible linguistic source for matching bias. Wason (1965) 
observes that the normal pragmatic function of negation is to deny presuppositions. For 
example, "There are sea dwellers that are not fish" seems to be a pragmatically felicitous 
utterance when denying a prior assertion to the effect that "All sea dwellers are fish". Prag- 
matically the topic of conversation is still fish. Evans goes on to argue that if explicit nega- 
tions were incorporated in the instances in a truth table task, then subjects may not discard 
an instance as irrelevant because it now shares the same topic as the rule. Since mismatch- 
ing instances are just those where an instance fails to match the named value, and it was 
observed (cf. above) that there appears to be a trend for more irrelevants in these cases, this 
should lead to a reduction in irrelevant responding. It is then argued that any interpreta- 
tional account could have nothing to say concerning this procedural change, since it would 
rely on suggesting that the matching phenomenon is a function of the effect of negatives on 
initial rule interpretations. The argument to this conclusion relies on separating two levels 
of processing one linguistic or heuristic and the other interpretational, semantic or analytic. 
It is assumed that subjects make an initial pre-interpretative parse of the rule. The "linguis- 
tic" information gleaned then interacts with the instance to determine whether further 
semantic processing occurs to determine how the instance bears on the rules truth or falsity. 
Two "linguistic" heuristics determine subjects irrelevant responding. First, the negative 
topic function described above. Second, a further "linguistic" heuristic, provided by the 
phenomenon of the irrelevance of false antecedent instances. The latter will affect both 
groups, ie. a group of subjects who perform a task containing explicit negations on the 
instances and those that do not. 
The task employed was similar to the construction task (1972) but instead of constructing 
instances subjects were presented with all 4 possible instances for each rule and asked to 
make a conform, contradict or irrelevant evaluation. The prediction was derived that there 
would be less matching for an Explicit (E) group than for an Implicit (I) group (the latter 
having members of the contrast class, ie. other numbers or letters, on the instances). This 
prediction was confirmed using an antecedent (AMI) and consequent matching index 
(CMI): 
(AMI) The frequency of irrelevant responses on -, pq and -, p-, q instances minus those on 
pq and p-, q instances. 
(CMI) The frequency of irrelevant responses on p-, q and -, p-q instances minus those on 
pq and -, pq instances. 
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Since each subject performed the task twice there was a potential for 2 irrelevant responses 
per instance per rule form. Hence, both indices range between +16 and -16, a positive 
value indicates matching. Both were significantly larger for the I-group than the E-group. 
Moreover, computing a Logic index permitted comparison between groups for consistency 
with the logical response. This was restricted to affirmative antecedents. The index was 
significantly higher for the E-group. Evans (1983b: 642) argues that: 
(6.3) "These findings are irreconcilable with the view that matching bias is simply a 
result of the effect of negatives on the interpretation or initial representation of the 
conditional rule itself. It is not a change in the rules but in the form of the in- 
stances which is making the difference. Furthermore, the logical information con- 
veyed in the instance is unchanged; it is the linguistic expression of that informa- 
tion which is critical". 
However, in the discussion it is allowed that if matching is the result of a linguistic topic 
function, then all matching should disappear for the E-group. It is suggested that there may 
well be some residual processing deficit incur ed due to the presence of negations on the 
instances, in accordance with Wason (1969,1961,1980). Moreover, since the manipulation 
is only supposed to affect the early heuristic stage the ratio of true false judgments should 
remain the same between conditions, which was not observed especially for FT and FF 
instances. It is therefore concluded that the instances may be affecting the analytic 
processes directly in some cases. The following critique of this experiment is going to be 
quite detailed since, prima facie, the results seem to argue strongly against the position 
being developed here. 
(1) The distinction between an essentially linguistic or heuristic level of processing and a 
deeper semantic or analytic level may be spurious modulo the processes attached to the 
heuristic level. First, the concept of topic is a discourse function (Haiman, 1978; Akatsuka, 
1986). Prima facie isolated rules expressed by means of a conditional would appear devoid 
of an appropriate discourse. The explicit mention of an item appears to be conflated with 
the item being the topic of the sentence. However, it is debatable whether the concept of 
topic is applicable to individual sentences. Moreover, in the linguistic literature (Haiman, 
1978), it is not the case that both antecedent and consequent of a conditional are topic 
markers, rather this is a function identified with the antecedent The antecedent is 
hypothesized to introduce given or shared knowledge (Clark, 1977) into a discourse (Hai- 
man, 1978). These functions are also identified in the psychological literature as being cru- 
cial to understanding discourse, ie. the are implicated in accessing the stored knowledge 
required for comprehension (Clark, 1977). This is hardly aa shallow heuristic level of pro- 
cessing, but rather about as deep as one could get, ie. after initial syntactic and semantic 
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processing, these pragmatic functions of linguistic expressions aid in integrating the 
interpretation with appropriate world knowledge. 
However, in part this could be a terminological quibble. Topic has a certain technical appli- 
cation which perhaps carries unintended connotations. The more neutral concept of about- 
ness could be appealed to, in some sense a negated constituent is still about that consti- 
tuent. However, this is contextually bounded. Take for example: 
(6.4) If its acid, then it turns the litmus paper blue. 
(6.5) If its acid, then it does not turn litmus paper blue (... it turns it red). 
(6.51 No, if its not acid, then it turns litmus paper blue (... alkalies do that). 
Negations are used to make denials, which presupposes an assertion to deny. In (6.4) an 
assertion is made which (6.5) and (6.5') deny. In (6.5) interest focuses on what colour acid 
turn litmus paper, in (6.5') it focuses on what substance turns litmus paper red. In this 
example, the negation functions to focus attention on a highly constrained contrast class. In 
(6.5) the consequent is about what colour acid turns litmus paper which is red, in (6.5') the 
antecedent is about the substance which turns litmus paper blue which is alkalies. In this 
constrained binary situation the negation identifies determinate members of a contrast class. 
However, in other contexts a negation may not focus attention on an item of a well defined 
contrast class, Evans employed the following example: 
(6.6) 1 did not go for walk. 
If I suddenly disappeared from my terminal and on my return a colleague says, "Did you 
enjoy your walk", I may utter (6.6) in reply but not thereby say anything about what I did 
during my absence. The information conveyed is simply the non-occurrence of my having 
been for walk. In this case, (6.6) is still about going for a walk. This distinction has 
already been introduced in chapter 2. The sameness of topic thesis seems only to apply to 
cases where there is no well defined contrast class. But in the task the subjects know that 
there is a letter on one side of each card and a number on the other. 
The fact that the denial presupposes a prior assertion, raises an issue which would seem to 
run together the two heuristic processes. What if I said, "the King of France is bald", and 
you replied "the king of France is not bald", have you successfully denied my assertion?. 
Well it appears that since there is no King of France, I have said nothing with a deter- 
minate truth value, and hence your denial is equally vacuous. My assertion and your subse- 
quent denial rely on the existential presupposition that there is a King of France. Just as 
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using a negation to make a denial presupposes a prior assertion; an assertion appears to 
presuppose the existence of the objects about which it is made. Note that in Evans' exam- 
ple, in my reply to my colleague, I have precisely denied the presupposition upon which 
his question was predicated, ie. that there was a walk to enjoy. Presuppositional phenomena 
constitute one of the primary motivations for introducing truth value gaps, a third truth 
value (? ) or partial interpretation. Moreover, the debate concerning whether this is a seman- 
tic phenomenon has raged since Frege (1892, cf. Russell, 1905, Strawson, 1950). If a third 
truth value or partial interpretation is allowed then the first candidate for re-interpretation is 
the conditional: a conditional only makes an assertion given the truth of its antecedent in 
which case the assertion made is the consequent, otherwise it does not possess a deter- 
minate truth value. 
There has been much debate as to whether presupposition should be dealt with by seman- 
tics or pragmatics (Gazdar, 1979; Seuren, 1985). However, the distinction between prag- 
matics and semantics is only a formal convenience of the linguist, all knowledge sources 
must interact in the human interpreter. The level at which these phenomena are discussed is 
semantic/pragmatic, they are crucially implicated in a our normative conceptions of mean- 
ing and interpretation, and indeed the issues involved are still some of the deepest facing 
natural language semantics. On pragmatic context theory and any reasonable theory of the 
interpretative component these phenomena are going to be central. Both the phenomena 
described are usually attributed to semantic/pragmatic factors. It therefore seems inappropri- 
ate to attribute their causes to early processing heuristics rather than perhaps the very 
deepest level-of the interpretative process. 
(2) The kind of theory Evans is arguing against relies on an initial interpretation of the rule 
subsequently determining how each instance is handled. Pragmatic context theory views the 
interpretative process as involving all knowledge sources, including prior beliefs and cir- 
cumstantial features of the environment. Negation especially is not tied to a particular 
representation, the representations it contributes to constructing will depend crucially on 
context. This is because negation is treated constructively: the processes involved will 
undoubtedly interact with the context provided by the instances, as is conceded in the dis- 
cussion section. Moreover, pragmatic context theory hypothesizes that the reason for the 
processing deficit incurred through the use of negatives is precisely caused by the construc- 
tive processes involved. Since it is also conceded that some difficulty may be imposed by 
the preponderance of negations, this is all to the good: a constructive view of the interpreta- 
tive processes involved may provide an explanation for the deficit. Generally, rather than 
suppose that the occurrence of irrelevants is due to two different kinds of heuristic process, 
-137- 
one affected by the implicit/explicit manipulation the other not, it seems that the difference 
could be one of degree involving the same underlying interpretative process. Furthermore, 
on each instance each subject had the rule available. The only way to test whether a shal- 
low pre-interpretative parse of the rule was responsible for discarding an instance as 
irrelevant would be to take reading time/response time measures and correlate these with 
the occurrence of irrelevants. 
(3) In the introduction it is conceded that a great deal of irrelevant responding is due to the 
perceived irrelevance of false antecedent instances (FT & FF). The issue over whether this 
phenomenon is due to a linguistic heuristic too one side, he nonetheless fails to correct for 
the possible effects of this additional factor. Recall matching produces irrelevants as a func- 
tion of the aboutness heuristic not the irrelevance of false antecedent instances. However, 
the two matching indices are computed for the whole response record including the 
irrelevants which are not hypothesized to be a function of matching. At least with no indi- 
cation to the contrary it must be assumed that this is the case. However, taking the double 
mismatch case, the percentage of irrelevants observed for false antecedent cases makes up 
32.25% of the total percentage of 45%. That is, irrelevants occurring for false antecedents, 
where they are appropriate for reasons other than matching, are responsible for the 
observed increase in irrelevants for the double mismatch case. 
The numbers of 0,1, and 2 mismatching/matching instances is exactly symmetrical between 
true and false antecedent cases. This means that Ti' and TF instances, match and mismatch 
exactly the same number of times as FT and FF instances. Since, the aboutness early pro- 
cessing heuristic is supposed to block further processing given a mismatch, but especially 
on double mismatches, ' then this process would predict exactly the same numbers of 
irrelevants between true antecedent and false antecedent instances. True/false assessments 
are only carried at the deeper analytic level: they have to get past the heuristics first. How- 
ever, in Evans data, for the I-group only 26% of all irrelevants were observed for true 
antecedent instances as opposed to 74% for the false antecedent instances, the figures were 
18% and 82% respectively for the E-group. Since matching makes symmetrical predictions 
this means that 48% of all irrelevants in the I-group and 64% in the E-group are solely due 
to the irrelevance of false antecedent instances and processing negatives. However, the 
defective truth table account would predict no differences between 0,1 and 2 mismatching 
cases, which clearly there were, but this is no more than was apparent from Evans (1972). 
(4) There are some quite marked population differences between Evans (1983b) and Evans 
(1972). First, for the Ti' case in Evans (1972) for the if-., p, -q rule form 96% of subjects 
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made the correct verifying construction against 68% who evaluated this instance as true for 
the I-group in Evans (1983b). Moreover, in Evans (1972) results on the false antecedent 
cards were broadly in line with the defective truth table account. As indicated above (Table 
6.8(a)), the predominant response for false antecedent instances was irrelevant. The major- 
ity of these responses were observed for affirmative antecedent rules (this will prove impor- 
tant later on). Moreover, Evans (1982: 142) observes that the response profiles observed in 
Evans (1972) are "remarkably similar" to evaluation tasks (Evans, 1975; Evans & New- 
stead, 1977). However, in Evans (1983b) for negative antecedent rules all the modal 
responses -accorded with the material biconditional, ie. for both the I-group and the E- 
group, FT was treated as false and FF as true. This only occurred for the if -, p, q rule form 
in Evans (1972). For Evans (1983b), for the if p, q rule form FT was treated predominantly 
as false in both I and E-groups. The FF instances was treated as irrelevant in the I-group 
but as true in the E-group. For the if p, -, q rule form FT was treated as irrelevant in both 
groups and FF was treated as true. Apart from the FT/if p, then -, q case, subjects would 
appear to be treating the rules as biconditionals throughout, but for certain cases this 
becomes a more obvious interpretation in the E-group. This does not replicate earlier stu- 
dies. 
(5) There may be a far simpler account of why subjects made less irrelevant responses in 
the E-group. As Evans (1983b) observes, for some cases subjects are confronted with four 
negations. For the if -p, -, q rule form, eg. "if not B. then not 4", they may be presented 
with an instance which has, "The letter is not B and the number is not 4" on it. Since it is 
already well established that negations produce a processing deficit, it seems entirely plausi- 
ble that when confronted with this many negations subjects may simply adopt a heuristic 
strategy, but one that is more perceptual than linguistic. It seems that the population each 
sample was drawn from has a general tendency to interpret the rule as a biconditional. 
However, for some false antecedent instances in the I-group this is found harder. But for 
the E-group a very simple strategy can be adopted to always get the right biconditional 
interpretation. Pick any rule, say if -'p, q, then if the instance either completely matches 
(-, pq), ie. perceptually including the negation, or completely mismatches (p-, q), then clas- 
sify as true, if only one component matches (-, p-, q; pq) classify as false. This of course 
works for all rules/instances. 76% of subjects total responses in the E-group could be 
accounted for by this strategy. It would also account for the differences between the 
groups, since without a simple perceptual matching strategy I-group subjects cannot cir- 
cumvent the normal interpretative process. They nonetheless predominantly treated the rules 
as biconditionals, 60% of total responses accorded with this interpretation. The 16% shift 
could well account for the observed differences. 
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In conclusion, the motivation for Evans's heuristic level processes appears questionable. 
The phenomena upon which they are based are generally agreed to be the function of quite 
deep semantic factors. The serial order of the heuristic-analytic processes involved predicts 
symmetrical responses between false and affirmative antecedent instances which renders 
suspect the procedure of computing a matching index over the whole response record. 
Moreover, the population differences observed suggests that the E-group subjects could be 
adopting a simple perceptual matching strategy. Evans' arguments only succeed against a 
certain view of the interpretative process which pragmatic context theory rejects. However, 
the issue of the source of the matching phenomenon can only be resolved via a competence 
model of interpretation which provides a rational basis for the empirical observations in this 
domain. The theory Evans objected to clearly fails in this regard. So the question becomes: 
does pragmatic context theory fare any better? This is an empirical question which will be 
addressed by experiments in the next chapter. 
6.2.2 Selection Tasks 
Evans (1972) speculated that matching bias may be present in the selection task. There 
were good grounds for this assumption. Using only affirmative rules, subjects could simply 
be matching since both verification and matching bias make the same predictions for this 
rule. Evans & Lynch (1973), therefore conducted a selection task using all rule variants. 
Again some terminology needs to be introduced. Rather than talk in terms of card case, 
logical case is used, ie. true antecedent (TA), false antecedent (FA), true consequent (TC) 
and false consequent (FC) (cf. table 6.6). Evans & Lynch (1973) argued that to assess the 
effects of matching logical case should be kept constant. Four predictions were derived 
which have subsequently been taken as the sine qua non of the presence of matching bias. 
They were as follows: 
Table 6.6 
Card case to logical case conversion table. 
Rule TA FA TC FC 
(1) If p, then q p -P q ., q (2) If p, then -q p -1p -, q q (3) If -, p, then q -p p q ., q (4) If gyp. then -, a -, o n -, o 17 
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(i) There will be more TA selections when there is an affirmative antecedent than 
when there is a negative antecedent. 
(ii') There will be more FA selections when there is a negative antecedent than when 
there is an affirmative antecedent. 
(iü) There will be more TC selections when there is an affirmative consequent than 
when there is a negative consequent. 
(iv) There will be more FC selections when there is a negative consequent than when 
there is an affirmative consequent. 
In Evans and Lynch (1973) all these predictions were significantly borne out using one- 
tailed sign tests. Table 6.7 shows the results obtained. Each prediction is within a column 
and the figures in italics indicate the selections predicted to be the most frequent on the 
basis of matching. 
In the discussion of the results, Evans and Lynch (1973) claim that these predictions are 
independent. However, this is only the case when the data is analysed ignoring any 
differences in rule form. However, it is a frequent observation that negative information is 
harder to process than affirmative information (Wason, 1959,1961). This would suggest 
that unless some correction for the processing deficit incurred as a result of employing 
negatives is used, these results need not be taken as directly supportive of matching. Unless 
it is argued that matching behaviour is a consequence of that deficit, an interpretation which 
Evans & Lynch do not countenance (although, Evans (1983a: 141) does argue that the prag- 
matic function of negations to deny presuppositions (Wason, 1965) may be implicated in 
matching phenomena, cf. above). Moreover, many of the observations of higher frequencies 
of selections would have been predicted by verification/falsification if the analyses were 
carried out within rules. 
The appearance of verification is treated as manifest in the results when there are more TA 
Table 6.7 
The frequencies with which subjects selected each 
alternative on each rule (n = 24). 
Rule TA FA TC FC 
(1) If p, then q 21 2 12 8 
(2) If p, then -eq 22 1 2 14 
(3) If -, p, then q 14 7 14 10 
(4) If -, p, then -q 13 11 7 18 
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than FA selections (TA > FA), and more TC than FC selections (TC > FC). Falsification is 
manifest when there are more FC than TC selections (FC > TC). This appears to indicate 
that verification and falsification make less detailed predictions in the data than matching 
bias. However, this is simply an artifact of how the data is organised. Whether logical case 
or card case is kept constant will determine the detail of the predictions made. Moreover, if 
concern centres on interpretational differences between rule forms, then it makes sense to 
see what predictions each strategy makes when rule form is kept constant. 
In table 6.8, the predictions made by each of matching bias, verification bias and 
falsification are illustrated, (i) when logical case is kept constant and (ii) when card case is 
kept constant. By logical case (card case), '0' indicates where a large number of responses 
is predicted and '"' a smaller number. Ignoring rule form for the moment, table 6.8 reveals 
two levels at which these strategies make predictions dependent on whether logical case or 
card case is kept constant. (There is nothing sacrosanct about keeping logical case con- 
stant, when the predictions made by each strategy for each rile form are derived it is 
wholly irrelevant as to which is chosen. The only difference it makes concerns which rule 
forms are collected together to derive predictions at a less detailed level of analysis. ) The 
two levels separate how many predictions are derivable from each strategy, either two 
(level I) or four (level II). The levels divide as follows (LC = Logical Case; CC = Card 
Case): 
(1) CC x Matching; LC x Verification; LC x Falsification. 
Table 6.8 
The Predictions made on the basis of Matching bias, Verification bias 
and Falsification in the Selection Task, when (i) Logical case is kept 
constant, and (ii) Card case is kept constant. 
Case Rule 
Matching Verification Falsification 















































































(II) LC x Matching; CC x Verification; CC x Falsification. 
Both levels separate antecedent and consequent predictions, but level I draws no distinction 
between rule forms, whereas level II separates out affirmative and negative antecedents and 
consequents. If each rule is treated independently, then a further level (III) of detail can be 
derived which makes 8 predictions per strategy. At this level whether logical case or card 
case is kept constant becomes irrelevant. These predictions are readily derivable from table 
6.8, however, for perspicuity they are detailed in table 6.9. This table reveals a consider- 
able overlap in predictions between the competing strategies. In the next chapter ° abstract 
and thematic versions of the selection task will be reported in which the data was analysed 
at all the levels introduced here. 
Manktelow and Evans (1979) conducted a thematic version of the selection task using the 
food and drinks material described in 5.4. It was observed in 5.4 that the materials they 
used were unlikely to facilitate reasoning on the task. First, the task retained the inductive 
status of the earlier abstract selection task, subjects were asked to determine the truth or 
falsity of the rule. Second, no action orienting scenario or context was provided to cue the 
appropriate rule conversion. Third, no rationale was provided for why the subjects should 
want to perform the action. All the factors which seem to conspire to produce facilitation of 
falsificatory responding were absent. However, Manktelow and Evans (1979) procedures 
were true to the existing accounts of the thematic facilitation effect. At the time it was 
thought that thematic content per se was the determining factor and they demonstrated that 
this simply was not the case. They also replicated the matching bias result using thematic 
0 Table 6.9 
Level III predictions (by rule form) for each of Matching, Verification and 
Falsification in the Selection Task, indicating both Card Case 
and Logical Case forms . 
Rule (lam 
Matching Verification Falsification 
CC LC CC LC CC LC 
(i)Ant. p>'p TA>FA P>-P TA>FA P>-P TA>FA pq (ii) Consq. q> -q TC > FC q> "q TC > FC "q >q FC > TC 
(iii) Ant. p> "p TA > FA p> 'p TA > FA p> "p TA > FA p-, q (iv) Consq. q>-q FC > TC `q>q TC>FC q>-q FC>TC 
(v)Ant. P>-P FA>TA 'p>p TA>FA "p>p TA>FA 
-, pq (vi) Consq. q> -q TC > FC q> "q TC > FC `q >q FC > TC 
(vii)Ant. P>-P FA>TA `p>p TA>FA "p>p TA>FA q (viii) Consq. q> `q FC > TC -q >q TC > FC q> -q FC > TC 
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materiaL 
Along with Pollard (1981), Reich & Ruth (1982) observed that the materials used in the 
Manktelow & Evans (1979) selection task experiment were far from realistic, " or in their 
terminology were low in thematic content. In order to check whether more realistic materi- 
als would facilitate performance they used rules such as: 
(6.7) When it is early Molly serves tea. 
None of the matching bias predictions were replicated for this selection task using high 
thematic content. High thematic content was defined as providing materials which esta- 
blished a coherent non-arbitrary relationship between the concrete terms. For these materi- 
als they observed a preponderance of verificatory responses, ie. TA > FA, and TC > FC. 
They also note that responses on the task are not independent between strategies when con- 
sidered by rule form (cf. above). There are only six wholly independent responses in the 
negations paradigm selection task: 
(1) Choice of -, q on pq-rule form = falsifying (F), 
(2) Choice of -, q on p-, q-rule form = verifying (V), 
(3) Choice of p on -pq-rule form = matching 
(4) Choice of -q on -pq-rule form = F, 
(5) 
(6) 
Choice of p on -, p-, q-rule form = M, 
Choice of -, on - -, -rule form =V -ý 
wV 
q p q . 
They therefore added the number of responses in each of (1) to (6) to provide a score for 
each strategy: 
Low: 27 (M) > 16 (V) > 13 (F). 
High: 19 (V) > 15 (F) >4M. 
This appeared to indicate that high thematic content simply placed subjects back where they 
were in standard abstract versions. Reich & Ruth (1982) interpreted this result to indicate 
that over and above high thematic content memory cueing was also required to facilitate a 
falsificatory response. However, Manktelow and Evans procedure failed to include the fac- 
tors hypothesized in the last chapter to facilitate falsificatory responding. Reich & Ruth's 
procedure was almost identical. Although they provided a scenario it was not action orient- 
ing, ie. the task remained inductive, and no rationale was provided. Given which the stan- 
dard predictive cycle strategy would be expected, which yields verificatory responses. 
Performing the same Reich & Ruth scoring on Evans & Lynch's (1973) data reveals that 
for the only wholly independent predictions matching and falsification came out equal: 
. 144- 
(6.8) 18(F)=18(M)>9(V) 
Recall that the occurrence of a falsificatory response on pragmatic context theory is a result 
of attempting to explain what is on the other side (cf. taxonomic example, chapter 5). 
Given a class inclusion relation, ie. a taxonomic constraint, subjects should be able to 
explain, ie. educt from -, q to -p. This suggests that the need to determine a contrast class 
for negated constituents may facilitate the realisation that given the class inclusion -, q can 
be explained by -p. Moreover, this may serve to partially override the non-taxonomic 
interpretation suggested by the disjoint expression of the rule. What predictions would this 
hypothesis make? It would suggest more FC responding for rules with negated constituents, 
but especially for rules with negative consequents. However, the latter prediction is also 
made by matching. But there is a prediction not made by matching. First, more falsificatory 
responses would also be expected for rules with affirmative consequents. Constructing con- 
trast classes would be expected to generally facilitate the class inclusion interpretation. And 
of course the Reich & Ruth score concentrates just on these cases for falsification, where 
on average 37.5% of subjects made FC selections on affirmative consequent rules in Evans 
& Lynch (1973). This contrasts with observations of falsificatory responses on purely 
affirmative tasks, in Wason's (1969) initial condition only 6.25% of subjects selected -. q 
(FC). Similarly, in Beattie & Baron (1988) for pure affirmative tasks (without therapeutic 
prompts, Wason's initial condition was conducted prior to the therapies) only 8.8% of sub- 
jects made -, q (FC) selections. Bayes' rule indicates that subjects are 4.8 times as likely to 
turn the FC for affirmative rules when this is in the context of a negations paradigm experi- 
ment. 
This suggests the possibility that if subjects were provided with materials which facilitated 
the easy identification of a contrast class, ie. the predicates used formed an antonymic rela- 
tion and were therefore binary, this may facilitate falsificatory responding in the context of 
a negations paradigm experiment. However the disjoint expression of the rule licenses a 
verification strategy in accordance with the predictive cycle. Therefore, although some 
suppression of matching may be expected, verification would still probably be in evidence. 
Wason (1969) employed materials in a purely affirmative version of the task which con- 
formed to this suggestion. Each card had a one of two coloured shapes on either side of the 
cards. Only two colours were used. Take a rule like: 
(6.9) If there is not a red square on one side, then there is a blue circle on the other. 
"Not red square" could indicate a red circle. So when four cards are presented, ie. blue 
square, red square, blue circle, red circle, it is ambiguous as to which are the TA and TC 
and FC instances. A blue or a red circle is as equally not a red square, as a blue square. 
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However, the subject/predicate structure of natural language means that the negation is nor- 
mally taken to attach to the predicate. Therefore, shape serves to identify antecedent and 
consequent instances and colour a binary predicate describing them. Wason (1969) 
observed no facilitation with these materials in an affirmative version of the task. This pro- 
vides a secure base line from which to judge the hypothesis that such binary materials 
should facilitate falsificatory responding in a negations paradigm context. - In the next sec- 
tion we will also see a contrast in interpretation for non-taxonomic and taxonomic cases 
which suggests a difference in consequent card selection task behaviour, hence a thematic 
version of the selection task was also included in the present experiments. 
6.3 A situation theoretic analysis of conditionals containing negations 
6.3.1 Taxonomic constraints 
The interpretations which are suggested by situation theory for taxonomic and non- 
taxonomic are different. For a taxonomic constraint, disregarding its unified or disjoint 
expression, simply defines a class inclusion relation between antecedent and consequent. 
This is only affected by the presence of negations in the following sense. The presence of a 
negation serves to identify the relevant contrast class, and then the class inclusions go 
between these classes once identified. The ease of identifying the relevant contrast class 
will be determined by pragmatic world knowledge concerning the domains of the predi- 
cates. Moreover, as we have observed (cf. chapter 4) some conditionals will express 
unlikely class inclusions because of pragmatic world knowledge. Relational taxonomic 
constraints also point to fact that if the antecedent class is vacuous then no decision can be 
reached concerning the truth or falsity of the constraint. Take the following examples: 
(6.10) All black things are ravens. 
(6.11) If I don't travel to Manchester, I take the train. 
(6.10) clearly violates prior beliefs concerning the domains of the predicates, unless of 
course the domain is appropriately delimited using a prepositional phrase, eg. all black 
things in the gardens at the Tower of London. Since constraints reflect the structure of the 
world as individuated, (6.10) would not be considered a good candidate for actuality, and 
hence may elicit falsificatory behaviour (cf. chapter 4 on truth status effects, Pollard & 
Evans, 1981). Put another way it violates belief bias. Manktelow & Evans (1979: 478) 
observe that (6.11) is nonsensical. Their observation is not quite that determinate, however. 
(6.11) can be read as "Wherever I travel other than Manchester, I take the train". This is 
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perhaps a confusion of negation and falsity. A purported instance of the non-negated rule, 
in which I didn't travel to Manchester, simply bears neither one way or the other on 
whether I always travel to Manchester by train (cf. chapter 5, taxonomic example). This is 
a defective truth table account of the reasoning involved. 
For the taxonomic case penning negations simply yields the standard set theoretic interpre- 
tations. This is implicit in the situation theoretic formalism for a taxonomic constraint, but 
for perspicuity the interpretations are simply given set theoretically. Where "P" is the set 
described by p and "Q" is the set described by q, and "'" is a contrast class forming opera- 
tor and "c" is proper subset 
(6.12) if p, then q => PcQ 
(6.13) if p, then -q => Pc Q' 
(6.14) if -gyp. then q => P' cQ 
(6.15) if --gyp, then -, q => P' c Q' 
Forming a contrast class is determined by pragmatic world knowledge of the taxonomical 
organisation of predicates, context etc. Even if the domain of objects is fairly well defined 
initially, other pragmatic factors may further delimit the domain. In the example provided 
by Reich & Ruth (1982), that Molly didn't serve tea, opens up the domain of drinks as the 
contrast class, but in a context where she is serving tea, the specific drink coffee may be 
more contextually appropriate. These interpretations are of course constrained by the obser- 
vation that instances which can not provide an anchor for the antecedent bear neither one 
way or the other on the rules truth or falsity (cf. chapter 5, and chapter 4: Johnny and the 
pipes). Hence, these interpretations license the defective truth table view of the truth condi- 
dons of the conditional. 
6.3.2 Non-taxonomic constraints 
The above interpretations apply to taxonomic constraints, where antecedent and consequent 
are unified by describing either instances of objects or occurrences of single events. When a 
constraint is non-taxonomic relating disjoint and discrete occurrences of events, then the 
interpretations above do not apply. In discussing Evans (1983b) above, it was observed that 
negations may fail to identify a contrast class, sometimes they simply denote the non- 
occurrence of an event. With regards to taxonomic constraints this is a scope distinction, 
the negations in a taxonomic constraint attach to the constituents of the relations or parts of 
the object (cf. chapter 4). But negation can also attach to the whole event, ie. a version of 
external negation (cf. chapter 2). In taxonomic constraints discrete events are described in 
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antecedent and consequent. Often, a la Evans, the negations attach externally, denying the 
occurrence of the event. And the relation which holds between these events indicates that 
the (non) occurrence of the antecedent event is the cause, reason, enablement for the (non) 
occurrence of the consequent event. 
The interpretations for non-taxonomic constraints containing negatives are provided below, 
"P" stands for the type described by the antecedent p and "Q" the type described by the 
consequent q: 
(6.16) if p, then q -> P => Q 
(6.17) if p, then -iq ' -> P =I Q 
(6.18) if -gyp, then q -> P =1 Q, Q =1 P 
(6.19) if -p, then -q -> P => Q, Q => P 
(6.16) and (6.17) require no further motivation. In (6.18) and (6.19), the constraints are not 
logically conjoined because these are operative constraints. This is like specifying the 
meaning of the conditional by the inference rules which determine it logical behaviour. 
Similarly (6.18) and (6.19) say that these relations determine those conditionals information 
gaining behaviour. For (6.18), take the following example: 
(620) If the boss doesn't want to see me, I'll be home in time for dinner. 
This could be paraphrased as the only thing which ever prevents me being home in time 
for dinner is if the boss wants to see me, ie. P =1 Q. This reflects the fact that pragmatically 
the boss wanting to see me is an impediment to my arriving home for dinner. The 
antecedent negation appears to be marking exclusivity, ie. not only would the boss wanting 
to see me prevent me being home, it is the only thing which would do this. This carries the 
information that if I arrive home in time for dinner, then the boss didn't want to see, Q =1 
P. A similar argument applies to (6.21): 
(621) 
, 
If I don't finish my work, I won't be home in time for dinner. 
However, in (6.21) finishing my work is an enablement for being home in time for dinner, 
ie. P => Q, and the exclusivity again indicates that whenever I arrive home for dinner, then 
I finished my work, Q => P. 
The truth conditions licensed by (6.18) are equivalent to exclusive-OR (XOR), ie. it is true 
just in case either the boss wants to see me and I make it home in time for dinner (Fl) or 
the boss doesn't want to see me and I don't make it home in time for dinner (TF), it is 
false otherwise. However, (6.19) is just the opposite, it is true just in case either I don't 
finish my work and I don't make it home (IT) or I finish my work and make it home (FF), 
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it is false otherwise. (6.16) and (6.17) license the same truth conditions as (6.12) and (6.13) 
respectively. 
However, when looking at the eduction licensed by each of (6.18) and (6.19), each con- 
straint still possesses a background type, other contextual factors have to be fixed. For 
example, although the only condition relevant to my promise in (6.21) is whether or not I 
finish my work, if I do finish my work, but the bus breaks down and I don't make it home, 
then although the claim is false I didn't lie. This is not pertinent to the truth conditions of 
the claim but are highly salient relative to the eductions which can be performed. All other 
things being right if I finish my work an eduction to my being home in time for dinner is 
sound. Also I may not finish my work but be home in time for dinner, because one of my 
daughters has had an accident, then although the claim is false, again I didn't lie. All other 
things being right my wife can educt to my having finished my work from my being home. 
This is just the situation described in the non-taxonomic example in chapter 5. (6.18) and 
(6.19) explicitly state that a good explanation of why I'm home is either the boss didn't 
want to see me or I finished my work respectively. But simply because this is explicit, 
rather than implicit, as in my hall lights example, does not mean any further information 
gaining eductions are licensed. This could account for why so few subjects ever turn all the 
cards, ie. treat the conditional as a material biconditional. 
The contrasting interpretations for taxonomic and non-taxonomic constraints have been 
motivated by appeal to intuitions. However, they cna be derived directly from the differing 
anchoring conditions and contextual assumptions which attach to these constraint types. Ini- 
tially a uniform interpretation can be provided for conditionals containing negations, where 
"-, " = dual: 
(i) P, => Q 
(ii) P =1 Q 
() -P => Q 
(iv) -P =1 Q 
Given these uniform interpretations, the contrasts result from considering the different 
anchoring conditions. Recall that taxonomic constraints induce a restriction on the anchor 
for the indicating type in the indicated type. Taking a rule, for example: 
(6.22) If triangle right. then square left 
and allowing the negations to perm through, yields the following interpretations: 
«Card_pair, right: x, left: y; 1» & <<Triangle, x; 1» 
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Q: <Square, y; 1» 
If triangle right, not square left: 
P «Card_pair, right: x, left: y; 1» & <<Triangle, x; 1» 
Q: <<Square, y; 0» 
If not triangle right, square left: 
P. «Cord pair, right: x, left: y; 1» & <<Triangle, x; 0» 
Q: <<Square, y; 1» 
If not triangle right, not square left: 
P. «Cardjair, right: x, left: y; 1» & <<Triangle, x; 0» 
Q: <<Square, y; 0» 
Relative to the anchoring conditions for taxonomic constraints, each states that any anchor 
for the indicating type P must be restricted such that it is also anchors y to objects which 
are (not) squares. The contrast classes for each dual will be contextually determined, eg. in 
construction tasks it will be given by the card array. 
For non-taxonomic constraints similar contextual effects will also be operative. It was men- 
tioned in chapter 2 that the interpretation of a condionla sentence as asserting the existence 
of a constraint will also depend on the other constraints which may be operative in a situa- 
tion. Non-taxonomic constraints do not simply induce a restriction on the anchors for the 
indicating type in the indicated type. The acnhoring conditions indicate that discrete events 
are related by a higher order relation. The examples provided by (6.20) and (6.21) will be 
used to illustrate the appropriate interpretations. 
P. <ds_being worked_on_by, 1, x, y; 1» & <<Me, y; 1» & <<Finishes, y. x; 1» 
P': «Wants_to_see, I, y, x; 0» & <<Me, y; 1» & «Boss, x; 1» 
Q: «Home. 1', y; 1» & «Dinner time. 1"; 1» & <<Overlaps, 1,1"; 1>> & 
<<Follows, 1'. 1; 1» 
All negated versions will not be presented. As with all negative soas the focus of the nega- 
tive is ambiguous unless disambiguated via intonation. The first conjunct of the indicating 
types, P and P', and the indicated type, Q, have additional restrictions placed on them by 
the subsequent conjuncts. A negation attaches to the first conjunct but it can focus on the 
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restrictions. So what is the focus of "I don't finish my work"?. Well it could be someone 
else finishes it, ie. the negation attaches to the second conjunct. In which case (6.21) would 
be interpreted as, "If someone else finishes my work, I won't be home in time for dinner". 
This is pragmatically anomalous, since now I don't have to do the work I am free to be 
home for dinner. The consequent pragmatically affects the interpretation of the antecedent. 
The pragmatically felicitous interpretation would appear to be where the negation attaches 
to the third conjunct, ie. the work is not finished by me. In the indicated type, a negation 
attaching to the fourth restriction would be anomalous given knowledge of the temporal 
sequencing of events. Attaching to the third, yields the contrast class of a time later than 
dinner time. So focus can be felicitous or not dependent on pragmatic world knowledge. 
However, wherever the negations felicitously focus the interpretations licensed are as indi- 
cated in (6.16) - (6.19). 
(6.16) has already been extensively discussed. In (6.17), this is the only eduction licensed 
because there may be events other than P' which could preclude my arrival home in time 
for dinner, eg. the departmental meeting went on late. In (6.18) and ' (6.19), the appropriate 
contextual assumptions need to be specified. This is required to identify the force of the 
antecedent negation. The antecedent negation in (iii) indicates that within a situation every- 
thing but P involves Q, in which case given Q the only thing that would not be expected is 
P, ie. Q =1 P. But equally if everything but P involves Q, and Q =1 P, then P =1 Q. So, if I 
assert that anything else that happens apart from the boss wanting to see me (within my 
control) will involve my being home, then if I arrive home an eduction to the boss not 
wanting to see me is sound. Equally, if anything other than the boss wanting to see me will 
involve my being home in time for dinner, then the boss wanting to see me is the only 
thing (within my control) which could preclude my being home in time for dinner. A 
directly analogous argument applies to (6.19). If my not finishing my work (cf. above on 
focus) will preclude my being home in time for dinner, then my being home in time for 
dinner must mean I finished my work. Equally if I finish my work, given that not finshing 
it is the only thing which will preclude my being home, then I will be home in time for 
dinner. 
These contrasting interpretations for conditionals containing negations describing taxonomic 
and non-taxonomic constraints will function to motivate the experimental hypotheses in the 
next section. 
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6.4 Introduction to the experiments 
6.4.1 Construction tasks 
The interpretations provided in the last section do indeed predict an interaction between 
negation and the conditional, but only for non-taxonomic constraints. However, it has 
already been observed that for the standard abstract selection task the disjoint expression of 
the rule forces a non-taxonomic interpretation (cf. chapters 4&5, and Wason & Green, 
1984). The rule used in Evans (1972) had a disjoint expression and in Evans (1983b), sub- 
jects were told that the numbers and letters occurred on each side of the card. On this basis 
it could be hypothesized that the occurrence of matching in subjects initial' response data in 
Evans (1972) was a result of adopting the XOR interpretation for the if -, p, q rule form 
which is appropriate to the non-taxonomic case. This is borne out in the total responses 
where it appeared that subjects were interpreting this rule as XOR. As indicated above, 
however, this interpretation is only appropriate given the kind of content in (6.20) and 
(6.21) where discrete events are being related. This could permit a critical test of whether 
this result is due to an albeit contextually apposite, misinterpretation of this rule form. If 
subjects conducted a thematic version of the task using materials appropriate to the non- 
taxonomic interpretation, then if the FT instance was also subjects initial falsifying con- 
struction, this would implicate the misinterpretation hypothesis. The occurrence of FT as 
subjects initial falsifying construction could be considered the result of the processes 
involved in constructing that interpretation. Alternatively, if in the thematic version sub- 
jects initial construction was TF as falsifying, subjects abstract construction task behaviour 
would have to be put down to other factors, ie. either matching or processing negations. 
Moreover, if the differences were due to interpretational factors then a similar effect would 
have been expected for the if -p, -, q rile form. However, although there was a tendency to 
construct FF as falsifying, this did not predominate over TF in the initial responses. This 
response is, however, inconsistent with an interpretational shift to material equivalence for 
this rule. But it is consistent with matching, FF is the double match case for this rule, it 
nonetheless did not predominate. 
Conducting two such construction tasks will also serve to test the hypothesis concerning 
subjects rule interpretations. For the thematic material where a non-taxonomic constraint is 
the appropriate interpretation, responses which accord with XOR and material equivalence 
would be expected for negative antecedent rules. And for these rules more of these 
interpretations would be expected in the thematic case over the abstract case. Moreover, if 
explicit negations were included in the thematic task, the appropriate thematic content 
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would be expected to override the general shift towards a material equivalence interpreta- 
tion observed in Evans (1983b). That is, more verifying constructions would be expected 
for FF instances and falsifying constructions on FT instances for negative antecedent rules 
over affirmative antecedent rules. Moreover, a perceptual matching strategy would predict a 
general shift for all rule forms. If the differences just adduced are found, then perceptual 
matching can be rejected as the general strategy being adopted for the thematic material 
containing negations. 
Testing for the occurrence of matching is relatively easy, -Matching results on these tasks 
are reported by group data pooled over the rules. In general this is a sound procedure pre- 
cisely because it makes symmetrical predictions across the response record. However, this 
is also a weakness of the matching bias hypothesis, especially one which attributes the 
phenomenon to an early processing heuristic. The interpretational account makes asym- 
metric predictions relative to rule form and instance. If most rules fail to display matching 
predictions, then it is generally unsound to attribute the exception to matching, rather than 
say a difficulty in processing antecedent negations, for example. The only asymmetry 
predicted by matching is between 0,1 and double mismatching cases. Again if symmetrical 
responding is observed for most cases, or it goes in the other direction, then again inferring 
that matching is responsible for the exception is unsound. Hence, if the only significant 
matching result is due to the initial construction of the FT falsifier for the if -, p, q rule 
form, then it can be reasonably concluded that a general matching strategy is not impli- 
cated. 
In Evans (1972) it was argued that the salience of TT and TF cases probably override the 
effects of matching. However, this argument is no longer available to Evans given the 
serial processes he suggests are implicated in subjects responses. Evans (1972) position was 
more reasonable than the two stage model of Evans (1983b). In Evans (1972), matching 
was simply hypothesized to facilitate or inhibit the construction of the logically correct TF 
falsifier. In the two stage model the processes responsible for the phenomena are actually 
hypothesized to block the interpretational process. 
As computed by Evans (1983b), the matching indices for each task would be expected to 
alter in the direction he predicts simply in virtue of the predicted interpretational shift for 
negative antecedent rules. In the results indices will therefore be computed correcting for 
predicted interpretational changes. The indices Evans computes are noteworthy for the fact 
that the double mismatch case enters into each computation, in this regard they are not 
independent measures of matching. They are also inappropriately named, since they actually 
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measure the occurrence of irrelevants, be they due to matching or otherwise. A "pure" 
matching index will be computed which corrects for interpretational changes, in a manner 
similar to Evans logic index. Once corrected it would be predicted that there would be 
more pure matching for negative antecedent rules in the abstract task, since it would appear 
that it is antecedent negation which is responsible for the anomalous results. 
Evans had different groups of subjects perform the two versions of the task in Evans 
(1983b). In order to function as a more effective test of the interpretational changes 
hypothesized it was felt appropriate to have subjects act as their own controls, therefore all 
subjects conducted two versions of the construction task, one abstract and one thematic. 
Transfer effects in these tasks are rarely observed (cf. Beattie & Baron, 1988). However, 
they were tested for in the results. The materials used are introduced in the experimental 
reports in the next section. The thematic materials used were those in (6.20) and (6.21), the 
negations were not wholly explicit but in their morphologically abbreviated form as were 
the statements on the cards in the array. 
6.4.2 Selection task 
It was suggested above that constructing contrast classes in the context of a negations para- 
digm experiment may alter subjects abstract selection task performance towards more 
falsificatory responding when purely binary materials are used. To test this hypothesis the 
same subjects as those above were given an abstract selection task to perform. The analysis 
of non-taxonomic constraints predicts that although subjects may interpret the rules as 
equivalence in the construction tasks they will nonetheless verify in an inductive version of 
the selection task. Again to test this hypothesis, having subjects act as their own controls 
and perform both tasks was deemed appropriate. This meant that each subject performed 4 
tasks, an abstract and thematic construction task and an abstract and thematic selection task. 
The orders were systematically permuted such that no abstract or thematic task followed in 
succession. This was to avoid any possible transfer effects. 
The exhaustive levels of analysis for a selection task will also be carried out in order to 
obtain as determinate an answer as possible concerning the strategy which best summarises 
subjects response profiles. As observed above different measures seem to imply different or 
conflicting summary strategies. Evans & Lynch (1973) initially appeared as conclusive evi- 
dence for matching. However, the Reich & Ruth scores, although wasteful of data, indi- 
cated ambiguity between matching and falsification. With this in mind, Pollard indices will 
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also be computed for each of matching, verification and falsification. I follow Manktelow & 
Over (personal communication) in naming this index after Pollard, however, it is simply an 
extension to selection task data of the matching indices introduced by Evans (1983b). 
Summary 
This chapter has critically reviewed the data from Evans' negations paradigm in the selec- 
tion task. Several experimental hypotheses have been derived which suggested the experi- 
ments to be reported and discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7: The Experiments 
7.1 Introduction and overall design 
This chapter reports the experiments introduced in chapter 6. Every subject conducted each 
experiment. The experimental order was systematically varied such that no two tasks, selec- 
tion or constriction, were juxtaposed. This was designed to prevent "the possibility of 
transfer between related task. This yielded only 2 possible task orders. Combining with all 
possible permutations of task type, abstract or thematic, yielded 8 possible task orders. 
There were 24 subjects, so three subjects received the same task orders which were 
assigned randomly. An analysis for transfer effects between the various tasks was con- 
ducted and will be reported in the results section of experiment 1. Anticipating those 
results, no transfer effects were observed. Taken together with the richness of the data to be 
reported from each task, treating each as a separate experiment rather than different condi- 
tions of the same experiment was deemed appropriate. 
7.2 Experiment 1: Abstract Construction Task 
Introduction 
This experiment was a replication of Evans (1972) with only minor procedural differences. 
The complete introduction is given in Chapt 6. 
Method 
Subjects 
24 undergraduate psychology students from the University of Edinburgh served as subjects 
on an unpaid volunteer basis. All subjects were tested individually on all conditions. 
ºS6 
Design 
Subjects were required to construct both verifying and falsifying instances of each of four 
conditional rules of the form: if p, then q; if p, then -, q; if --p, then q; if -p, then -, q, as 
in Evans (1972). Each subject was given one of the 4! permutations of presentation order 
of the rules. Evan's (1972) divided subjects into two halves, one half constructed verifying 
cases before falsifying cases on each rule, the other half constructed falsifying cases before 
verifying cases. It was felt that this method of counterbalancing could induce a "strategy 
set". The more regularity in the task the more subjects may be inclined to adopt a single 
strategy and ignore the changes in semantic/pragmatic content. So, for each subject the 
verify/falsify order was systematically varied such that for each rule, the same order could 
occur in succession only once. This still meant that half of all subjects responses were in 
each order, so counterbalancing the group data. It also meant that each subject's data was 
individually counterbalanced within the task. Rule presentation orders were randomly 
assigned. 
Task Materials 
The task materials were the same as in Evans (1972), apart from one minor detail. Evans's 
used a4x4 array of stimulus cards which depicted various coloured shapes. The shapes 
were: circle, triangle, cross, and square; the colours were: red, yellow, green and blue. In 
the present experiment a diamond was used in place of the cross. The general form of the 
rules employed is illustrated below: 
(7.1) If there is a red diamond on the left, then there is not a green circle on the right. 
The lexical material was varied randomly between between rule forms. Subjects task was to 
select a pair of cards from the array which either verified or falsified the rule. For example, 
a subject may place a red diamond on the left and a blue circle on the right to verify. This 




Each subject was presented with the 4x4 array of single sided colours and shapes 
stimulus cards. The following typed instructions were then given to the subject: 
(72) "You will be presented with a series of rules which always assume that two of the 
figures before you have to be placed side by side. Your task will be to select two 
of the figures from the array and place them in such a way as to make a given rule 
true, or in such a way as to make a given rule false, according to the instruction. 
If you have any questions please ask them now and not after you have started on 
the problems. " 
When a subject had finished reading the instructions, he was told that they could keep the 
instructions beside them to refer to. The four rules were then presented one at time on a 
typed sheet in the order of presentation assigned, and from the set of materials assigned. 
Dependent on the verify/falsify order assigned on a eile, a subject was asked to make a 
selection which made it true or made it false. For each verify or falsify instruction, once a 
subject had provided one solution, they were asked whether there was any other selection 
which made the rule true (false) This was continued until the subject said there were no 
more. Generalisations such as "a red diamond on the left with anything other than a green 
circle on the right would make the rule true" were permitted. Thus, an exhaustive series of 
verifying and falsifying constructions was obtained for each rule. 
Results 
(i) Transfer effects 
The Cochran Q test was used. The dependent variable employed was correct or incorrect. 
This was the same procedure carried out by Beattie & Baron (1988) in a similar multi-task 
design. For the selection tasks "correct" was defined as a TA and TC selection, in accor- 
dance with pragmatic context theory, and for the thematic construction tasks "correct" = TT 
to verify and TF to falsify on affirmative antecedent rules, and Ti' & FF to verify and TF 
and FT to falsify on negative antecedent rules. For the abstract construction task "correct" = 
TT to verify and TF to falsify. There were four tasks and four rules leading to 16 serial 
positions. Cochran's Q(15) = 16.612, which is not significant. 
It was possible that this result was a function of pooling the data across tasks. Therefore, 
the data was broken down by tasks and similar tests performed. Cochran's Q, nor any other 
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test statistic, is wholly appropriate to the data when analysed by tasks since in each task 
position the same six subjects conducted the task on all four rules. Hence, the design, when 
taking task/rule position as the dependent variable, is neither fully repeated measures nor 
fully independent. However, it could be argued that the subjects are a sufficiently matched 
sample for Cochran's Q to be appropriate; all were undergraduate psychology students at 
the University of Edinburgh. The results of the tests by task were, Abstract selection: Q(15) 
= 11.61, n. s.; Thematic selection: Q(15) = 22.35, n. s.; Abstract construction: Q(15) = 
13.99, n. s.; Thematic construction: Q(15) = 24.88, n. s. Since, there were no significant 
changes in the distribution of correct responses either in the pooled data or by task it can 
be concluded that there was no tendency for subjects to perform better on the tasks as a 
function of the order in which they were performed. Therefore, each experiment is reported 
individually. 
(ii) Initial and Total Response Analysis 
Table 7.1 shows the frequency with which subjects gave each truth table case on their ini- 
tial verification and initial falsification of each rule. Subject's initial responses were an 
almost direct replication of Evans (1972). The TT construction was almost universally 
chosen as the only verifying case. This was consistent with Wason's (1966) "defective" 
truth table account. The initial choice of the FT construction as a falsifier for the if -, p, q 
rule form was also replicated more strongly than Evans (1972). It was this initial choice 
which was observed to be responsible for the confirmation of Evans matching bias predic- 
tions. The prediction that there would be fewer TF falsifiers constructed for rules with 
negative antecedents than affirmative antecedents was significantly replicated, using one- 
way sign tests (p < 0.0005). The prediction that there would be more TF falsifiers 
Table 7.1 
The frequency with which subjects gave each truth table case on their initial 




TT TF FT FF TT TF FT FF 
(i) If p, then q 23 1001 18 32 
(ii) If p, then -, q 23 0010 23 01 
(iii) If -gyp, then q 23 10003 19 2 
(iv) If -, p, then -, q 23 001092 13 
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constructed for rules with negative consequents was also significantly replicated (p < 
0.005). 
It was argued in Chapter 6 that testing for these predictions only in subject's initial 
response data was the artefactual cause of their significance. Table 7.2 shows the total fre- 
quency with which each subject gave each truth table case on verifying and falsifying each 
rule. Subject's total response data revealed the following results. The prediction of fewer 
TF falsifiers for rules with negative antecedents was still significant (p < 0.001.1-tailed 
sign test). This prediction was not significant in the total response data in Evans (19721. 
The reason for this can be seen from Table 2. There has been a shift in predominance as 
the main falsifying response from TF to FF for the if -. p, -, q rule form between Evans 
(1972) and the current abstract version of the task. This result may be due to the presence c% f 3c 
of contrastive information (cf. Discussion). The prediction of more TF falsifiers for rules 
with negative consequents was not significant in the total response data, replicating Evans 
(1972). In general, for subject's total responses, them was a failure to replicate parts of 
Evans (1972) (cf. Discussion). 
(iii) Psychological truth tables 
Table 7.3 shows the result of plotting the frequency of true, false and "irrelevant" (non- 
constructed) classifications of each truth table case. There were important differences 
between the present abstract version and Evans (1972) which all occurred for rules with 
negative antecedents. For the if -, p, q rule form, the FF instance shifted radically from 
being treated as true in Evans (1972) to being treated as irrelevant. For the if -, p, -, q rule 
form, the TF case moved from false to being treated as irrelevant. 
Table 7.2 
The total frequency with which each subject gave each truth table case on 
verifying and falsifying each rule for the Abstract Construction Task 
Rule 
Verification Falsification 
TT TF FT FF TT TF FT FF 
If p, then q 23 1021 21 64 
If p, then -, q 24 0030 23 41 
if -, p, then q 23 1020 16 21 2 
if -, p, then -, q 24 0010 11 5 14 
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Table 7.3 
The frequency of true, false and "irrelevant' (non-constructed) 
classifications of each truth table case (N = 24; modal 
response is in italics). 
Rule Truth Value 
Truth Table Case 
TT TF FT FF 
(i) If p, then qT 23 102 
F1 21 64 
?02 18 18' 
(ii) If p,. then -, q T 24 003 
F0 23 41 
?01 20 20 
(iii) If -gyp, then qT 23 1 0 2 
F 0 16 21 2 
1 7 3 20 
(iv) If -, p, then -, q T 24 0 0 1 
F 0 11 5 14 
7 0 13 - 19 9 
Consistent with Evans (1972), the TT case was significantly more often constructed as true 
than false for all rules (p < 0.0005, one-tailed Binomial test). The TF case was significantly 
more often constructed as false than true for all rules (p < 0.0005, one tailed Binomial test). 
In reporting these results Evans (1972) tied the analysis to the matching bias hypothesis. 
Matching was hypothesized to suppress the construction of certain cases, "which involved 
mismatching or altering named values, thus increasing their apparent irrelevance" (Evans 
1972: 197). The occurrence of the inferred "irrelevant" value was thereby firmly tied to the 
matching bias hypothesis. Hence, in testing for the significance of each response category, 
ie. rule form by truth table case, Evans (1972) did not test for differences between the 
irrelevant value and the other two truth values but only for the direction of classification, 
true or false. Since the source of irrelevants is the subject of test in these experiments, 
. 
differences between true, false and irrelevant response categories were computed for each 
rule form x truth table case. However, this only applies to the false antecedent instances 
(FT & FF) because the "irrelevant" category was significantly more subscribed to than the 
other truth values only for these instances. (For TF in the if -p, -, q rile form, "irrelevant" 
predominated, but not significantly, over false (p = 0.838,2-tailed Binomial test). For the if 
--'p, q rule form, TF was constructed significantly more often as false than irrelevant (p = 
0.047,1-tailed Binomial test). All tests are 1-tailed Binomial tests where the direction is 
predicted by the defective truth table/taxonomic constraint interpretation and two-tailed 
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predicted by the defective truth table/taxonomic constraint interpretation and two-tailed oth- 
erwise. 
For the if p, q rule form there were significantly more FT cases constructed as false than 
true (p = 0.016,2-tailed), but FT was also significantly more often treated as irrelevant than 
false (p = 0.011,1-tailed). FF was more often constructed as false than true, but not 
significantly (p = 0.688,2-tailed), whereas it was significantly more often treated as 
irrelevant than false (p = 0.002,1-tailed). For the if p, -, q rule form, although FT was more 
often constructed as false than true, this was not significant (p = 0.124,2-tailed) whereas it 
was treated as irrelevant significantly more often than false (p < 0.001,1-tailed). FF was 
more often constructed as true than false, but not significantly (p = 0.624,2-tailed) whereas 
it was treated as irrelevant significantly more often than true (p < 0.0005,1-tailed). For the 
if -gyp, q rule form, FT was significantly more often constructed as false than either true (p 
< 0.001,2-tailed) or irrelevant (p < 0.001,2-tailed). FF was constructed as true and false in 
equal numbers, but was treated as irrelevant more often than both true (p < 0.0005,1- 
tailed) or false (p < 0.0005,1-tailed). For the if -, p, -, q rule form, FT was constructed as 
false more often than true but not significantly (p = 0.062,2-tailed), whereas it was treated 
as irrelevant significantly more often than false (p = 0.003,1-tailed). FF was constructed as 
false significantly more often than true (p < 0.001,2-tailed) and more often than irrelevant, 
but not significantly (p = 0.404,2-tailed). These results are consistent with pragmatic con- 
text theory except for the TF instance in the if -p, q rule form, which replicates Evans 
(1972) and the FF instance for the if -p, -, q rule form which does not. 
From table 7.3, the three valued truth tables in table 7.4 were extracted. 14 out of 16 
(87.5%) of these truth table entries reflect significant differences from both remaining possi- 
ble response categories. 
Table 7.4 
Psychological truth tables extracted for each rule orn. 
Rule-Form 













' ý' F 
ýýu 
^C 7 M rr 
0 
-162- 
(iv) Defective truth tables? 
Evans (1982) re-analysed the data from Evans (1972) adding further weight to a response 
bias interpretation of subjects irrelevant responses (cf. Chapt 6). It was observed that this 
analysis relies on the assumption that negations do not interact with the conditional to 
affect subjects interpretations. However, it has been argued that negation does indeed 
interact with the conditional, but indirectly via the relations implicitly asserted to exist 
between antecedent and consequent. For the simple class inclusion relation pragmatic con- 
text theory would predict responses which accord with the defective truth table. The results 
of the same analyses as Evans (1982) are reported below. 
Table 7.5 pools the results over the four rules classified by (a) logical case and (b) match- 
ing case. From table 7.5 it can be seen that in the present data the defective truth table 
account received even stronger corroboration than in Evans (1972). The analysis by logical 
case clearly indicates that irrelevant was the modal response for cases with false 
antecedents. For matching case, a trend for more irrelevants was not observed. Although 
mismatching cases did in general yield more irrelevants there was no increase for double 
mismatches over single mismatches where it would be most expected on the basis of the 
matching bias hypothesis. This is even more clearly demonstrated by looking to the fre- 
quency of irrelevants by mismatching case within rules. Table 7.6 shows the frequency of 
irrelevants by rule as a function of the number of mismatches. None of the expected 
Table 7S 
Results pooled over the four rules and classified by (a) 
Logical Case and (b) by Matching Case. Results are percentage 
frequencies (N = 24). 
ýý Classification 
True False Irrelevant 
(a) Logical 
TT 98 1 1 
TF 2 74 24 
FT 0 373 625 
FF 8 22 70 
(b) Matching 
p, q 25 61 14 
p, -+q 28 29 43 
-, p, q 27 19 54 
-gyp. -, q 28 25 47 
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Table 7.6 
The frequency of "irrelevants" (non-constructed) classifications for 
each rule and mismatching case. 
Rule 
Number of Mismatches 
0 io`n 'I Tr '2 
(i) If p, then q02 18 18 
(ii) If p, then -, q 10 20 20 
(iii) If -, p, then q31 20 7 
(iv) If -, p, then -, q 9 13 19 0 
º3 16 77 45 
increases in irrelevants predicted by matching occur within rules. The failure to observe any 
increase, but rather decreases, between 1 and 2 mismatches severely questions the viability 
of the matching hypothesis. Matching would predict a step function, with sharp rises 
between 0 and 1 mismatching cases and between 1 and 2 mismatching cases, with a plateau 
for the two single mismatches. None of the profiles by rule type reveal this pattern. 
Table 7.7 shows the result of plotting the frequency of true, false and irrelevant responses 
for rule forms/logical cases which constitute a"double match, as in Evans (1982). Table 7.7 
is a direct replication of Evans (1982/1972), apart from the more clear cut falsifying 
classification of the FF instance for the if -3p, -, q rule. However, there is no reason to sup- 
pose that this is not due to a another trend, ie. for more erroneous irrelevant responding as 
a function of the number of negations in the rule, when matching is held constant. This is 
consistent with the failure to observe the predicted trend for irrelevants as a function of 
matching and the complementary observation of the predicted response profiles by logical 
case. However, it is only appropriate if it can be established that subjects are 
Table 7.7 
The percentage frequency of construction of each logical case on rules 
where they constitute a double match, p, q. 
(N = 24). 
Logical Case Rule % Frequency True False Irrelevant 
TT If p, then q 96 4 0 
TF If p, then -, q 0 96 4 
FT If -, p, then q0 87.5 12.5 
FF If--, P, then -, q 4 58 38 
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misinterpreting the rule as a non-taxonomic constraint due to the disjoint expression of the 
rule. To determine this will have to await the discussion of the thematic construction task. 
(v) Evans' matching indices 
Antecedent and consequent matching indices were calculated for each subject (Evans, 
1983b). ANH had a mean of 1.583 and a standard deviation of 1.412, CMI had a mean of 
0.917 and a standard deviation of 1.288. If an index is positive then this indicates the pres- 
ence of matching, by the criterion laid down by Evans (1983b). A significant majority of 
subjects produced positive indices on both AMT (19 +. 3 -, p<0.0005,1-tailed Binomial 
test) and CNH (18 +, 4 -, p=0.015). Given the failure to observe, by inspection, any of the 
predicted increases in irrelevants between mismatching cases, the significance of these 
results is suspect. The only reason for their significance is that they conflate two sources of 
irrelevant responding, partial interpretation and matching. Below an index is derived to un- 
conflate these sources of irrelevants. 
Evans (1983b) provides the means and standard deviations of the matching scores he 
obtained which permits a comparison. However, each of his subjects performed the task 
twice, so to obtain comparable statistics the mean and the standard deviation were doubled. 
AMI was lower than observed in Evans (1983b) I-group, but not significantly. However, 
CMI was significantly lower in the present experiment (unequal Ns, independent samples t- 
test, t=2.36,62 df., p<0.05,2-tailed). 
The results seem to support Evans contention that their is a significant matching bias 
observed in these tasks. However, pragmatic context theory represents a competence model 
of interpretation which predicts the occurrence of irrelevants. This is a different contention 
than the claim that the observation of irrelevants can be explained by a defective truth table 
in the logical component. This may or may not be the case. However, since the com- 
petence model provided by pragmatic context theory predicts the occurrence of irrelevants 
for false antecedent instances and Evans (1983b) concedes that irrelevants occur for this 
reason (although he did not correct for it) an appropriate correction needs to be applied. 
The simplest correction which begs the fewest questions against the matching hypothesis as 
possible is to allow that where pragmatic context theory fails to predict irrelevants, then 
these can be attributed to matching. Where irrelevants are predicted, ie. for false antecedent 
instances, the following strategy should be adopted. For each rule form, there are two 
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irrelevant predictions, one of which matches once more often than the other, eg. for 
affirmative antecedent rules one is a 2-mismatch case the other a 1-mismatch case, for 
negative antecedent rules, one is a 1-mismatch case, the other a 0-mismatch case. If the 
number of irrelevants is tied between mismatching cases then matching can be assumed not 
to be present, since the extra mismatch has had no effect on subjects' behaviour. Alterna- 
tively if there is an irrelevant only for the extra mismatch then this should be assigned to 
matching. For example, take subject 21's response record for the if -, p, -, q rule form by 
matching case (a "1" = irrelevant): 0 (pq), 1 (p-, q), 1 (-, pq), 0 (-q), both (pq) & (p-eq) 
are predicted to be irrelevant, but only (p-, q) is found to be assigned irrelevant, since this 
is in the direction predicted by matching, subject 21 is assigned a pure matching score of 1. 
Moreover, since an irrelevant also occurred (-pq) where it was not predicted, he gets 
another matching score of 1, totalling 2. Matching scores can then be calculated for each 
subject for each rule. Two dichotomous categories are created, non-matchers (0 matching 
score) and pure matchers (+ve matching score), hence the Binomial test was employed to 
assess matching levels within rule forms. This facilitated a test of the hypothesis that there 
would be little matching for affirmative antecedent rules, if subjects are either (i) having 
problems with processing antecedent negation or (ii) a non-taxonomic interpretation had 
been adopted due to the disjoint expression of the rule. Matching would not hypothesize 
any differences between rule forms. 
The results by eile form were as follows. For the if p, q eile form a significant majority of 
subjects were non-matchers (17 0,7 +, p=0.032), the pure matching score (PMS) had a 
mean (M) of 0.292 and a standard deviation (SD) of 0.455. This result was significantly 
replicated for the if p, -, q rule form (21 0,3 +, p<0.0005; PMS: M=0.125, SD = 0.331). 
For the if -, p, q rule form the majority of subjects were pure matchers (3 0,21 +, p< 
0.0005; PMS: M=1.125, SD = 0.612). However, for the if -, p, -, q, although there were 
more pure matchers than non-matchers, the result of the binomial test was not significant (9 
0,15 +, p=0.154; PMS: M=1.042, SD = 0.889). 
There was no significant difference in the occurrence of pure matching between the if p, q 
and if p, -. q rule forms (t = 1.699, n. s). However, there was a highly significant increases 
in pure matching over the if p, q rule form for the negative antecedent rule forms: if -, p, q 
(t = 4.275, p<0.0005) and if -, p, -, q (t = 4.097, p<0.0005). There were also highly 
significant increases in the occurrence of pure matching over the if p, -, q rule form for 
negative antecedent rule forms: if -, p, q (t = 5.874, p<0.0005) and if -, p, -, q (t = 5.102, p 
< 0.0005). There was no significant difference in the occurrence of pure matching between 
the negative antecedent rules (t = 0.358, n. s. ). 
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As expected from pragmatic context theory, the majority of subjects on affirmative 
antecedent rules are non-matchers. This is reversed for the negative antecedent rules where 
the majority display some pure matching behaviour. Moreover, the differences between 
affirmative and negative antecedent PMSs are nearly all significant. However, within 
affirmative and negative antecedent rules pure matching levels are not significantly 
different. This argues strongly that the anomalous results and hence the occurrence of pure 
matching for negative antecedent rules is not due to any generalisable matching strategy. 
Rather, either (i) a contextually apposite disjoint, non-taxonomic interpretation has been 
adopted, or (ii) the anomaly is due to difficulties in processing antecedent negations. 
Discussion 
These results argue strongly against attributing the observation of anomalous responses on 
this task for negative antecedent rules to a generalised matching strategy. Matching makes 
essentially symmetrical predictions which are not borne out in the data. The only significant 
pure matching result was obtained for the ff -+p, q rule form. However, there was no 
significant differences between this rule form and the if -gyp, -, q rule form. This appears to 
suggest that it is processing of antecedent negations which is responsible for the anomalous 
result, since the if -gyp, -q results do not conform to the non-taxonomic interpretations for 
this rule form. However. although it would appear that matching is definitely not responsi- 
ble, at least in the form suggested by Evans (but cf. below), the negations/conditional 
interaction hypothesis is not totally ruled out. This can only be determined by the results 
from subjects initial interpretations in the thematic version of the task. 
There were two interpretational shifts between the Evans (1972) data and the present 
results. This represents a small change in response profiles which could easily be put down 
to population differences. However, there is a another factor present in this experiment 
which was absent in Evans (1972) which could account for the variation. The class inclu- 
sion relationship use in the present experiment invites different inferences and engages 
different modes of thought from the enablement relation in the thematic version (cf. Chapt 
6). This is the hypothesis these experiments are investigating. If the encoded message in 
the conditionals is unclear, then varying the encoded information between the abstract and 
thematic variants, while retaining task structure, could allow subjects to use contrastive 
information. This was possible in the present experiment because subjects performed both 
an abstract and a thematic version of the task. Hence, a possible explanation for the 
discrepancy between Evans (1972) and the present experiment was that in the original 
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study this contrastive information was not available. 
7.3 Experiment 2: Thematic Construction Task 
Introduction 
This experiment was a replication of Evans (1972) but using thematic materials. The com- 
plete introduction is given in Chapt 6. 
Method 
Subjects 
The same 24 undergraduate psychology students from the University of Edinburgh served 
as subjects on this experiment as in Experiment 1. All subjects were tested individually on 
all conditions. 
Design 
The design of this experiment was the same as Experiment 1. 
Task Materials 
The rules employed were discussed in Chapt 6: 
(i) If I finish my work, then I'll be home in time for dinner. 
(ii) If the boss wants to see me, then I won't be home in time for dinner. 
(iü) If the boss doesn't want to see me, then IT be home in time for dinner. 
(iv) If I don't finish my work, then I won't be home in time for dinner. 
The 3x2 array of stimulus cards embodied all possible antecedents and consequents and 
their respective negates. The negations used in the rules and on the cards were in their mor- 
phologically abbreviated forms. Each subject received all four rules. Given the nature of the 
task materials, varying lexical content was not appropriate. The subjects' task was to select 
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a pair. of cards from the array which either verified or falsified the rule. Since the materials 
were not homogeneous between antecedent and consequent no explicit left/right marking 
was necessary. If a subject placed the I don't finish my work card next to the I don't make 
it home in time for dinner card to verify, then this is equivalent to constructing the TT logi- 
cal case (-, p, -, q card case) to make the rule in (iv) true. 
Procedure 
Each subject was presented with a3x2 array of the single sided thematic stimulus cards. 
Apart from the following typed instructions being given to the subject, the procedure was 
the same as for Experiment 1. 
(73) You will be presented with a series of rules which concern the events described on 
the cards in the array before you. Your task will be to select two of the events 
described on the cards in the array which either make a given rule true, or make a 
given rule false, according to the instruction. If you have any questions please ask 
them now and not after you have started on the problems. 
Results 
Exactly the same series of analyses were performed for this experiment as for Experiment 
1. 
(i) Initial and Total Response Analysis 
Table 7.8 shows the frequency with which subjects gave each truth table case on their ini- 
tial verification and initial falsification of each rule. The TT construction was universally 
chosen initially as the only verifying case. The initial choice of the FT construction as a 
falsifier for the if -3p, q rule form in Evans (1972) and experiment 1 has completely disap- 
peared in the present experiment. It was this initial choice which was observed to be 
responsible for the confirmation of Evans matching bias predictions. The analogous obser- 
vation for the if -, p, -eq rule of FF as the modal falsifier in the initial responses (. cf experi- 
ment 1) was also not observed. As would be expected, the matching bias prediction that 
there would be fewer TF falsifiers constructed for rules with negative antecedents than 
affirmative antecedents was not replicated. Neither was the prediction that there would be 
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Table 7.8 
The frequency with which subjects gave each truth table case on their initial 




TT TF FT FF TT TF FF FF 
(i) If p, then q 24 0000 18 24 
(ii) If p, then -, q 24 0000 18 24 
(iii) If -, p, then q 24 0000 17 43 
(iv) If -, p, then -q 24 0000 15 63 
more TF falsifiers constructed for rules with negative consequents. Along with the observa- 
tions made in experiment 1 concerning the lack of matching and the failure of a misin- 
terpretation hypothesis to capture the anomalous if -, p, -, q rule interpretation, this result 
offers strong support for a negative processing deficit account of the abstract results. Both 
the anomalous initial falsifiers were only observed in the abstract version of the task where 
subjects must compute the relevant contrast classes prior to establishing the appropriate 
class inclusion relation. 
Table 7.9 shows the total frequency with which each subject gave each truth table case on 
verifying and falsifying each rule. In subject's total responses, neither matching prediction 
was borne out. The main expected difference between rule interpretations. was that there 
should be more FF verifiers and more FT falsifiers for rules with negative antecedents than 
affirmative antecedents. Both expectations where borne out but the FT instance was picked 
as falsifying only marginally more often for negative antecedent rules than affirmative 
antecedent rules. However, the result for the FF instance was clear cut. There were 
significantly more FF verifiers for negative antecedent rules than affirmative antecedent 
Table 7.9 
The total frequency with which each subject gave each truth table case on 
verifying and falsifying each rule for the Thematic Construction Task 
Verification Falsification 
nu1C TT TF FT FF TT TF FT FF 
If p, then q 24 0190 21 11 4 
If p, then -, q 24 0090 20 94 
if -np, then q 24 00 13 0 20 14 3 
if -, p, then -, q 24 00 18 0 20 12 3 
x 
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rules (p < 0.005, one tailed). This belies a generalised material implication to material 
equivalence switch between abstract and thematic versions (cf. section (iv) "Between tasks 
analysis"). 
(ii) Psychological truth tables 
Table 7.10 shows the result of plotting the frequency of true, false and "irrelevant" (non- 
constructed) classifications of each truth table case. Consistent with Evans (1972), the TT 
case was significantly more often constructed as true than false for all rules (p < 0.0005, 
one-tailed Binomial test). The TF case was significantly more often constructed as false 
than true for all rules (p < 0.0005, one tailed Binomial test). As in Experiment 1, 
differences between all values are reported, including "irrelevant". All tests are 1-tailed 
Binomial tests where the direction is predicted by the defective truth table/taxonomic con- 
straint interpretation and two-tailed otherwise. 
For the if p, q rule form, FT was constructed significantly more often as false than true (p = 
0.006,2-tailed). It was treated as irrelevant more often than false, although not significantly 
Table 7.10 
The frequency of true, false and "irrelevant" (non-constructed) classifications 
of each truth table case for the Thematic Construction Task (N = 24; modal 
response is in italics). 
Truth Table Case Rule Truth Value 
TT TF FZ, FF 
(i) If p, then qT 24 019 
F0 21 11 4 
?03 12 11 
(ii) If p, then -eq T 24 0 1 8 
F 0 20 9 4 
? 0 4 14 12 
(iii) If -, p, then qT 24 0 0 13 
F 0 20 14 3 
? 0 4 10 8 
(iv) If -np, then -q T 24 00 18 
F0 20 12 3 
?04 12 3 
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0.006,2-tailed). It was treated as irrelevant more often than false, although not significantly 
(p = 0.5,1-tailed), and more often than true (p = 0.002,1-tailed) . FF was constructed 
more often as true than false, although not significantly (p = 0.266,2-tailed). It was treated 
as irrelevant more often than true, albeit not significantly (p = 0.332,1-tailed), and more 
often than false but not significantly (p = 0.059,1-tailed). For the if p, -, q rile form, FT 
was significantly more often constructed as false than true (p = 0.022,2-tailed). It was 
more often treated as irrelevant than false, although not significantly (p = 0.202), and than 
true (p = 0.0005,1-tailed). FF was more often constructed as true than false, but not 
significantly (p = 0.388,2-tailed). It was treated as irrelevant more often than true, albeit 
not significantly (p = 0.252,1-tailed), and more often than false (p = 0.038,1-tailed). For 
the if -, p, q rule form, Fr was constructed significantly more often as false than true (p < 
0.0005,1-tailed), and more often than it was treated as irrelevant, although not significantly 
(p = 0.271,1-tailed). FF was constructed as true significantly more often than false (p = 
0.011,1-tailed), and more often than it was treated as irrelevant, albeit not significantly (p 
= 0.192,1-tailed). For the if -qp, -, q rule form, FT was constructed as false significantly 
more often than true (p = 0.0005,1-tailed), but it was treated as irrelevant in equal numbers 
(see below for the justification of treating this as false). FF was constructed significantly 
more often as true than either false (p = 0.001,1-tailed) or irrelevant (p < 0.001,1-tailed). 
From table 7.10, the three valued truth tables in table 7.11 were extracted. 9 out of 16 
(56.25%) of these truth table entries reflect significant differences from both remaining pos- 
sible response categories. This is a far less clear cut result than the abstract version. How- 
ever, all the differences in modal responses between the abstract and thematic versions 
were significant (cf. section (iv): "Between tasks analysis"). 
Although there were equal numbers of irrelevant and false classifications for the FT 
Table 7.11 
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instance in the if -, p, -, q rule form it has been treated as falsifying in these truth tables. 
There are two reasons for this. First, the irrelevant category is a response by omission, 
rather than by commission. Where there is an ambiguity, therefore, it should be resolved in 
favour of the subjects positive responses. Second, the rationale behind these experiments is 
to extract the general pattern in subjects responses, rather than looking at individuals' glo- 
bal response patterns, many of which are uninterpretable. However, in order to resolve the 
ambiguity, it can be noted that if FT was being treated as irrelevant then a response profile 
where IT and FF were constructed as verifying and only TF as falsifying would be 
expected to predominate in subjects global responses. 29% of subjects global responses 
conformed to this pattern. However, 46% of subjects responses accorded with a response 
profile where TT and FF were constructed as verifying and where TF and FT were con- 
structed as falsifying. This accords with the hypothesis that FT is correctly classified as 
false for this rule. 
(iii) Defective truth tables? 
As for Experiment 1 the same analyses as Evans (1982) were carried out for the present 
data. It was argued that due to the interpretational changes between abstract and thematic 
tasks the response profile for the thematic version would be expected to differ from the 
monotonic trend observed in the abstract task. 
Table 7.12 pools the results over the four rules classified by (a) logical case and (b) match- 
ing case. From table 7.12 it can be seen that in the present data the defective truth table 
account was not directly corroborated. 48% of subjects FT responses indicated falsity and 
50% of their FF responses indicated true. However, this would be expected given half the 
rules were being treated as equivalence. So, this does not undermine the view that false 
antecedents are irrelevant on affirmative antecedent rules when an enablement relation is 
being implicitly asserted to exist between antecedent and consequent. Although this is a 
sound interpretation of the table, it should be recalled that in the psychological truth tables, 
the even split between affirmative and negative antecedent rules is not observed. Nonethe- 
less, the overall reduction in irrelevants is precisely in line with the predicted interpreta- 
tional changes. For matching case, the trend for more irrelevants was not observed. 
Mismatching cases yielded only minimally more irrelevants. Moreover, where they were 
expected to occur was where they were least observed. A sharp rise would be expected 
between the 0-mismatching case and 1-mismatch cases and between single mismatches and 
- 
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Results pooled over the four rules and classified by (a) 
Logical Case and (b) by Matching Case. Results are percentage 
frequencies (N = 24). 
Case Classification 
True False Irrelevant 
(a) Logical 
TT 100 0 0 
TF 0 84 16 
FT 2 48 50 
FF 50 15 35 
(b) Matching 
p, q 44 39' 17 
p, -, q 39 38 23 
-, p, q 34 36 30 
-p, -nq 35 34 31 
clearly demonstrated by looking to the frequency of irrelevants by mismatching case within 
rules. Table 7.13 shows the frequency of irrelevants by rule type as a function of 
mismatching case. Few of the expected increases in irrelevants predicted by matching 
occur within rules and where they do occur they are marginal, and in many cases go in the 
opposite direction. The failure to observe any non-marginal differences between 1 and 2 
mismatches questions the viability of the matching hypothesis. 
Table 7.14 shows the result of plotting the frequency of true, false and irrelevant responses 
for rule forms/logical cases which constitute a double match, as in Evans (1982). Table 
7.14 fails to replicate Evans (1982/1972). The FF, instance for the if -, p, -, q rule has 
Table 7.13 
The frequency of "irrelevants" (non-constructed) classifications for 
each rule and mismatching case (Thematic). 
Rule . Number of Mismatches 
0112 
(i) If p, then q03 12 11 
(ii) If p, then -, q 40 12 14 
(iii) If -, p, then q 10 814 
(iv) If gyp, then _q 34 12 0 
17 r5 i5 -1 z9 
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Table 7.14 
The percentage frequency of construction of each logical case on rules 
where they constitute a double match, pq. 
(N = 24). 
Logical Case Rule 
% Frequency 
True False Irrelevant 
TT Ifp, thenq 100 00 
TF If p, then -q 0 83 17 
FT If -, p, then q0 58 42 
FF If -, p, then -, q 75 12.5 12.5 
7.14 fails to replicate Evans (1982/1972). The FF instance for the if -, p, -, q rule has 
switched to true. The high number of irrelevants for the if -, p, q rule form undermines the 
the matching hypothesis which argues that double match cases should alleviate response 
suppression. Moreover, the fact that for the if -p, -, q rule, precisely the reverse is observed 
suggests strongly that matching is not determining subjects responses. 
(iv) Evans' matching indices 
Antecedent and consequent matching indices were calculated for each subject (Evans, 
1983b). ANH had a mean of 0.75 and a standard deviation of 1.09, CMI had a mean of 
0.417 and a standard deviation of 1.151. If an index is positive then this indicates the pres- 
ence of matching, by the criterion laid down by Evans (1983b). A significant majority of 
subjects produced positive indices on AMI (17 +, 3 -, p<0.006,1-tailed Binomial test) but 
not on CMI(15+, 5 -, p=0.151). 
Evans (1983b) provides the means and standard deviations of the matching indices he 
obtained which permits a comparison. However, each of his subjects performed the task 
twice, so to obtain comparable statistics the means and the standard deviation were dou- 
bled. AMI was higher than observed in Evans' (1983b) E-group, but not significantly. How- 
ever, CMI was significantly lower in the present experiment (unequal Ns, independent sam- 
ples t-test, t=2.238,62 df., p<0.05,2-tailed). 
As in experiment 1. these results seem to support Evans contention that there is a 
significant matching bias observed in these tasks. So pure matching scores were again com- 
puted which correct for the interpretational effects predicted by pragmatic context theory. 
There has been a change in the predicted interpretations such that for negative antecedent 
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rules, no irrelevants are predicted. Therefore, for these rules the occurrence of any 
irrelevant response must be assigned to the pure matching category. 
The results by rule form were as follows. For the if p, q rule form although a majority of 
subjects were non-matchers the result of a Binomial test was not significant (14 0,10 +, p 
= 0.271; PMS: M=0.417, SD = 0.493). There was a significant majority of non-matchers 
for the if p, -, q rule form (17 0,7 +, p, = 0.032; PMS: M=0.458, SD = 0.763). For the if 
-, p, q rule form the majority of subjects were pure matchers but not significantly (9 0,15 
+, p=0.154; PMS: M=0.917, SD = 0.812). For the if -p, -, q rule form, although there 
were more pure matchers than non-matchers, the result of the Binomial test was not 
significant (11 0,13 +, p=0.419; PMS: M=0.792, SD = 0.815). 
There was less pure matching for the if p, q than the if p. -, q eile form (comparing means), 
but not significantly (t = 0.272, n. s). However, there was significantly less pure matching in 
the if p, q rule form than both negative antecedent rule forms: if -p, q (t = 2.627, p<0.02) 
and if -p. -, q (t = 2.386, p<0.05). There was significantly less pure matching for the if 
p, -, q rule form than for the if -p, q rule (t = 2.110, p<0.05) and there was less pure 
matching on the if p, -, q than the if -p, -, q rule form, but not significantly (t = 1.360, 
n. s. ). There was no significant difference in the occurrence of pure matching between the 
negative antecedent rules (t = 0.720, ns. ). 
There was significantly less pure matching on affirmative antecedent rules than for negative 
antecedent rules. This belies any general matching strategy as an explanation of these 
results. PMS scores were significantly higher for negative antecedent rules. This seems to 
argue that despite the appropriate interpretations being adopted, subjects still incur some 
processing deficit for antecedent negations when a non-taxonomic interpretation is appropri- 
ate. However, this result could not have been predicted on the basis of the consideration 
that explicit negations were included on the cards in the array (Evans, 1983b). This mani- 
pulation would be expected to alleviate response suppression across the board, and not 
selectively between rules. However, whether the results on the thematic task can be put 
down to an effect of a simple perceptual matching strategy or a release from response 
suppression can only be determined via the between tasks analysis. 
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(v) Between tasks analysis: construction tasks 
It was argued in the last chapter that if the anomalous results on negative antecedent rules 
for the abstract version were due to a non-taxonomic constraint misinterpretation, because 
of. their disjoint expression, then similar initial response profiles would be expected between 
the abstract and thematic versions. However, it has already been observed, qualitatively, 
that this is not the case. This was also confirmed in the quantitative comparisons. For the if 
gyp, q rule form, the TF instance was constructed initially significantly less often in the 
abstract task than the thematic task (McNemar tests, 2-tailed, p<0.001) and the Fr 
instance was constructed significantly more often in the abstract task (p < 0.001). For the if 
--, p, -+q rule form, less subjects constructed the TF instance as the initial falsifier for the 
abstract task than the thematic task, albeit not significantly. However, significantly more 
subjects constructed the FF instance as their initial falsifier in the abstract task than the 
thematic task (p < 0.01). These results argue strongly against the misinterpretation 
hypothesis and for a negatives processing deficit account of the anomalous results. This 
hypothesis is consistent with the hypothesis that misinterpretations are implicated in selec- 
tion tasks (cf. chapter 5), since in those tasks an information gaining eduction is also 
required. Concern, centres not on truth conditions but on the relations which govern the 
rules information gaining behaviour. 
In discussing Evans (1983b) it was suggested that a possible cause of the significant reduc- 
tion in the matching indices for the E-group was a shift to an even more clear cut adoption 
of a biconditional interpretation for all the rule forms. It was argued that when explicit 
negations are present on the cards this could lead subjects to adopt a simple perceptual 
matching strategy. Such a strategy would predict a generalised shift towards a biconditional 
interpretation from the abstract to the thematic task. More , FF verifiers and more FT 
falsifiers would be expected for all rules. The shifts in Evans (1983b) data would be 
expected to be small since even the I-group subjects seemed to be predominantly treating 
the conditional as equivalence. This was only the case for the if -gyp, q rule form in the 
present abstract experiment, so if a perceptual matching strategy were being adopted, then 
significant increases in FF verifiers and FT falsifiers would be expected for all rules. 
Qualitatively, it can be observed that there has been a general interpretational shift towards 
equivalence in the thematic version. For all rules more FT instances were constructed as 
false in the thematic variant than in the abstract variant and more FF instances were treated 
as true. However, it was only for negative antecedent rules that this shift resulted in 
changes in modal responses. Although the shift occurred for affirmative antecedent rules it 
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was not sufficiently pronounced to have this effect. With this in mind, the results of the 
quantitative comparisons were as follows. The McNemar test was used throughout, but 
where the sum of the change cell frequencies dropped below 10 (ie. expected cell fre- 
quency < 5), the Binomial test was used (cf. Siegel & Castellan, 1988: 79). For the if p, q 
rule form there were significantly more Ff verifiers in the thematic version than the abstract 
version (p = 0.02,1-tailed Binomial test). However, although there were more FT falsifiers 
in the thematic version this was not significant, as assessed by the Binomial test. For the if 
p. -ýq rule form there were again significantly more FF verifiers in the thematic version 
than the abstract version (p = 0.035,1-tailed Binomial test). However, although there were 
more FT falsifiers in the thematic version this was not significant, as assessed by the Bino- 
mial test. For the if -p, q rule form, a highly significant increase in FF verifiers for the 
thematic version over the abstract version was observed (p < 0.005, McNemar test). How- 
ever, there was a significant reduction in FT falsifiers for the thematic version (p = 0.02, 
1-tailed, Binomial test). For the if -p, -eq rule form a highly significant increase in FF 
verifiers was observed for the thematic version over the abstract version (p < 0.0005, 
McNemar test), a similar increase was observed for FT falsifiers but not as significantly (p 
< 0.05, McNemar test). 
There has been a general shift towards an equivalence interpretation. However, it is far 
more pronounced for the negative antecedent rules where it was predicted to occur on the 
basis of pragmatic context theory. Only two significant increases were- observed for 
affirmative antecedent rules. FF was constructed as a verifier more often in the thematic 
version than the abstract version for both rules, however neither represented the modal 
response for these rules and instances, so there has been no overall shift for the affirmative 
rules. This contrasts with the negative antecedent rules where the increases were highly 
significant for all instances in the predicted direction and each constituted the modal 
response for the instance FF or FT. All, that is, except for the FT falsifier in the if -+p. q 
rule form. Although this was the modal response in the thematic version, there were 
significantly more of these responses in the abstract version. This is solely due to the 
anomalous result in the abstract case which is under investigation. However, the direction 
of this result is inconsistent with a general shift across all rules as the result of a perceptual 
matching strategy, as is the whole pattern of these comparisons. If subjects were ' adopting 
this strategy, then the effects would be expected across the board and not selectively 
between rules. However, some perceptual matching may be present and could account for 
the increases on affirmative antecedent rules. 
The tests conducted for negative antecedent rules also function to confirm the hypothesis of 
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interpretational changes as a function of whether a taxonomic or non-taxonomic constraint 
is being described in the rule. However, although each result represented a shift in modal 
response it could still be the case that a significant reduction in the abstract modal response 
was not observed. Hence three further McNemar tests were conducted to ensure that the 
significant increases observed in the thematic results were accompanied by significant 
reductions in the modal responses observed in the abstract task. There were significantly 
less FF irrelevants in the thematic version than in the abstract version for the if -p, q rule 
form (p < 0.005, McNemar test). For the if -p, -, q rule form, significantly less FT 
irrelevants (p < 0.05) and significantly less FF falsifiers (p < 0.005) were observed in the 
thematic variant. Taken together these results are strongly supportive of an interpretational 
change between the abstract and thematic variants in accordance with the predictions of 
pragmatic context theory. Whether the rule expresses a taxonomic or non-taxonomic con- 
straint significantly affects subjects distribution of true/false/irrelevant constrictions and in 
the predicted directions. 
The misinterpretation hypothesis has been discounted as responsible for the anomalous 
abstract results and a simple perceptual matching strategy rejected as determining subjects 
changes in interpretations. Moreover, in both experiment 1 and experiment 2 there was a 
patent absence of results which would support the possibility that the explicit negations are 
simply alleviating response suppression in accordance with Evans (1983b). However, the 
possibility was tested for by making the same comparisons between matching indices car- 
ried out by Evans (1983b). The ANH was significantly lower for the thematic version than 
the abstract version (t = 2.64, p<0.01) in accordance with the release from response 
suppression hypothesis. However, although the CMI was lower on the thematic variant, it 
was not significantly lower (t = 0.826, n. s. ). 
Using Evans' (1983b) indices yields an equivocal result in the present data. However, the 
demonstrable presence of highly differentiated interpretational effects in these experiments 
renders the use of Evans' indices invalid since they are computed over the whole response 
record. Hence differences were tested for using the PMSs for each rule form. For the if p, 
q rule form, the PMS was larger for the thematic version than the abstract version, although 
not significantly (t = 1.165, n. s. ). For the if p, -, q rule form the PMS was again larger for 
the thematic version than the abstract version, this time significantly in a 1-tailed test (t = 2, 
p<0.05). This was in the opposite direction to that predicted by the release from response 
suppression hypothesis. For both negative antecedent rules the PMSs were lower for the 
thematic version but not significantly, if -p, q (t = 1.238, n. s. ) and if -, p, -eq (t = 1.100, 
n. s. ). 
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These results argue against the position that the inclusion of explicit negations functions to 
override an early processing linguistic heuristic. The data has clearly differentiated between 
negative antecedent and affirmative antecedent rules. The lower PMSs for the thematic ver- 
sion on negative antecedent rules seems to reflect the less equivocal interpretation available 
when appropriate thematic content is included. And the higher PMSs for affirmative 
antecedent rules seems to reflect the possibility that some pure matching is occurring. In 
general, the vast majority of the results obtained in these experiments are consistent with 
the interpretational effects predicted by pragmatic context theory. Only a small minority of 
the matching predictions were confirmed and where they were it was due to a failure to 
correct for other possible causes of irrelevant responding. 
Discussion 
These results offer strong support for the hypothesis of an interpretational effect determined 
by the nature of the relations asserted to exist between antecedent and consequent of a con- 
ditional and the way these relations interact with negation. The predictions of pragmatic 
context theory have been broadly confirmed for the construction tasks. The differences 
observed confirm that negation interacts in a different manner given different relations, ie. 
here class inclusion versus enablement/impediment. It appears this interaction differentially 
affects peoples ability to process negative information. 
There are three possible sources of the apparent discrepancy between Evans (1983b) and 
the present results. First, these experiments were construction not evaluation tasks. In an 
evaluation task a complete instances is presented to a subject in isolation from other possi- 
bilities. However, in a construction task the domain over which the implicit universal 
quantifier varies is before the subject in the card array, presenting the whole range of possi- 
bilities and crucially all the possible members of the relevant contrast classes. Moreover, 
having to construct an instance rather than evaluate it in isolation, will involve engaging 
higher level processes: the correct selection has to be drawn from a range of possibilities. 
Second, in the present experiment the negations were present on the cards in their morpho- 
logically abbreviated form in the thematic version, they were not explicit. However, they 
were also in this form in the rules. It is hard to assess any consequences of this change 
since in natural language the need to employ an explicit negation is minimal: natural 
language is replete with opposites, antonyms, dimensions of variation etc. Because the task 
materials mirrored the example provided by Evans (1983b) meant that the most felicitous 
expression was using the morphologically abbreviated form. Third, the possibility of 
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population variations must always be admitted. It has already been observed that Evans' 
(1983b) subjects predominantly treated the rules as biconditionals. Moreover, the CMI index 
was significantly lower in the present data for both abstract and thematic tasks than in 
Evans' (1983b). Perhaps Florida University students are more emphatic than Edinburgh 
University students, and more unwilling to believe the context may change after all and 
prove them wrong. 
The anomalous results obtained on the abstract version would appear to be unequivocally 
attributable to a processing deficit incurred due to the presence of negative components. 
Moreover, the specific locus of the processing deficit appears to lie with antecedent nega- 
tion when a class inclusion constitutes the appropriate interpretation of the relation 
described by the conditional. Pragmatic context theory argues that in the right contexts 
negations- serve to identify contrast classes. Given a negated constituent subjects must 
actively construct the contrast class either by accessing prior knowledge concerning the tax- 
onomies and relations in which that constituent participates or by direct appeal to the 
environmental context. The emphasis is on the fact that the contrast class needs to be con- 
structed. In the constructional process subjects must begin with the affirmative constituent 
and use it to access the appropriate contrast class. If the process proves difficult for any of 
a variety of reasons, this may cause subjects to abandon the constructive process and sim- 
ply match the affirmative constituent. Hence a constructional view of negation may not 
only explain the apparent processing deficit but also the albeit limited occurrence of match- 
ing in these experiments. A similar constructional complexity hypothesis underlies 
Johnson-Laird and Steedman's (1978; and Johnson-Lain!, 1983) account of errors in syl- 
logistic reasoning. 
It has often been observed that the abstract tasks are in fact more concrete than thematic 
tasks. In the latter subjects can integrate their interpretation of the rules with the appropriate 
semantic structures and relevant prior experience. However, it seems that, 
(7.4) "... the abstract tasks involve the mental manipulation of concrete objects - in the 
absence of - the semantic structures and relevant experience for understanding and 
relating the sentences as structural wholes. " (Evans & Lynch, 1973: 396) 
Subjects responses in the abstract construction task may be explained by allowing that the 
concrete presence of the array provides the environmental circumstances relative to which 
subjects attempt to construct the relevant contrast classes and subsequently establish the 
relationship between antecedent and consequent. 
A series of diagrams will be used, called Aberrant Constructive Venn diagrams (ACVs), to 
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reconstruct the processes involved in subjects reasoning. This has a different aim from 
Johnson-Laird's theory of mental models. He was concerned to provide a model which 
allowed logically pristine performance, but which admitted graded constructional complex- 
ity to combine with resource limitations to explain observable error patterns. In the present 
case the principle observation which coheres with rationality is that subjects interpret nega- 
tion in these contexts constructively. However, the way these processes interact with the 
concrete context provided by the card array may lead to systematic errors due to the pro- 
cess itself rather than resource limitation. Hence, the following account has far more lim- 
ited aims. It does not constitute a generalisable model of conditional reasoning. Rather it 
provides a task specific model of how the assertion of a particular relation, class inclusion, 
interacts with negation in a particular environmental context. 
The assertion of a class inclusion relation is counterintuitive in the context of the task. 
Treating the relation as class inclusion requires subjects to abstract away to card pairs. As 
Wason & Green (1984) have observed, in the standard selection task the relevant unifying 
objects are the cards. But because the rule focuses attention on the card sides subjects may 
treat the rule as disjoint. In which case class inclusion would be an inappropriate interpreta- 
tion of the implicit relation. Similar arguments apply here, but even more so, as the. card 
pairs do not actually form a concrete unified object. So, to get the correct interpretation, a 
rule like: 
(7.5) If there is a blue circle on the left, there is not a green diamond on the right. 
has to be interpreted as: 
(7.6) The set of card pairs with a blue circle on the left is included in the set of cards 
pairs where the card on the right has any colour/shape combination in the array 
other than a green diamond. 
The convoluted nature of this description serves to indicate the complexity of the task sub- 
jects confront. It is surprising, therefore, that apart from one or two processing errors, sub- 
jects manage rather well. 
Figures 7.1 to 7.4 show the arrays and ACVs for all rule forms. The constructive process 
subjects' must engage in to construct the contrast class is shown by the arrows indicating 
the process unfolding. The inclusion of the array is to show how its concrete presence is 
interacting with the interpretative process in order to construct the relevant contrast class 
and subsequently establish the appropriate relation of class inclusion between them. The 
array show the various cards: blue circle (BC), red diamond (RD), yellow square (YC), 
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Rule: If red circle left, green diamond right 
ARRAY ACV 
RS, BS, YS, GS, 
RC, BC, YC, GC, 






RS, GD BS, GD 
RC, GD BC, GD 
RT, GD BT, GD 












P' (2 -p'4 
r- q 
Ql 
Figure 7.1: ACV and Array for the if p, q rule form 
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RS, BS, YS, GS, 
RC, XX BC, YC, GC, 
RT, BT, YT, GT, 









Figure 7.2: ACV and Array for the if p, ^"q rule form 
green triangle (GT) etc. The slots beside each coloured shape indicates that the relation is 
asserted between card pairs. Subjects are therefore attempting to identify contrast classes 
and pair up cards appropriately. The fact that the slots are to the right of the coloured 
shape, should not be confused with the left/right instructions in the rules. The ACV serves 
to provide a more perspicuous account of why subjects construct the various true, false 
instances, and why they don't construct others. 
If p, q: (Figure 7.1) Subjects always begin by identifying the named items in the rules. 
This places two distinct set circles in the ACV. They then establish the relation between 
the named items by matching the consequent card to the slot in the antecedent card. The 
rule does preclude green diamonds being paired ' with other cards, nor other cards than 
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Rule: If not red circle left, green diamond right 
ARRAY ACV 
RS, BS, YS, GS, 
RC, 
_ 
BC, YC, GC, 






RS, BS, YS, GS, 
RC, BC, YC, GC, 
RT, BT, YT, GT, 







RS, GD BS, GD YS, GD GS, GD 
RC, XX BC, GD YC, GD GC, GD 
RT, GD BT, GD YT, GD GT, GD 
RD, GD BD, GD YD, GD GD, GD 
P Q' 
p -q 
Figure 7.3: ACV and Array for the if - p, q rule form 
either those explicitly mentioned being paired. The ACV, indicates that once these pairings 
have been made then a p, -q pair can not be constructed, and hence is false. The other 
pairings do not involve the p card and are therefore not constructed and hence are treated 
as irrelevant. The cross hatched area indicates the true assignments. 
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Rule: If not red circle left, not green diamond right 
ARRAY ACV 
RS, BS, YS, GS, 
RC, 
_ 
BC, YC, GC, 
RT, BT, YT, GT, 
RD, BD, YD, 
_ 
GD, 
RS, BS, YS, GS, 
RC, BC, YC, GC, 
RT, BT, YT, GT, 
RD, BD, YD, 
I 
GD, 
RS, xx BS, xx YS, xx GS, xx 
RC, YY BC, xx YC, xx GC, xx 
RT, xx BT, xx YT, xx GT, xx 










Figure 7.4: ACV and Array for the if - p, -q rule form 
If p, -, q: (Figure 7.2) Again the subjects begin with the named values. They must then 
construct the contrast class for the consequent. In a normal Venn diagram representation 
this would involve simply switching complement markers, and the same basic diagram as 
in Fig. 7.1 would result. However, the concrete presence of the array drives subjects' con- 
structive processes. And in the array the space of pairs which represents not green diamond 
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is the larger box in the lower array. p (RC) is in this space, and the appropriate relation is 
established by allowing any member within the larger box to be paired with RC. The XX 
functions as a variable in the diagram indicating that subjects believe anything in the larger 
box can be paired with RC. But equally items in the larger box minus RC can be paired 
with each other. This gives the pattern of true, false and irrelevants in the lower ACV. 
Only p4 can not be constructed. 
If -, p, q (Figure 7.3) Again subjects begin by identifying the named items. They must then 
construct the contrast class for the p card (RC), this is shown by the large box in the mid- 
dle array. Subjects then proceed to pair items. They take the rule to state that every item 
that is in the large box, --p, must be paired with q, the green diamond, which they proceed 
to do. But this means that the space of qs is now the same as the -cps. Subjects therefore 
assume that the only pairings for -, q must be with p (RC), this is again indicated using the 
XX variable. But once the space is divided up in this fashion then neither p, q nor -p, -, q 
pairs can be constructed. 
If -, p, -, q: (Figure 7.4) Once the named items have been located, the joint contrast classes 
must be identified. Subjects will probably do this in the antecedent-consequent order, but 
for reasons of space the constructive process for both is embodied in the middle array. The 
large box indicates the co-incidence of contrast classes. Each item in the large box can be 
paired with any other item in the large box, indicated by the variable XX. p can be paired 
with any item in the large box as can q, indicated by the variable YY. Once the space has 
been divided up in this way, then only the p, q pair can not be constructed, it is therefore 
treated as false. 
In conclusion, subjects error patterns are driven by the circumstantial features provided by 
the array and the requirement to constrict the relevant contrast classes. When thematic 
materials are used, which require subjects to apply a non-taxonomic interpretation of the 
linguistic expressions on the cards then the systematic error patterns observed for the 
abstract version disappear, subjects no longer have to exploit their environment in interpret- 
ing the negations. 
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7.4 Experiment 3: Abstract Selection Task 
Introduction 
This experiment was an abstract selection task (Evans & Lynch, 1973). The complete 
introduction is given in Chapt 6. 
Method 
Subjects 
The same 24 undergraduate psychology students from the University of Edinburgh served 
as subjects on this experiment as in Experiments 1 and 2. All subjects were tested individu- 
. ally on all conditions. 
Design 
Subjects were required to determine the truth or falsity of four conditional rules of the 
form: if p, q; if p, -, q; if -V, q; if -+p, -+q, as in Evans and Lynch (1973). Each subject 
was given a different one of the 4! permutations of presentation order of the rules. 
Task Materials 
Cards with various coloured shapes were used in the present experiment. A different pair of 
shapes and pair of colours was used for each of the four rules. Thus, the lexical materials 
were different for each rule form. The lexical material was varied randomly between rule 
forms. Each card had one shape on one side and the other shape on the other side; taking 
all colour-shape combinations yielded the four cards used for each rule. These materials 
were analogous to Wason's (1969) form group, where only two colours and shapes were 
used and subjects knew there was shape of each type on each card. Since Wason (1969) 
simply replicated the standard result (in his initial choice group) using the familiar, A. K, 
2,7 materials, if any of the predicted effects are observed this can only be attributed to the 
binary situation interacting with the context of the negations paradigm. An example rule is 
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shown below: 
(7.7) If there is not a yellow square on one side, then there is a blue triangle on the oth- 
er side. 
Procedure 
Each subject was given four of the double sided colours and shapes stimulus cards to look 
at and handle. Subjects were told to familiarise themselves with the cards but not to learn 
them. They were allowed to handle the cards for as long as they wanted (normally between 
20 and 30 secs. ). The cards were then placed in front of the subject in the appropriate 
orientation such that there was a p, a -p, aq and a -+q face uppermost, but randomly jux- 
taposed in a line. The subject was then given the following typed instructions and told to 
read them carefully: 
(7.8) You will be presented with arrays of four cards like the ones you have just seen 
and handled, naturally only one side of each card will be visible. Only two shapes 
will be involved in each problem and it can be assumed that each card has one 
shape on one side and the other shape on the other side. 
For each array, you will be given a rule which applies to certain combinations of 
the coloured shapes which appear on the cards. 
Your task is to indicate which card or cards you would have to turn over in order 
to test whether the rule is true or false. 
For each array and rule, I will simply ask you to point to the cards you think 
should be turned over, do not actually turn the cards over. 
You may take as long as like over the problems, once you have finished one you 
will be presented with the next. In this task there are four problems in all. 
If you have any questions, please ask them now and not after you have started the 
problems 
Subjects were then told that they could keep the instructions to refer to. The four rules 
were then presented one at a time on a typed sheet in the order of presentation assigned 
and from the set of materials assigned. 
Results 
It was argued in Chapt. 6 that when the selection task data is analysed exhaustively there 
are three levels of comparative analysis. Along with the overall results and a Reich and 
Ruth (1982) style score, the results will be reported by levels. 
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(i) Overall Results 
Table 7.15 shows the frequency with which subjects gave each logical case as being neces- 
sary to test for the truth or falsity of each rule. This table is in the standard format for 
presenting Evans negations paradigm data. It was argued in Chapt. 6 that simply present- 
ing the data by logical case obscured the more detailed levels of analysis which can be per- 
formed for verification and falsification when the data are presented by card case. Table 
7.16 shows the same data as table 7.15, but by card case. 
(ii) Reich & Ruth (1982) Scoring 
From Chapt. 6, it should be recalled that Reich & Ruth (1982) added the numbers of selec- 
tions where each strategy makes unique predictions to obtain a score indicating the popular- 
ity of each strategy. These were as follows: 
(1) Choice of -, q on #f p, q rule form = falsifying, 
(2) Choice of -, q on if p, -, q rule form = verifying, 
Table 7.15 
The frequency with which subjects gave each logical case as being necessary to 
test for the truth or falsity of each rule for the Abstract 
Selection task. 
Rule TA FA TC FC 
(i) If p, q 19 6 15 5 
(ii) If p, -, q 20 6 4 16 
(iii) If -, p, q 14 8 17 10 
(iv) If -, p, -, q 21 6 13 10 
Overall % 77 27 51 43 
Table 7.16 
The frequency with which subjects gave each card case as being necessary to 
test for the truth or falsity of each rule for the Abstract 
Selection task. 
Rule p -P 9 -+9 
(i)Ifp, q 19 6 15 5 
(ii) If p, -, q 20 6 16 4 
(iii) If -, p, q8 14 17 10 ' (iv) If -, p, -, q 6 21 10 13 
Overall % 55 49 60 33 
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(3) Choice of p on if p, q rule form = matching, 
(4) Choice of -, q on if -p, q rule form = falsifying, 
(5) Choice of p on if - p, -, q rule form = matching, 
(6) Choice of -eq on V--, p, -q rule form = verifying. 
The results of deriving similar scores for the present data indicated the following prefer- 
ences: 
(7.9). Verification (17) > Falsification (15) > Matching (14) 
This result accords neither with a similar analysis of Evans & Lynch (1973): 
(7.10) Falsification (18) = Matching (18) > Verification (9) 
Nor with the analysis of Reich & Ruth (1982): 
Abstract Matching (27) > Verification (16) > Falsification (13) 
Thematic: Verification (19) > Falsification (15) > Matching (4) 
Reasons for this discrepancy are discussed below. These analyses presents a descriptive feel 
for the pattern of results. In the following analyses the data are subject to inferential statist- 
ical analysis to further determine the nature of subjects strategies in the present experiment. 
(iii) Level I Analyses 
" Matching 
Keeping card case constant, matching predicts (i) more p card selections than -, p card 
selections (p > -p), and (ii) more q card selections than -, q card selections (-, q > q). 
Although prediction (i) was borne out (p: 53; -p: 47) this was far from significant (r = 8, N 
= 16, n. s., all results are one tailed sign tests). Prediction (ii) was significantly confirmed (r 
=4, N= 17, p<0.025). 
" Verification 
Keeping logical case constant, verification predicts (i) more TA selections than FA selec- 
tions (TA > FA), and (ii) more TC selections than FC selections (TC > FC). Prediction (i) 
was significantly confirmed (r = 1, N= 21, p<0.0005), however, although prediction (ii) 
was borne out (TC: 49; FC: 41) this was not significant (r = 6, N= 15, n. s. ). 
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" Falsification 
Keeping logical case constant, falsification makes the same antecedent prediction as 
verification, but predicts the exact opposite for the consequent cases, ie. FC > TC. As for 
verification, prediction (i) was borne out, but prediction (ii) went in the opposite direction. 
This is expected, since verification and falsification make mutually exclusive predictions for 
the consequent case and the verification prediction was borne out. 
At this level of analysis it would appear that subjects are verifying on the antecedent cards 
and matching on the consequent cards. Falsification appears ruled out because all conse- 
quent results go in the opposite direction to that predicted by this strategy. 
(iv) Level II 
" Matching 
The four level II matching bias predictions have already been introduced. For the abstract 
version, the prediction that there would be more TA selections for rules with affirmative 
antecedents than negative antecedents was borne out (p: 39; -p: 35), but far from 
significantly (r = 4, N= 10, ms. ). There were more FA selections for rules with negative 
antecedents than for those with affirmative antecedents (-p: 14; p: 12); but again this result 
fell well short of significance (r = -7, N= 14, ns. ). The two consequent predictions were 
both significantly confirmed. There were more TC selections for rules with affirmative con- 
sequents than negative consequents (r = 3, N= 17, p<0.01), and more FC selections for 
rules with negative consequents than affirmative consequents (r = 4, N= 16, p<0.05). 
" Verification 
The prediction that there would be more p card selections for rules with affirmative 
antecedents than negative antecedents was significantly confirmed (r = 1, N= 18, p< 
0.0005), as was the prediction that there would be more -'p card selections for rules with 
negative antecedents than affirmative- antecedents (r = 1, N= 19, p<0.0005). However, 
although both consequent predictions were borne out neither was significant: more q card 
selections on rules with affirmative consequents than those with negative consequents (q: 32; 
-, q: 26; r=4, N= 13, ns. ); more -, q card selections on rules with negative antecedents 
than affirmative antecedents (-iq: 17; q: 15; r=6, N= 14, ns. ). 
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" Falsification 
The antecedent predictions are the same as for verification. Since both consequent 
verification predictions were borne out, the consequent predictions made by falsification 
were disconfirmed. 
At this level of analysis, the level I summary is borne out but in more detail. Matching 
seems to predominate in the consequent cards and verification in the antecedent cards. 
(v) Level III 
The level III results for the abstract version are presented in table 7.17. The table shows the 
result of the relevant comparison and whether the predictions made by each of the three 
strategies was bom out ('1) or not (x) (see table 6.7, Chapt 6). Apart form (i) and (iii) these 
analyses represent the comparative analogues of the Reich & Ruth scores. At this third 
level of analysis it can be seen that subjects' performance profiles in fact belie the apparent 
evidence from the lower levels. By just carrying out level I and level II analyses, which is 
Table 7.17 
Level III results (by rule form) for each of Matching, Verification and 
Falsification in the Abstract Selection Task. 







P> -P (1) J J J (r = 3, N= 19, p<0.025) 
q>-, 4 (ii) J J x (r = 3, N= 16, p<0.05) 
u p> --v ( 1) J J J (r=2, N= 18, p<0.001) 
i 4>-, 4 ( v) J x J r=2, N= 16, < 0.005 
(v) >P x J J (r = 6, N= 18, ns. ) 
(vi) 4>- (J J x (r = 4, N= 15, n. s. 
(vii) -P >P x J J (r=2, N=20, p<0.0005) 
(viii) >4 x x r= 6, N= 13, n. s. 
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the norm in selection task research, the picture was developing of a mixed strategy of 
verification on antecedent cards and matching on consequent cards. However, when the 
predictions made by each strategy for antecedent and consequent cards are separated out by 
rule type, as in table 7.17 a different picture presents itself. Apart from the if p, -, q rule 
form all consequent predictions went in the direction predicted by verification. Two out of 
three of these predictions were also made by matching. None-the-less, these results do 
reveal that with one exception, even for the consequent cards a verification strategy may 
best summarise subjects overall performance. A way of further testing this is via the use of 
Pollard indices. 
(vi) Pollard indices 
Pollard indices were computed for these results (Pollard & Evans, 1987). The index is 
computed in a similar way to the matching indices employed in analysing the construction 
task data. It has only been used on affirmative selection tasks, where for the matching (or 
verifying index), the score is computed for each subject by assigning scores of +1 for ap 
or q card selection and a -1 for a -, p or -, q card selection. A falsification index can be 
computed similarly by scoring +1 for ap or -q selection and -1 for a --, p or q card selec- 
tion. This permits a score ranging between -2 and +2 to be computed for each subject 
allowing parametric analyses. However, the indices have one limitation, since they are not 
independent they can not be compared with each other. For a negations paradigm experi- 
ment, verification, matching and falsification indices (VI, MI and FI indices respectively) 
can be computed in similar fashion. Table 7.18 shows the relevant computations. Each 
column can be totalled to provide global VI, MI and FI indices ranging between +8 and -8. 
A positive index indicates the presence of the relevant strategy. 
VI had a mean of 2.417 and a standard deviation of 2.231. MI had a mean of 1.333 and 
Table 7.18 
Computing the MI. VI and Ff Indices 
Rule MI VI FT 
(i) If p, 9 P, Q - -, P, -, Q P. Q - -%P, -nQ P, -, Q --P, Q (ii) If p, -, Q P. Q - -P, -, Q P. -+Q - -1P. Q P. Q - P, -, Q (iii) If -vp, q P, Q - -, P, -, Q -+P, Q - P. -nQ -P. -+Q - P. Q (i) If -, p, -, 4 P, Q - -P, --Q -, P, -+Q - P, Q -P, Q - P, -, Q 
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standard deviation of 3.064. FI had a mean 1.667 and a standard deviation of 2.095. A 
highly significant majority of subjects produced positive indices for both VI (17 +, 1 -, p< 
0.0005, Binomial tests) and Fl (17 +, 2 -, p<0.0005). However, although the majority of 
subjects produced positive MIs, this was not significant (12 +, 6 -, p=0.119). 
These results confirm the summary of the results obtained at level III. The VI Index was 
higher than the other two indices indicating that verification best summarises subjects per- 
formance. A highly significant majority of subjects had positive VIs. However, a highly 
significant majority also had positive Fis indicating that falsification was also employed. 
Matching, although in evidence was not adopted by a significant majority of subjects. To 
test for whether the binary contrast class had any significant effect over standard versions 
of the task requires a standard abstract baseline result from which to compute the same 
indices for comparison. It was mentioned above that Reich & Ruth (1982) conducted two 
versions of the negations paradigm, one a replication of Manktelow & Evans (1979) using 
low thematic content. In this condition they simply replicated Manktelow & Evans' finding 
of no facilitation, ie. in this condition the standard abstract result was found. Reich & Ruth 
(1982) provide the raw data for this condition from which it was possible to compute the 
Pollard indices for a standard negations paradigm selection task result. 
In Reich & Ruth's (1982) results, VI had a mean of 1.082 and a standard deviation of 
2.360. MI had a mean of 2.5 and standard deviation of 3.830. FI had a mean 0.417 and a 
standard deviation of 2.532. A significant majority of subjects produced positive indices for 
both MI (18 +, 5 -, p=0.005, Binomial tests) and VI (14 +, 4 -, p=0.015). However, for 
FI the division between positive and negative indices was roughly equal (8 +, 7 -, p=0.5). 
As would be expected these results reveal a reversal in the numbers of subjects adopting 
each strategy. Comparing Reich & Ruth's results with the present results reveals the fol- 
lowing pattern. Although the MI was lower for the present experiments, this was not 
significant (independent samples t-test, t=1.14, n. s. ). This was largely due to the higher 
variances found for matching indices than for either FI or VI. Both the Fi and the VI were 
significantly higher in the present experiment than in Reich & Ruth's low thematic content 
condition (FI: t=1.97,46 df., p<0.05; VI: t=1.83,46 df., p<0.05), as predictecd. 
The only manipulation which was present in the present experiment and not in Reich & 
Ruth (1982) or other negations paradigm experiments was the provision of a binary contrast 
class. Given this simple manipulation subjects are now behaving on the task in the manner 
predicted by pragmatic context theory. The rule remained disjointly expressed, which means 
that each card was treated independently. On antecedent cards subjects turn those cards for 
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which an information gaining eduction is licensed, ie. the TA card. For the consequent 
cards the task changes to one where subjects are trying to explain what is on the other side. 
They tend to turn the TC card because the only operative constraint is given by the rule. 
However, for negative consequent rules, they turn the FC card because the ease of con- 
structing the contrast class in a binary situation evokes the realisation that the FC card is 
the only card which can be explained by the non-presence (if p, -q) eile form) or presence 
(if --p. -, q) of p. 
Matching predicts that subjects turn the FC card on negative consequent rules because they 
match the named values. However, this would not predict the crossover observed for TC 
and FC cards between the two negative consequent rules. For the if p, -q rule form sub- 
jects distribution of selection was TC: 4, FC: 16, but this was reversed for the if -, p, -, q rule 
form, TC: 13, FC: 10. Although it violates the independence assumptions of the test, the 
results of a Chi-square test indicated a significant crossover (x2 = 4.52,, 1 df., p<0.05). If 
subjects were simply matching named values this would not be predicted. However, if they 
were constructing the relevant contrast classes in a serial order then this would have been 
predicted. This will be described in the discussion. 
Discussion 
In arriving at the conclusion that they should turn the FC card for the if p. -+q rule form, 
subjects are constructing the contrast class described by the consequent negation. Figure 
7.5, indicates the processes involved. The boxes can be thought of as working memory and 
the content of the boxes as the changing contents of working memory as the various con- 
trast classes are constructed and de-constructed. Take the rule: if blue circle, then not red 
square. To identify the "not-red square", they construct the contrast class given by the sin- 
gleton set: blue square. This constructive process focuses attention on red square as the 
only thing which should not be found with a blue circle. Once the contrast class is con- 
structed then the rule states blue circles are only to be found with blue squares. Given the 
binary situation this renders obvious that a blue circle must not be on the other side of the 
red square. However, for the if p, -q rule form, things are slightly more complicated. 
Subjects begin by constructing the antecedent contrast class, by analogy with above rule 
they conswct red circle. They then construct the consequent contrast class, and realise that 
red square is the only coloured shape that can be found with the opposite of the contrast 
class they have just constructed. So a further operation must be performed, to get back to 
blue circle. The extra processing involved is responsible for the crossover observed in the 
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Figure 7.5: Constructive processes for negated 
ccnsequents, p= Blue Circle 
q= Red Square 
data. 
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7.5 Experiment 4: Thematic Selection Task 
Introduction 
This experiment was the same as Experiment 3 apart from the use of thematic materials. 
The complete introduction is given in Chapt 6. 
Method 
Subjects 
The same 24 undergraduate psychology students from the University of Edinburgh served 
as subjects on this experiment as in Experiments 1,2 and 3. All subjects were tested indivi- 
dually on all conditions. 
Design 
The design of this experiment was the same as Experiment 3. 
Task Materials 
The task materials were analogous to those used in Experiment 2, the thematic construction 
task. Exactly the same rules were used but in the present experiment the antecedent and 
consequent clauses were either side of the cards. Again this was to maintain homogeneity 
of lexical content between task types. Whether the boss wants to see me or whether I finish ýý Pýýý 
my work on time was stated on one side of each card, and whether I made it home in time 
for dinner was stated on the other side. All combinations, for the different rules, again 
yielded the four cards for each rule. 
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Procedure 
The procedure and typed instructions were the same as for Experiment 3, except for the use 
of the thematic stimulus cards and the following changes in the typed instructions for the 
first two paragraphs: 
(7.11) You will be presented with arrays of four cards like the ones you have just seen 
and handled, naturally only one side of each card will be visible. On one side of 
each card something that happens to me at the office is indicated, eg. I finish my 
work OR the boss doesn't want to see me, and on the other side it is indicated 
whether or not I make it home for dinner on time. 
For each array, you will be given a rule which applies to combinations of the 
events described on the cards. 
Subjects were then told that they could keep the instructions to refer to. The four rules 
were then presented one at a time on a typed sheet in the order of presentation assigned. 
Results 
It was argued in Chapt. 6 that when the selection task data is analysed exhaustively there 
are three levels of comparative analysis. Along with the overall results and a Reich and 
Ruth (1982) style score, the results will be reported by levels. 
(i) Overall Results 
Table 7.19 shows the frequency with which subjects gave each logical case as being neces- 
sary to test for the truth or falsity of each rule. This table is in the standard format for 
presenting Evans negations paradigm data. It was argued in Chapt. 6 that only presenting 
the data by logical case obscured the more detailed levels of analysis which can be per- 
formed for verification and falsification when the data are presented by card case. Table 
7.20 shows the same data as table 7.19, but by card case. 
(ii) Reich & Ruth (1982) Scoring 
The results of the same analysis carried out for Experiment 1, were: 
(7.12) Verification (25) > Matching (23) > Falsification (19) 
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Table 7.19 
The frequency with which subjects gave each logical case as being necessary to 
test for the truth or falsity of each rule for the Thematic 
Selection task. 
Rule TA FA TC FC 
(i)Ifp, q 19 6 14 10 
(ii) If p, -, q 18 7 14 9 
(iii) If -, p, q 16 12 8 9 
(iv) If -, p, -, q 16 11 11 10 
Overall %' 77 27 51 43 
Table 7.20 
The frequency with which subjects gave each card case as being necessary to 
test for the truth or falsity of each rule for the Abstract 
Selection task. 
Rule P -P q -'q 
(i) If p, q 19 6 14 10 
(ii) If p, -, q 18 79 14 
(iii) If -, p, q 12 16 8 Z3 
9 
(iv) If -+p. -, q 11 16 10 11 
Overall % 55 49 60 33 
This result does not accord with Reich and Ruth's (1982), "high thematic content" result: 
Thematic Verification (19) > Falsification (15) > Matching (4) 
Reasons for this discrepancy are discussed below. This score represents a descriptive 
analysis for the pattern of results. In the following analyses the data are subject to inferen- 
tial statistical analysis to further determine the nature of subjects strategies in the present 
experiment. 
(iii) Level I Analyses 
" Matching 
Keeping card case constant, matching predicts (i) more p card selections than -, p card 
selections (p > -, p), and (ii) more q card selections than -, q card selections (-+q > q). Pred- 
iction (i) was significantly confirmed (r = 1, N=9, p<0.025; all results are one tailed sign 
tests). However, prediction (ii) went in the other direction (q: 41; -, q: 44) albeit not 
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significantly (r = 4, N= 10, n. s. ) 
" Verification 
Keeping logical case constant, verification predicts (i) more TA selections than FA selec- 
tions (TA > FA), and (ii) more TC selections than FC selections (TC > FC). Prediction (i) 
was borne out (TA: 69; FC: 36) but not significantly (r = 6, N =19, n. s. ). Similarly for pred- 
iction (ii) (r = 5, N= 15, n. s. ). 
9 Falsification 
Keeping logical case constant, falsification makes the same antecedent prediction as 
verification, but predicts the exact opposite for the consequent cases, ie. FC > TC. As for 
verification, prediction (i) was borne out, but prediction (ii) went in the opposite direction. 
This is expected, since verification and falsification make mutually exclusive predictions for 
the consequent case and the verification prediction was borne out. 
At this level of analysis these results are not as clear cut as for the abstract data. The only 
significant result was for matching on the antecedent cards. However, both matching and 
falsification make predictions for the consequent cards which went in the opposite direction 
to that predicted. Whereas both verification predictions were borne out, albeit not 
significantly, which seems to tip the balance in favour of this strategy as best summarising 
subjects' performance. 
(iv) Level II 
" Matching 
The four level II matching bias predictions have already been introduced. The prediction 
that there would be more TA selections for rules with affirmative antecedents than negative 
antecedents was borne out (p: 37; -: 32), but far from significantly (r = 1. N=5, n. s. ). 
There were significantly more FA selections for rules with negative antecedents than for 
those with affirmative antecedents (r = 0, N=8, p<0.025). There were fewer TC selec- 
tions for rules with affirmative consequents than negative consequents (-, q: 25; q: 22) but not 
significantly. This is in the opposite direction to that predicted by matching. There were 




The prediction that there would be more p card selections for rules with affirmative 
antecedents than negative antecedents was confirmed (p: 37; -, p: 32) but not significantly. 
The prediction that there would be more -gyp card selections for rules with negative 
antecedents than affirmative antecedents was significantly confirmed (r = 3, N= 16, p< 
0.025). Although both consequent predictions were borne out neither was significant. 
" Falsification 
The antecedent predictions are the same as for verification. Since both consequent 
verification predictions were borne out, the consequent predictions made by falsification 
were disconfirmed. 
At this level of analysis, the same picture emerges as for the lower level. However, one of 
verification's antecedent predictions is now significantly confirmed. Both consequent predic- 
Lions for both matching and falsification went in the opposite direction. 
(v) Level III 
The level III results for the abstract version are presented in table 7.21. The table shows the 
result of the relevant comparison and whether the predictions made by each of the three 
strategies was born out ('1) or not (x) (see table 6.7, Chapt 6). At this more detailed level 
of analysis the expectation that verification best summarises subjects performance is borne 
out. It is only at this level that the responses which all strategies predict can be separated 
out. Despite the lack of significance it can be seen that only 1 (out of 6) of the predictions 




Level III results (by rule form) for each of Matching, Verification and 
Falsification in the Thematic Selection Task. 
Predietinn Recnlt Matching Verification Falsification 
P> -P (1) 
(r=4, N=21, p<0.01) 
(ii) 4> x (r = 8, N= 20, n. s. ) 
ui P>-P () J (r =4, N= 19, p<0.02) 
-+4>4 (iv) (r = 7, N= 19, n. s. ) 
x x 
(v) -'P >p x -i (r = 7, N= 18, n. s. ) 
(vi) >q x (r = 6, N= 13, n. s. ) 
(vii) -P >P x (r = 7, N= 19, n. s. ) 
(Viii) -q>4 x x (r = 8, N= 17, n. s. ) 
(vi) Pollard indices 
Pollard indices were again computed for the thematic version of the selection task. VI had 
a mean of 1.833 and a standard deviation of 4.14. MI had a mean of 1.333 and standard 
deviation of 2.091. F1 had a mean 1.667 and a standard deviation of 2.427. A significant 
majority of subjects produced positive indices for both VI (13 +, 4 -, p=0.025, Binomial 
tests) and FI (12 +, 3 -, p=0.018). However, although more subjects produced positive 
MIs than negative, this was not significant (7 +, 3 -, p=0.119). Comparing Reich & 
Ruth's results with the thematic results revealed the following pattern. MI was significantly 
lower for the thematic version (independent samples t-test, t=2.152,46 df., p<0.025). 
Both the FI and the VI were higher in the present thematic experiment than in Reich & 
Ruth's low thematic content condition, but not significantly (FT: t=1.336, n. s.; VI: t= 
0.756, n. s. ). 
In the thematic version matching has failed to account for a significant proportion of the 
data. These results replicate Reich and Ruth's finding that when appropriate thematic con- 
tent is available subjects tend to adopt the verificatory strategy licensed by pragmatic con- 
text theory. Given the non-taxonomic interpretation and the retention of the inductive struc- 
ture of the task this was to be expected. The principle difference made by appropriate 
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thematic content would appear to be a reduction in matching, rather than any, at least 
significant, increases in verification or falsification. " 
(vi) Between tasks analysis: selection tasks 
In general, the results on both abstract and thematic versions of the selection task revealed 
similar performance profiles. Verification best summarises subjects behaviour on both tasks. 
However, there were notable differences between tasks which are tied to subjects' different 
interpretations of the various rules as revealed in the construction tasks. 
No significant or otherwise noteworthy difference in the cards selected between abstract 
and thematic versions were observed for the if p, q rule form. For the if p. -, q rule foam, 
antecedent card selection frequencies were virtually the same. However, there was a 
significant crossover for the consequent cards. In the abstract version the q card was 
selected significantly more often than the -, q card (p < 0.005; cf. Table 7.15 (iv)). In the 
thematic version this was reversed but not significantly (cf. Table 7.18 (iv)). The 
differences in selection frequencies between tasks for these cards were significant. There 
were more q cards selected in the abstract version than the thematic version (p < 0.05, 
McNemar tests), and there were more -, q cards selected in the thematic version than in the 
abstract version (p < 0.01). 
For the if -, p, q rule form there were significantly more q cards selected in the abstract ver- 
sion than in the thematic version (p < 0.05). There were no significant differences in card 
selection frequencies for the if -p, -, q rule form. For the negative antecedent rules in gen- 
eral there were significantly more p card selections in the thematic version than in the 
abstract version (p < 0.05). 
Discussion 
In the abstract version of the selection tasks the binary situation has elicited the eductive 
behaviour which pragmatic context theory predicts. This is, however, not independent of 
the disjoint expression of the rule nor the difficulties with processing negations. The dis- 
joint rule expression elicits the predict and explain strategy licensed by the non-taxonomic 
interpretation. However, the binary situation evokes the realisation that the appearance of q 




Moreover, the failure to observe matching on the antecedent cards also argues strongly that 
it is the binary situation which has facilitated the appropriate strategies. The crossover 
between consequent card selections for negative antecedent rules argues against a matching 
interpretation of this result and for a processing deficit explanation incurred by the serial 
order in which subjects must construct the antecedent and consequent contrast classes for 
the if -gyp, -eq rule form. 
The principle differences between abstract and thematic task performance go in the direc- 
tions which could have been predicted from pragmatic context theory. For the if p, -+q rule 
form in the abstract version the binary situation has facilitated the realisation that q should 
not be found with ap on the other side. This focusing of attention is a form of matching 
but one which is elicited by attending to the semantic content of the rules, not a simple 
matching of named values. This was not observed for the thematic variant where no 
appropriate contrast classes are specified, rather the negation simply specifies the non- 
occurrence of the described event, hence the q events non-occurrence can be explained by 
the occurrence of the p event. 
The significant increase in p card selections for the negative antecedent rules in the 
thematic variant, combined with overall low levels of selections on the consequent cards, 
appears to be a function of (i) the XOR/biconditional interpretations elicited in the con- 
struction tasks. (ii) an unwillingness on behalf of the subject to turn all the cards. In accor- 
dance with pragmatic context theory, although subjects interpret the rule as 
XOR/equivalence in the construction tasks, this does not mean they should thereby select 
all the cards. Truth conditions and information conditions are different. However, it would 
appear that subjects have imported this interpretation into their selection task strategies. The 
significant increase in p card selections for the thematic version appears to indicate that 
subjects believe that they can predict from my finishing work to my being home. However, 
they also believe they can predict from my not finishing work to my not being home. This 
result is not wholly consistent with pragmatic context theory. But neither are they con- 
sistent with matching. 
The high number of p card selections also argues against a simple perceptual matching stra- 
tegy. Since explicit negations were present on'the cards in the thematic selection task as 
well as the thematic construction task, this strategy would have been available to subjects. 
This would have predicted more verification than matching in the thematic task than the 
abstract task. However, the results of comparing the Pollard indices for both tasks revealed 
no significant differences. All the indices were lower for the thematic version but not 
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significantly (VI: t=0.65, n. s.; MI: t=0.913, n. s.; Fl: t=0.529, n. s. ). This may be an 
effect of subjects confusion over the negative antecedent rules in the thematic task. How- 
ever, perhaps this is the wrong comparison to make, the present abstract selection task 
results were non-standard, since the binary situation has overridden the strategy adopted 
when the contrast class is less determinate. However, comparing the thematic results with 
Reich & Ruth's (1982) low thematic content condition revealed that the principle effect of 
the thematic materials used here (including the explicit negations) was a significant reduc- 
tion in matching without a correlative increase in verification or falsification levels. This 
argues against a perceptual matching strategy. The principle effect of the binary situation in 
the abstract task, contrasts with the effect of thematic materials. Rather than a decrease in 
matching, significant increases in verification and falsification were observed. This is con- 
sistent with the fact that a by-product of constructive negation is the possibility of match- 
ing, since subjects must begin the constructive process with the named value (cf. discus- 
sion, experiment 3). 
Summary 
In experiment 1, very few of the predictions made by matching were observed. Instead 
highly differentiated interpretational effects predominated. The clear distinction between the 
behaviour observed between affirmative and negative antecedents could not be explained by 
matching. The only plausible explanations for the anomalous results was either (i) a pro- 
cessing deficit produced by the negations, or (ii) a non-taxonomic rule mis-interpretation. 
However, experiment 2, discounted (ii). This experiment also demonstrated the predicted 
interpretational differences between taxonomic and non-taxonomic rules, while simultane- 
ously discounting a simple perceptual matching explanation. A model was provided for the 
constructive processes of contrast class formation which exploited the concrete presence of 
the array in the abstract task. 
In experiment 3, the use of binary contrast classes was shown to produce a marked facilita- 
tion of falsification and verification over abstract versions of the negations paradigm selec- 
tion task. The simultaneous increase in verification was consistent with the fact that the 
rules were still disjointly expressed, and so the predictive cycle strategy still applicable. 
Complementary effects were observed for the thematic version in experiment 4. Rather than 
an increase in falsification and verification a significant decrease in matching was observed. 
This argued against a simple perceptual matching explanation. However, it appeared that 
part of this result may be due to subjects importing their XOR/biconditional interpretations 
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of negative antecedent rules from the construction tasks. Nonetheless, highly differentiated 
interpretational effects were again observed which argues against matching, even in the 
selection task. 
In the next chapter the consequences of this research for causal modeling of the observed 
behaviour will be discussed after a summary of the principle conclusions. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions and Consequences 
8.1 Introduction , 
In this chapter the main findings of the thesis are summarised by way of a conclusion. In 
the following sections the consequences of this work are outlined. It will be argued that 
present theories of conditional reasoning, either based on pragmatic reasoning schema or 
mental models may be indistinguishable from approaches which assume a mental logic. It 
is then argued that the most eloquent argument against the doctrine of mental logic is the 
failure of logical attempts to capture the computation of context. Finally some speculations 
are offered on the nature of the cognitive architecture which may be able to capture the 
properties implicit in the conclusions. 
8.2 Conclusions 
The concept which has played a central role in providing a rational basis for the behaviour 
observed in human conditional reasoning is the distinction between the logical behaviour of 
the conditional and its eductive or information gaining behaviour. This contrast has been 
demonstrated to affect the manner in which people come to fixate conditional beliefs in the 
model of the predictive cycle. It was shown how this strategy not only accounts for the 
standard data on the task but also, once the appropriate action orienting interpretation is 
provided, how the same basic strategy is at work in the thematic facilitation results. Any 
organism needs to be able to predict its environment, and therefore acquire knowledge of 
the operative constraints in its ecological niche. The mechanisms by which an organism 
discovers those constraints are primarily bottom-up. The organism can either discover a 
constraint by enumerative procedures, or one-shot processes. Upon regular observation of a 
correlation between two events, the prior event will be taken as a good predictor of the 
subsequent event, be this in time or in order of discovery. This process leads to expecta- 
tions which if regularly fulfilled can be only due to the actual structure of the world. Only 
attunements to constraints which are appropriately grounded make the planning of effective 
and efficient action possible in the long inn. Particular salient experiences may also suggest 
constraints in a one-shot manner. Organisms who can be attributed with higher level cons- 
cious thought, may also acquire constraints via top-down processes. Repeated conscious 
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decisions can be sedimented into unconscious habits: top-down learning can be enumerative 
too. But, importantly, promises and moral obligations may provide the basis for attune- 
ments which are essentially one-shot. The justificatory procedure is the same in all cases 
however, use the constraint to predict your world. 
Within constraints the distinction between taxonomic and non-taxonomic constraints proved 
central. The basis of this distinction is grounded in the contrast between instances or single 
occurrences of an event possessing thus and so properties, and distinct occurrences being 
related by some higher order relation. Situation theory allowed the encoding of this distinc- 
tion, which again has been shown to provide a rational basis for subjects selection task 
behaviour. In the various COSTs it would appear that this is one of the primary factors 
responsible for the facilitation of falsißcatory responding. The other crucial factor being the 
closed domain assumption which is explicitly incorporated in these tasks. This assumption 
placed the facilitation observed in these versions of the selection task in a different category 
to the remaining data. It also questioned the actual falsificatory status of subjects responses, 
they could have been confirming in a surveyable domain. 
By relativising truth to situations, partial bits of the world like the books in Hacking's 
Borgesian library, situation theory simultaneously embodies the concept of partial interpre- 
tation. It has been shown how this concept is grounded in the basic context dependence of 
human reasoning. The constraints or laws which permit effective and efficient action are 
local. It was demonstrated how this conception of interpretation rendered the strategy of 
falsification unsound when based either on modus tollen or the semantics of the universal 
quantifier. The domains over which generalisations are stated constantly change in our 
uncertain world. The concept of partial interpretation was shown to provide a rational basis 
for the observation of defective truth tables in conditional reasoning experiments. And it 
was demonstrated that the force of this observation has been seriously underestimated in 
the psychological literature. Experiments were conducted which conclusively demonstrated 
that subjects behaviour is due to interpretational factors and not simple response bias, per- 
formance error, or shallow linguistic processes. - 
The observation of defective truth tables occurred in the context of negations paradigm 
work. It was shown how a constructive and essentially contextually bounded conception of 
how negation works which is at least implicit in situation theory, permits a rational founda- 
tion to be provided for some of the most recalcitrant data in the psychological literature on 
conditional reasoning. The ability to construct contrast classes was demonstrated to be 
influenced not only by peoples pre-existing taxonomic knowledge of the world as they 
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individuate it, but also crucially on the circumstantial features of a subjects environment. 
The context provided by the card array in the abstract construction class was shown to 
interact with subjects attempts to construct the relevant contrast classes in a manner which 
accounts for the systematic errors observed in the data. The circumstantial nature of sub- 
jects reasoning with negation is consistent with the conception of the circumstantial nature 
of human inference articulated in situation theory, (Barwise, 1987). 
With these empirically motivated considerations in mind, the two principle psychological 
theories which could account for subjects reasoning behaviour will looked at. These are 
mental models theory and pragmatic reasoning schema. However, other theories are avail- 
able, for example various schemes of mental logics exist (Braine, Rips etc. ). However, it 
will be argued that the problems which surround these other two theories also infect mental 
logics. 
8.3 Theories of conditional reasoning 
Neither mental models nor pragmatic reasoning schema constitute fully articulated theories 
of human conditional reasoning. No computational models exist capable of deriving similar 
inference patterns to those observed in conditional reasoning tasks. In this respect, prag- 
matic reasoning schema may be in better shape than mental models theory. Prima facie 
pragmatic reasoning schema make no appeal to any particular normative theory, in which 
case there are considerably more degrees of freedom available to extract an empirically 
valid model. Mental models on the other hand attempt to demonstrate how logically valid 
inferences are possible, while putting "error" down to performance factors. In Johnson- 
Laird's model of syllogistic reasoning (Johnson-Laird & Steedman, 1978; Johnson-Laird, 
1983) complexity of processing interacts with resource limitations on working memory to 
produce the observed error patterns. 
However, they both share a common characteristic: they may be indistinguishable from 
theories of mental logic. ' Let us look at pragmatic reasoning schema first. It was argued in 
chapter 5, that the production rules provided in Cheng & Holyoak (1985) were in an 
important sense, vacuous. The inclusion of modal terminology functioned to satisfy intui- 
tion but failed completely to provide a satisfactory explanatory account of mechanism. 
Unless the modal terms were provided with (i) a causal role in the overall production sys- 
tem architecture, or (ii) a denotational semantics, they serve no explanatory role. It was 
mentioned that the production rules could be provided with a semantics along the lines 
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suggested by Manktelow & Over (personal communication), within the framework of a 
deontic logic. This render's pragmatic reasoning schema indistinguishable from a mental 
deontic logic. However, pragmatic reasoning schemas are modular. That is they are not part 
of a monolithic inference regime. They are also context dependent, in the sense that they 
are accessed not by the particular rule interpretation but by context. However, this does 
not vitiate against their potentially logical status. It may be that rather than one metanl 
logic, people possess various mental logics, each accessed to mediate inference in the 
appropriate contexts. 
The appeal to production systems, say as opposed to a logic programming regime as the 
implementation of the theory, does'nothing to distinguish pragmatic reasoning schema from 
a mental logic. Mental logics have to be implemented too. And the way this is achieved in 
logic programming is to use a production system. The rule interpreter in PROLOG is a reso- 
lution theorem prover which operates over the Horn clause subset of logic (plus Skolemisa- 
tion to eliminate the quantifiers) which functions as the programming language in which the 
productions are framed (Hogger, 1984). 
Prima facie mental models appear to be distinct from mental logics. Operations are per- 
formed over a partial representation of the objects in the appropriate model. The objects are 
representative arbitrary exemplars of the models domain. However. to implement such a 
theory requires a notation in which to describe these exemplars. Johnson-Laird argues that 
it is important to distinguish between syntactic characterisation like mental logics and 
semantic characterisations like mental models. Johnson-Laird's notation is designed to pro- 
vide at least a sound system. In the syllogisms model, if the rules which permit the con- 
struction of the model and the subsequent operations over it are followed then valid conclu- 
sions follow. It is only when the complexity of the derivations this notation employs 
interacts with resource limitation that error becomes possible. This matching of particular 
data structure and process to the empirical complexity observed in human inference is no 
mean intellectual feat, but does it license the claim that the notation provided is not a logic? 
It may be incomplete: would this mean it is not a logic? Well most interesting logics are 
not complete. Any logic capable of expressing all the truths of Peano arithmetic for exam- 
ple, is not going to be complete (Godel, 1931) - at least if it is complete then it is 
demonstrably inconsistent (Enderton, 1972). There is a trade off between expressibility and 
completeness. 
There is a fundamental distinction between semantics and syntax. When a language is 
inductively defined, a recursive function maps those expressions in to the truth values 
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licensed by the model. Although, the notations which are used to describe both halves of 
the definition look very much the same it must always be remembered that the semantic 
half of the definition describes the model directly. Semantic procedures of proof like truth 
tables or semantic tableaux, operate on semantic principles, unlike purely syntactic pro- 
cedures like Hilbert or Gentzen style syntactic proof theories. However, they are equivalent. 
For example, in proving soundness and completeness results for monadic modal logic an 
equivalence is proved between an axiomatic treatment and semantic tableaux (cf. Hughs & 
Cresswell, 1968). If people were using one or the other need not be an empirical question. 
For example, there is no decision procedure for logical implication (1=) for polyadic first 
order logic. However, by exploiting the provable equivalence of the semantic concept of 
logical implication (1=) and deducibility (I-), polyadic first order logic is at least recursively 
enumerable. A decision can be reached in a large but finite amount of time as to the dedu- 
cibility of a statement but not as to whether it is not deducible. If subjects always drew 
valid conclusions, then this a priori result could be taken to indicate that people must be 
using syntactic procedures. 
However, the patent inability of subjecst to draw logically valid inferences in laboratory 
tasks indicates that this is an empirical question. Would general considerations of complex- 
ity enable a decision one way or the other concerning the kind of proof theory imple- 
mented, ie. whether it is based on semantic or syntactic principles? Looking to attempts to 
use logic as a knowledge representation language in Artificial Intelligence is instructive 
here. 
Artificial Intelligence has had a rather cyclical, she loves me, she loves me not, relationship 
with logic. In the late 60s there were many attempts to use logic in the form of general- 
purpose theorem provers as general problem solvers (Moore, 1982). A problem situation 
would be encoded as axioms in first order logic and the to-be-solved problem would be 
encoded as a theorem which was to be proved from the axioms. This was usually done 
using the resolution method (Robinson, 1965). However, it was found that, in the general 
case, the search space grew exponentially (or worse). This meant that only problems of 
moderate complexity could be solved in a reasonable time. This lead to the view in the Al 
community that the use of logic as a notation for knowledge representation would be hope- 
lessly inefficient, and therefore, should be abandoned. The apparent failure of the pro- 
gramme meant that many of the problems people routinely solve by drawing inferences 
from their common sense knowledge could not be represented this way and remain tract- 
able. This lead to a move away from logical formalisms during the 70s. This earlier period 
of Al research engendered an attitude towards logic which is summarised in a quote from 
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Alan Newell (1980; reported in Moore, 1982): 
(8.1) "- the role of logic [is] as a tool for the analysis of knowledge, not for reasoning 
by intelligent agents" 
Newell's statement implies that in analysing a representationaluinferential scheme research- 
ers are concerned to ensure that it has the properties guaranteed by a logical formalism. To 
be a representation of knowledge means a formalism must have a denotational semantics, it 
must make sense to ask whether or not the way the world is corresponds to what an 
expression claims. And indeed Al researchers are keen to provide just such a denotational 
semantics for whatever formalism they are using, be it, frames, conceptual dependencies, 
semantic networks etc. Whether or not a standard linear notation is used, if the concern is 
to provide a denotational semantics for a formalism, then one is engaged in doing logic 
(Moore, 1982). So, which ever way a researcher turns it would appear that he ends up 
doing something which looks like logic. 
The conclusion reached in this later period of applying logic to problems in Artificial Intel- 
ligence, was that more efficient ways of implementing logics had to be found: implementa- 
tions with complexity profiles which did not make such explosive demands on computa. 
tional resources. There are essentially two ways to achieve this. The first, exploited in PRO- 
LOG is to provide a more efficient control regime. The second is to employ different data 
structures other than the standard linear notation. The question of efficiency is a matter of 
complexity. Different data structures and different control regimes will produce different 
complexity profiles. If concern centres on matching the complexity of the implemented 
logic to the observed human data, then the right control regime and data structure are 
required. The data structures employed in mental models have been carefully selected to 
match the empirically observed complexity of drawing certain syllogistic inferences. But 
this does not imply (i) the notation is not a logic, nor (ii) even if by some other criteria 
mental models do not constitute a logic, this does not imply that the empirically observed 
complexity cannot be mimicked by a logic implemented using a novel data structure and/or 
control regime. 
This argument mirrors the representation vs process arguments of the last decade (Ander- 
son, 1978). Perhaps it could have been avoided if in mental models, "error" were not just a 
function of complexity, but rather of some other more deep seated adaptive function. On 
pragmatic context theory it is the computation of context which is the main determinant of 
subjects inferential behaviour. How this is achieved, and indeed whether a standard logic 
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regime can provide a tractable theory of contextualised inference will be looked at next. but 
not before offering some final comments on pragmatic reasoning schema and mental 
models. 
The data on conditional reasoning and especially Wason's selection task has been taken to 
argue that human reasoning is content dependent and therefore irrational (eg. Stich, 1985). 
It has been argued throughout this thesis that (i) in many instances the task is inductive, in 
which case it has been established at least since Goodman (1983, originally, 1954) that 
content is crucial; '(ii) the bulk of the adaptive inferential behaviour of human beings con- 
cerns eductive inference, which few would deny is context sensitive, and content dependent. 
Inferential behaviour which is so patently adaptive to the demands of a changing world can 
hardly be characterised as irrational. 
The locus of the problem appears to be with the form/content distinction. Once a sufficient 
grasp on a problem domain has been achieved to the extent that generalisations can be 
stated it would appear that a formal account will be forthcoming. Both pragmatic reasoning 
schema and mental models fall foul of this phenomenon. Once the apparently aberrant data 
is sufficiently organised, essentially formal characterisations are provided which will then 
be amenable to logical treatment This is most obvious in the current proliferation of logical 
systems. Linguistic phenomena like tense, modality etc. are being incorporated into formal 
logic. The boundary' between form and content is apparently flexible. However, will this 
equally apply to the computation of context? Prima facie the observation of contextual 
effects of the kind observed, described and appealed to in this thesis, are precisely in oppo- 
sition to the formalising tendency. Observations of contextual effects are precisely observa- 
tions of the inability to state overarching generalisations concerning the inferences subjects 
should draw. The question that will be addressed in the next section is could even these 
contextual phenomena be captured logically? 
8.4 The computation of context 
Within Artificial Intelligence there have been some attempts to deal with contextual 
phenomena via default inference schemes (Reiter, 1980). For example, Johnny believes 
that all the 1" pipes are threaded but on talking to his boss he knows that It does not hold 
for bends, it equally may not hold for non-standard lengths of pipe, the new pipes bought 
in from Japan, copper as opposed to steel pipes etc. All of these possibilities override the 
generalisation that all the 1" pipes are threaded. If a standard logical Implementation Is to 
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be provided all the various conditions that might override Johnny's rule must be explicitly 
encoded in a default rule and a check performed that none of them apply in any specific 
case. In the standard approach to default reasoning in knowledge representation the nega- 
tion as failure procedure achieves this. Each condition is encoded as a negated conjunct in 
the antecedent. Unfortunately there are sound reasons to suspect that default reasoning 
schemes along these lines are intractable. 
Most standard logical schemes are monotonic. For example, if Johnny infers that the pipe is 
threaded on discovering it is 1", then his inference is monotone if no additional premise 
can invalidate his conclusion. In non-monotonic reasoning premises can be added and con- 
clusions lost. For example, when Johnny learns that it is also a bend, he will no longer 
infer it is threaded. 
Attempts have been made to extend standard logic to incorporate non-monotonicity. The 
most notable example is Reiter (1980). who adds a metatheoretic M-operator to first order 
logic. 
(82) P&Mq ->q 
i. e. given p and the fact that q is not inconsistent with an agents current knowledge, q can 
be inferred. McDermott (1986) notes that there are two problems with this formulation and 
the fixed point semantics provided for the M operator. First, Reiter's logic is undecidable 
and radically intractable in practice. The problem of deciding whether a default rule applies 
comes down to consistency checking. When Johnny learns that the bends are not threaded 
he needs to revise his beliefs about pipes and bends. He has ensure that all his other beliefs 
are consistent with this new piece of knowledge. Consistency checks are a kind to NP hard 
satisfiability problem (cf. Horowitz & Sahni, 1979). McDermott calls this the "you can't 
know problem". Second, given the semantics for M the conclusions drawn are usually too 
weak. Quite often, although p is the conclusion desired, all that follows is pVq, where q 
is some arbitrary proposition. McDermott calls this the "you don't want to know problem". 
This technical problem need not decide against logical approaches to the computation of 
context. However, there are more general difficulties which beset any logical approach. 
There are indefinitely many conditions which may override Johnny's inference concerning 
the threadedness of 1". Indeed they can be invented at will, eg. the pipes arc not lead, 
brass, aluminium, the thread cutting device at the factory has not broken down, the pipe 
manufacturer has decided its to expensive to supply them ready threaded etc. These coun- 
tcrexamples are not merely rhetorical devices - they would in the right circumstances block 
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the inference. On a logical approach, it seems that each of these possibilities must be expli. 
citly encoded in the appropriate rule. To avoid an infinite list of default clauses a finite tax- 
onomy must be appealed too which captures the infinitude of specific cases. Perhaps the 1" 
pipes are unthreaded if they are of non-standard length, they have a foreign origin and so 
on. However, what counts as a non-standard length is relative to what rule is being con- 
sidered: 4 feet may be a non-standard length vis vis gas pipes, but not vis a vis water 
pipes. Foreign origin will vary dependent on the location of Johnny's place of employment. 
So it seems that the categories in our taxonomy must be rule relative - i. e. the precise 
sense of 'non-standard length, foreign etc. ' must be spelt out in detail in each rule. It is a 
considerable act of faith to believe that such specifications will be forthcoming. Default 
rules infect lexical inference as well as structural inference. 
Intractability problems with default logic suggest that logical attempts to compute context 
are unpromising. Further attempts could involve a heavy investment in modularity. How- 
ever, the basis for the modularisation would have to be along the lines of the rule relative 
taxonomies already discussed, which would make for modularisation on a scale which 
would ultimately prove vacuous. The level of the module may well have to be the indivi" 
dual rule! 
Intractability results concerning logical attempts to compute context argue more eloquently 
against mental logics than any of the proposals put forward by mental modellers. The 
observation of contextual effects in human inference per se does not argue against a logical 
treatement. It is the practical computational intractability of logical systems which attempt 
to capture contextual phenomena which legislates against mental logics. 
Attempts to provide theories of conditional reasoning are generally under-specified. The 
existing accounts seem to be characterisable in logical terms and hence fail with regard to 
the requirement to provide an account of the computation of context. In the next and con- 
cluding section of this thesis some speculations will be offered on the kind of general cog- 
nitive architecture which may at least cohere with the conclusions derivable for the main 
body of the thesis presented in section 8.2. 
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8.5 Implications for the human cognitive architecture 
It has already been established that a Classical cognitive architecture based on logical proof 
theoretic principles (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988) is unlikely to be able to compute contextual- 
ised inferences. The role of any cognitive architecture is the provision of appropriate data 
structures and an inference' regime. However, an inference regime which works on logical 
principles would appear an unpromising candidate for the architecture of cognition modulo 
the empirical data on conditional reasoning. Despite which, the general production system 
architecture may be appealed to. For example, Anderson's ACT* (1984), seems to embody 
many of the desirable characteristics indicated in the conclusion section. However, it is also 
the case that PDP (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986) systems appear to embody some of 
these requirements. The strategy of this section will, therefore be to briefly introduce the 
important features of each system and then to locate some of the various properties stated 
in the conclusions within these frameworks. The accounts will be highly general and specu- 
lative, the intention is to very broadly identify the kind of system which is most compatible 
with pragmatic context theory. 
Anderson's (1983) ACT* production system architecture consists of three basic memory 
systems: a working memory, a declarative memory and a production memory. Working 
memory contains the items upon which the system is currently working. It can retrieve 
from and store information in declarative memory which is a local semantic network. ie. 
each node corresponds to an individual concept. The locus of control in the system is given 
by the production memory. If the condition half of the production matches, fully or par- 
tially, the contents of working memory, then the action is loaded into working memory. 
The working memory is the recipient of encoded external input. and the initiator of action. 
The matching principles for the production memory are governed by three conflict resolu. 
tion heuristics. Partial matching is one of these, although the system is biased to prefer 
complete matches. 
Prima facie ACT* provides some interesting characteristics which are consistent with many 
of the requirements implicit in the conclusions. The general concept of the production 
memory is broadly in line with the concept of the eductive process when attuned to a con- 
straint. Many constraints may be operative at any one time and unlike logical systems 
where matches need to be perfect, conflict resolution procedures can allow partial matches. 
Moreover, particularly familiar or salient matches (production strength), or matches which 
are more specific, will prevail. One major weakness of the conditions in the productions, 
however, is that they are simply a conjunction of the relevant conditions, in much the same 
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way as a default rule is conjunction of negated conditions. This implies that similar prob- 
lems concerning the context dependence of human reasoning may infect ACT*. It is just 
not possible to encode all the relevant background conditions explicitly in the condition half 
of the condition/action pair. Another problem concerns the gradual processes involved in 
production learning. Although, in general, it must be conceded that the processes involved 
in acquiring an attunement to a constraint are enumerative and bottom-up, they can be one- 
shot, or top down and one-shot. Subsequent justification may well proceed slowly but it 
would seem that unless a constraint acquired via a one-shot process is given a very high 
production strength initially it will always be over taken in the conflict resolution process. 
However, further characteristics are desirable. The distinction between taxonomic and non- 
taxonomic constraints seems to be captured by the distinction between declarative memory 
and the production memory. Hierarchical taxonomic relations can be seen as part of the 
declarative memory, which encodes information about the properties of instances or the 
required constituents of a relation. The production memory embodies information concern- 
ing the higher level relations between discrete occurrences of events. Contextualised nega- 
tion could function as an operator in declarative memory accessing the concepts which are 
inhibited by the activation of the negated constituent. The principle limitation of ACT* 
would appear to be a deficiency akin to default logics concerning the ability to handle rich 
contextual information. Let us now look briefly at PDP systems. 
PDP systems consist of a large number of interconnected units or idealised neurons which 
are massively interconnected. The activation levels on each unit affect the units they are 
connected too mediated by the weights on the connections. They are essentially distributed 
in the sense that only patterns of activation over several units correspond to a conceptual 
unit. They "provide an efficient way of using parallel hardware to implement bcst"fit 
searches. " (Hinton, McClelland and Rumelhart 1986 p 80) 
(83) "One way of thinking about distributed memories is in terms of a very large set of 
plausible inference rules. Each active unit represents a 'microfeature' of an item, 
and the connection strengths stand for plausible 'microinferences' between micro. 
features. Any particular pattern of activity of the units will satisfy some of the mi. 
croinferences and violate others. A stable pattern of activity is one that violates the 
plausible microinferences less than any of the neighbouring patterns. " (ibid pp 80- 
81) 
It is contentious as to whether PDP systems constitute rival cognitive architectures or 
implementational theories (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988). My own view is that they are best 
considered as implementational theories which nonetheless play a central role in explaining 
the causal antecedents of cognitively mediated behaviour (cf. Chater & Oaksford, 
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forthcoming). And this is nowhere more so than in the area of how context affects human 
inferential processes. 
Hinton, McClelland and Rumelhart (1986) discuss a novel implementation of semantic nets 
in PDP hardware (originally in Hinton 1981) which characterises how an implementational 
theory along PDP lines may capture the context sensitivity of human inference: 
(8.4) "People are good at generalising newly acquired knowledge... If, for example, you 
learn that chimpanzees like onions you will probably raise your estimate of the 
probability that gorillas like onions. In a network that uses distributed representa- 
tions, this kind of generalization is automatic. The new knowledge about chimpan- 
zees is incorporated by modifying some of the connection strengths so as to alter 
the causal effects of the distributed pattern of activity that represents chimpanzees. 
The modifications automatically change the causal effects of all similar activity 
patterns. So if the representation of gorillas is a similar activity pattern over the 
same set of units, its causal effects will be changed in a similar way. " (p 82) 
The similarity metric used in automatic generalisation is induced by pattern similarity. This 
similarity metric need not be specified by the programmer (who antecedently knows which 
generalisations he wants to go through), but may itself be learnt by the network (Hinton 
1987). Notice that gorilla is given 'likes onions' as a default. Yet this default may be over- 
ridden by explicitly storing information to the contrary. Further the default eile may be 
overridden if 'gorilla' has a similar pattern to 'orangutan', whose representation does not 
include 'likes onions'. The similarity metric gives us plausible inference rules for free. and 
the autoassociative mechanism weighs up these various soft constraints to settle on the best 
fit interpretation. Soft constraints just are default rules - and soft constraints are the very 
fabric of PDP implementations. 
Three problems currently beset PDP systems. First, other than the basic dynamics of the 
settling process, ie, the best fit search, PDP models possess no intrinsic dynamics, le. no 
control regime. In ACT* the productions provide the locus of cognitive control, ie. treating 
each production as an attunement to a constraint, the control regime is what keeps working 
memory in synch with the world. The productions predict the environment. However, there 
are attempts to provide PDP systems with a more useful dynamics by encoding temporal 
dependencies (Elman, 1988). Second, and relatedly, PDP systems seem unable to encode 
structure. For example, the analytic relations between a relation and it constituents is not 
mediated by stochastic processes, it is a fact about our categorisation of the world which 
needs to be structurally embodied in the cognitive system. At the present time, apart from 
hand pardoning the network in to structural modules (Hinton, 1981), PDP systems cannot 
learn structural relations. Again the encoding of temporal dependencies has been suggested 
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as a way around this problem. Third, all learning in these systems is enumerative. How- 
ever, any adequate model of the cognitive system is going to have to allow one shot learn- 
ing. (PDP systems are not restricted to bottom up learning since it depends on where the 
inputs are coming from whether a particular system is performing a bottom up enumerative 
learning procedure or top down). 
In conclusion, a combination of the contextualising ability of PDP systems and the dynami- 
cäl and structural properties of ACT* would form a desirable combination. This suggests 
the possibility of employing hybrid systems which embody both sets of characteristics in 
modelling subjects inferential behaviour. Such a hybrid system would, moreover. be at least 
in the spirit of the dual process theory of Wason & Evans (1975). Contextualising PDP 
Type 1 processes would be responsible for the integration of knowledge sources which sub- 
sequently become available to higher level Type II processes, perhaps providing the default 
values to the constituents of higher level relations, which may then be subject to further 
higher level processing if required. If a workable dynamics were specified for PDP systems 
it could be speculated that only when a prediction fails or becomes otherwise salient will it 
become consciously available for further processing. Similarly the processes must be rever- 
sible, high level conscious decision making must be allowed to affect lower level processes. 
These possibilities for modelling along with continued testing of the empirical conse- 
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